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ABSTRACT
We have learned about democracies’ peaceful behaviour but we know relatively
little about why some democracies are more peaceful and use more soft power
instruments than others. I argue that contrary to competing theories that link soft power
use to budget size or institutions, it is the variation in the public’s social trust that drives
the variation in peaceful behaviour. Individual’s social trust toward peaceful foreign
policies are shaped by their core beliefs about trusting other people, which vary across
democracies. I argue that leader’s with more trusting populations will be more likely to
use soft power instruments becasue they can generate more public support for peacful
actions effectively.
My mixed method approach first statistically evaluated social trust’s role in the
selection of soft power actions relative to hard power actions using regression analyses of
fifty-one democratic countries over the time period of 1995-2010. My analysis revealed
that even though social trust is positively correlated with soft power use, it was not a
statistically significant indicator. The quantitative analysis pointed to the perception of
geopolitical threat. Using a most similar case design of Finland and New Zealand, my
qualitative analysis found that Finland uses high soft power due to the Russian
geopolitical threat. Further my crucial case design of the U.S found that in addition to
geopolitical threat, in the case of the U.S. the desire to be global leader is also a boosting
factor in its soft power use. These findings indicate that scholars should pay more
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attention to democracies’ geopolitical differences to understand their foreign policies and
more attention should be paid to understanding how and why country’s construct their
foreign policies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

My exploratory analysis revealed that there is a large variation among
democracies’ reliance of peaceful instruments such as soft power tools. Some countries
like Finland greatly favors soft power instruments over hard power tools as they use 92%
soft power instruments in their overall foreign interactions, while Australia only uses
62% soft power instruments (Trunkos 2017). Despite the fact that relying on soft power
has been widely noted in international relations, policy makers and academics alike are
currently unsure about what factors stimulate countries’ use of soft power tools. While
not all soft power tools are peaceful, the nature and the objective of soft power
interactions are generally considered cooperative (Nye 2011). A detailed investigation
and analysis of soft power can significantly improve the peaceful use of foreign policy
tools. In addition, there is an increasing criticism of relying on force and coercion which
often leads to instability and hate as opposed to cooperation among nations (Johnson
2000, Yalcinkaya and Ozer 2016).
In the past, the concept and use of soft power was closely associated with the
United States and its Cold War policies. But since the Cold War, many countries have
been utilizing their soft power options which have not been quantified before in a large
international scale. Using digital diplomacy and social media as a diplomatic tool (Sandre
2015) or relying on international social pressure by posting human trafficking
1

performance indicators of various countries (Kelley and Simmons 2013) are just a few of
the new ways to achieve foreign policy goals. Other compelling examples of a
government that uses soft power is the United States and their reliance on military soft
power in the form of officer exchanges (Atkinson 2014) or the cleaning efforts of the
U.S. Navy battleships after oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico (Elleman and Pain 2015).
Peace and cooperation is favored over war in most societies and yet there is not
enough information about why some democracies use more peaceful instruments such as
soft power tools than other democracies. Democracies have been identified and studied
since the works of Kant (1970) as a possible group of countries with more peaceful
foreign policies than non-democracies. Building on Kant’s work research has further
studied foreign policy differences between democracies and non-democracies (Maoz and
Abdoli 1989, Valentino et al. 2010) but their objective was not to study the variation
amongst democracies. Similarly to Stein (2015) I limited my research to democracies
because I wanted to understand the variation amongst them. Democracies spread out in
the world (Stein 2015) and they impact their region as well as the world. Previous
literature has shown that there is variation among democratic countries’ soft power
reliance (McClory 2017). In democracies the norms and values of the society can also
influence foreign policy via the democratic process and the democratic accountability
(Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1989, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995) and this
mechanism offers a great opportunity for my research to find out how much influence can
the variation of a specific value, namely trust play in democracies’ differences in their
soft power reliance.
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Despite the fact that soft power instruments are becoming more available and
easier to use, not every democracy uses them to the same degree. Some democracies such
as Sweden, Germany, France along with the United Kingdom and the United States
reportedly top the existing soft power world rankings (McClory 2017), while other
democracies such as Poland and Brazil barely succeed in ranking at the bottom of the list
(McClory 2017). I argue that the reason for such variation amongst democracies lies in
the differences in their society’s norms and values. Specifically, I theorize that
democracies with more trusting populations are more likely to support their leaders’ soft
power choices over hard power options and as a result trusting countries end up using
more soft power tools than their non-trusting counterparts. Trusting populations by
definition feel that others are generally benign, cooperative and honest (Brewer and
Steenberger 2002) which makes persuasion and not coercion the most cost-effective and
logical choice of interaction with other nations. I argue that trusting societies find the use
of soft power tools the most effective as their goal is to sway others into working together
with them as opposed to coercing them to do so. This thought process manifests itself
when the population supports their leader to prefer and select soft power instruments over
force when possible.
When explaining the domestic difference among democracies and their variances
in foreign policy outcomes, public opinion in recent literature has been identified as an
explanatory variable (Tomz and Weeks 2013, Stein 2015). When studying the choice of
using peaceful instruments or force, public preferences vary in different countries
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Feldman 1988) and attitudes towards peace have their roots
in individual core values (Jacoby 2006). While it has been noted that the public’s mood
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(Caspary 1970) impacts foreign policy. In the case of major events such as 9/11 in the
United States the mood can change but in general the basic core values of societies
remain consistent. Scholarship has also argued that democracies in general are more
equipped to settle disputes in a peaceful manner (Dixon et al. 1994); however, there is no
adequate information about the actual differences among democracies. My research is
important because by using public opinion it will provide clarity about societies’ impact
on their countries’ instrument selection patterns and it will provide further explanation of
why Norway and Finland rely mostly on soft power instruments while Ireland or Mexico
do not.
There are certain countries that consistently seem to advance more peaceful
solutions then other nations in the form of soft power use (McClory 2012, 2015, 2016,
2017). In recent PEW survey ten European democracies’ populations were asked if they
felt that relying too much on military force was counterproductive. The results of this poll
clearly show the variation within European nations regarding their attitudes towards
coercive versus peaceful solutions (Pew 2016a). The Netherlands (66%) and Germany
(64%) revealed the most concern about using force while Italy (39%) and Poland (30%)
scored the lowest regarding this matter. These domestic differences in core values and
attitudes towards peaceful interactions are the foundation of my research.
Competing theories explaining the variation of peacefulness have usually focused
on resources (Palmer and Morgan 2000, Chiba Machain and Reed 2012) or institutions
(Morgan and Campbell 1991, Clark and Nordstrom 2005). Resource-based theories argue
that governments use and prioritize their foreign policy instruments based on their
capabilities. Following this line of argument, rich countries would be more likely to use
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soft power than poor countries and the variation amongst democracies could be explained
by their variation in the resources such as GDP, military capability and budget. Resources
are definitely key factors in countries’ foreign policy decisions as they provide insight
into what countries have at their disposal, but they do not provide answers about the
differences in foreign policy decisions between countries with the same resources. This
suggests that normative examinations of the influencing factors are also warranted (Maoz
and Russett 1993). I believe the reason for this is that governments allocate their
resources based on their foreign policy goals (Palmer and Morgan 2011) which in
democracies are influenced by the population’s opinion. I argue that as a result, some
democracies such as Ireland will utilize coercive solutions while Switzerland will rely on
more soft power instruments. The interesting comparison here is that Ireland and
Switzerland have roughly the same resources and yet Switzerland relies on soft power
instruments more than Ireland (McClory 2017). Therefore, only looking at their resources
will not provide an adequate picture concerning their foreign policy preferences. I argue
that the variation in those countries’ attitudes regarding trust will complete our
understanding of their selections.
The other known theory concerning countries’ foreign policies points to
institutional differences. Based on this theory, institutional differences such as the timing
of elections, political competitiveness, the extent of political participation and the level of
legislative constraints on the executive all impact the foreign policy outcome. While
examining the institutional variation amongst democracies provides some answers
regarding the likelihood of peaceful behavior, they do not provide a clear explanation
about why peaceful solutions were chosen in some cases but not in others when the
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above-listed indicators are identical. Based on my theory, the reason for their failure is
the lack of inclusion of societies’ differences in their norms and values. I also concur with
Stein (2015) and Weeks (2014) that democratic institutional differences have proved to
be weak predictors of variation in nonviolent interactions because they have little
variance1. Using the same examples of Ireland and Switzerland again the commonly used
democratic institutional indicators such as Freedom House and Polity would rate these
two countries equally and would not provide explanation about the differences in the two
countries soft power use.
The variation in social trust on the other hand is able to provide a clearer
explanation about the variance of democracies and their use of soft power because their
political system is built on feedback from public opinion regarding government actions.
For instance, numerous polls have demonstrated the differences in trust level regarding
the Syrian refugees entering Europe. The polls clearly show the variation in trust among
European democracies as in Sweden (24%), Germany (31%) and the Netherlands (36%)
only a small percentage of the population feels threatened by the Syrian refugees while in
other countries such as Poland (73%), Greece (69%) and Hungary (69%) the percentages
are much higher (Pew 2016b). Building on this argument I will test the variation in trust
and its impact on the soft power use of democracies.

1 Institutional differences have been utilized much more successful in predicting the
behavior of non-democracies (Kinne and Marinov 2013; Pickering and Kisangani 2010;
Way and Weeks 2014; Weeks 2008, 2009, 2012). Large bodies of literature have focused
on domestic institutional constraints on non-democratic leaders’ decision to initiate
conflict (Morgan and Campbell 1991, Maoz and Russett 1993, Dixon 1994, Ray 1995,
Schultz 1999, Howell and Pevenhouse 2007).
6

First, I will study democracies’ peaceful foreign policies via their detailed soft power
actions. Soft power has been defined as the ability to achieve goals using persuasion and
attraction (Nye 2011). While not all soft power tools are peaceful in nature, I argue that
they represent policies that are based on the intention of strengthening relationships with
other nations. Soft power is a complex concept. Thus, for this study I disaggregate it into
measurable units in the form of diplomatic, economic and military instruments and
further divide each into resources and actions. The key contribution of my instrument
typology is that it separates soft power actions and resources and focuses my theory and
analysis on soft power actions. My approach using the individual soft power actions will
provide more information about the type of actions leaders are likely to take.
Secondly, I propose to explain the variation in democracies’ soft power use by the
differences in their social trust. Building on the role of core values from the literature on
public opinion formation (Chong 2000) and research on the relationship between trust
and peaceful foreign policy (Kydd 2005, McGillivray and Smith 2000) I hypothesize that
democratic leaders with more trusting populations will be more likely to rely on soft
power because they can generate public support for peaceful actions more effectively. In
order to study trust’s influence on democracies’ soft power reliance, I will use attitudes
regarding trust as a proxy for measuring the level of variation of trust amongst societies.
Then using mixed methodologies, I will first conduct a large N statistical analysis about
the frequency of democracies’ soft power use versus hard power use and then I will test
social trusts’ influence on such outcomes. Based on the results of the statistical analysis, I
will select case studies to further investigate the connection between public opinion and
soft power use.
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Once my analysis is complete, I expect to find that trusting populations will be
more likely to employ soft power instruments to achieve their foreign policy goals than
non-trusting societies. I will also have a better understanding of the variance of
democratic government’s frequency of turning to soft power instruments as well as their
reliance on hard power tools which will provide previously hidden information about the
fundamental values of those populations and as a result it will also provide indicators
about their future foreign policy choices.
1.2 GOALS OF PROJECT AND CHAPTER OUTLINE
In the following Chapter (Chapter 2), I will examine the literature on the
competing theories related to leaders’ foreign policy choices. I will also discuss the
under-utilization of public opinion in such models. In Chapter 3 I will clarify the concept
of soft power by creating four new concepts in the form of soft power actions, soft power
resources hard power actions and hard power resources. In the same chapter I will
develop my theory connecting public opinion and soft and hard power instruments
arguing that trusting populations’ leaders will rely on soft power instruments more than
those of less trusting nations.
In order to test my theory, I will use mixed methods including large N statistical
analyses and three case studies. Chapter 4 will explain my research design in detail.
Using a most similar case design I will closely examine Finland (Chapter 5) and New
Zealand because these two democracies have similar resources and institutions they vary
greatly in their leader’s selection of soft power relative to hard power. My most similar
case approach is designed to uncover the relationship between these two otherwise
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similar countries’ outcome variables (soft power actions) and alternative independent
variables (social trust values). Finland has a very high soft power percentage use while
New Zealand has one of the lowest reliance on soft power over hard power among
democracies. I will study how these two countries’ trust impacts the variation in their soft
power instrument selection. Finally, I will study the United States (Chapter 6) as it is a
hegemon that plays a leading role in the world as well as it provides an exceptional case
of a country that relies on high soft power and hard power actions. The in-depth
examination of these three cases’ will provide information about public opinion
previously not recovered in the statistical analysis and its connection with soft power and
hard power instrument choices. My research will conclude with my discussion of the
results in the conclusion and policy relevance chapter (Chapter 7).

9

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW OF SOFT POWER AND SOCIAL TRUST

Soft power instruments are not used equally amongst democracies. Publications
regarding the differences in governments’ soft power reliance have concluded that the top
soft power users are the Western countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States
and Germany along with France and the Nordic nations (McClory 2012, 2015, 2016,
2017, 2018). This means that based on the current literature other democracies such as
India, New Zealand, Czech Republic and Portugal are not using as much soft power as
the previously mentioned countries (McClory 2018). For example, McClory’s 2018 soft
power rankings gives the United Kingdom’s 80 points while Argentina only receives a 48
soft power score. This variation in democracies’ soft power achievements need further
explanations.
To better understand the reasons why some countries use more soft power than
others, I argue that we need to look into a new indicator that varies amongst democracies
and which is not the usual resource or institution-based explanatory variable. The
democratic peace literature pointed to democracies’ peaceful foreign policy patterns. This
is a great start to further examining democracies’ use of soft power and by testing a new
variable (social trust) this dissertation will offer answers about soft power policy
differences between democratic countries with similar resources or institutions.
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This review of the literature shows that the existing soft power literature has not
provided a clear definition of soft power, which also results in measurement problems. In
addition, scholars have not provided any predictors of soft power, which again, makes it
difficult to study why some countries use more soft power than others. I propose a new
conceptualization, a new measurement method as well a new explanatory variable to
compare democracies’ soft power use.
2.1 CONCEPT OF SOFT POWER
Soft power has been defined as the ability to achieve goals using persuasion and
attraction (Nye 2011). The key concept in Nye’s (2011) definition is attraction. Countries
can only wield more soft power if they are able to generate attraction. Attraction refers to
creating a positive magnetic affect (Nye 2011 p. 92). Soft power builds on this positive
attraction that sways others to behave in a preferable way. In terms of states’ behaviors,
Vuving (2009) suggests that there are three types of characteristics that lead to positive
attraction, namely benignity, competence and beauty. Benignity is an aspect of how an
agent relates to others. Benign act produces sympathy and credibility. Competence refers
to how and agent does things and it produces respect and admiration. Beauty is defined as
the perception of ideas, values and visions (Vuving, 2009)2. All these characteristics can
produce positive attraction, which adds to countries’ soft power.

2 The success of soft power depends on both the agent having one the listed qualities,
otherwise the given actions may produce indifference or dislike (Nye 2011). My
dissertation does not focus on the effectiveness or success of soft power use, only on the
amount of soft power use for comparison.
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Despite that the initial soft power definition (Nye 1990) has been around for
almost three decades, a fundamental conflict in soft power literature still exists regarding
a clear measurable definition of soft power and its instruments (Parmar and Cox 2010,
Naim 2013, Jain 2017, Doeser and Nisbett 2017, Gallarotti 2018). This issue leads to
further problems with measuring and categorizing foreign policy tools. Soft power
literature offers two conflicting conceptualizations; the earlier one is based on a
conceptual dichotomy of power instruments in the form of soft power and hard power
tools (Nye 1990, Yan 2007, Sun 2008, Li 2009, Jain 2017) and the later one is based on a
mixed-approach (Nye 2011, Gallarotti 2011) in which soft and hard power instruments
mix and interact. For example, soldiers rebuilding schools in a war zone would add to the
soldiers’ country’s soft power, according to the dichotomous approach via the benevolent
action of the solders, however, the mixed-approach would evaluate the same scenarios as
the rebuilding of the school counting for soft power, but the contradictions and harm
caused by the soldiers and the war taking away from such soft power.
The dichotomous approach is more focused on identifying the instruments and
actions and categorizing it as either hard or soft power. But the mixed-approach is more
interested in a deeper evaluation of the interaction and perception of the used instruments.
According to their framework, the foreign policy actions can weaken or strengthen each
other. The next section will review the conceptual development of soft power from the
early dichotomous approach to the later mixed-approach.

12

2.1.2 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SOFT POWER.
This literature review will show that the conceptualization of soft power has
changed some, but scholars still need to agree on the concept and on a clear measurement
of soft power. Without a clear conceptualization measurement is also problematic.
2.1.3 EARLY YEARS. THE DICHOTOMUS SCHOOL
The early works of Nye (1990) started a conversation about the dichotomous
understanding of power instruments. Many soft power publications use this
conceptualization of instruments (Yan 2007, Sun 2008; Li 2009, Jain 2017, Cobaugh
2017). The dichotomous school views power instruments as mutually exclusive. This
means that all power tools can be categorized as either a soft power or a hard power tool
(Nye 1990, Yan 2007, Sun 2008, Li 2009, Cobaugh 2017, Jain 2017). According to this
view, what matters is the ability to clearly place each tool into one or the other category.
It is important to note here that the dichotomous school does not argue that there is no
interaction between the soft and hard power tools, they merely create categories in which
foreign policy tools can be placed.
At the time when Nye (1990) introduced the concept of soft power into the power
literature, scholars were mostly concerned with the various aspects of power also known
as the faces of power debate. As a reaction to this literature, it was Nye’s (1990) work
that created the first conceptual separation of soft and hard power. Some of the soft
power scholars continued to work with the dichotomous understanding of power and
power instruments (Yan 2007; Sun 2008, Li 2009, Cobaugh 2017, Jain 2017). For
instance, while Nye (1990, 10) explained that as a result of Norway actively participating
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in peace talks in the Philippines, the Balkans, Colombia, Sri Lanka and the Middle East,
the country’s increased its soft power as other nations identified shared values with
Norway. On the other hand, an example of hard power from Nye’s (1990, 14) publication
explained that the U.S.’ War in Iraq in 2003 was categorized as a hard power action
because it was a coercive action that was perceived negatively outside of the U.S. In this
approach, the conceptual focus is on creating guidelines between soft and hard power
categories in order to be able to recognize, separate and apply them in foreign policy.
Another example from a more recent dichotomous conceptual approach is
Cobaugh’s (2017) work, who stresses the importance of using soft power to make hard
power more effective. His examples are concerned with current asymmetric conflicts as
he separates soft power instruments and hard power instruments (kinetic warfare).
Cobaugh (2017) specifically notes that a more effective and strategic use of soft power
tools in the form of communication/narrative about the current U.S. conflicts in the
Middle East would allow the U.S. to have more success in the region. This can only be
achieved if soft power instruments are recognized and strategically applied. His
dichotomous conceptualization of soft power and hard power (kinetic warfare) serves as
another example of scholars separating these power instruments, but it falls short on
providing a systematic typology of instruments outside of the military. As a result of the
mentioned efforts, the categorization of power instruments became somewhat clear but
all hard and soft power instruments were still not comprehensively and systematically
separated. Instead, what we see in the soft power literature is conceptual focus on only a
few soft power instruments such as culture, sports or education but no further
development of a complex typology of all soft power tools.
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The problem emerging from the dichotomous approach is the difficulty of
categorizing instruments that can be placed into both power categories. President
Trump’s social media posts for example, can sometimes be categorized as soft power
tools when he tweets about Easter at the Whitehouse, but it can also be categorized as a
hard power tool when it is coercive. For instance, when President Trump insulted the
North Korean leader by calling him “Rocket Man,” that was clearly a hard power action.
As this example shows, categorizing Tweeter as a foreign policy tool solely as a soft or
hard power instrument makes the general mistake of oversimplifying the usage of the
instrument. Another example is the role of economic instruments. Their classification
either as a hard or soft power wielding tool has been questioned from the beginning. Nye
(1990) initially placed all economic tools into the hard power category, and later started
noting that there are some economic tools such as humanitarian aid that wields soft power
(2011). As these examples show, soft power conceptualization would greatly benefit
from a more nuanced new typology in which soft power use is clearly separated from
hard power use.
2.1.4 LATER SCHOLARSHIP. THE MIXED-SCHOOL
With the mixed-conceptual approach scholars argue that there is a significant
interplay between soft and hard power instruments as some tools can play both roles
therefore, it is a mistake to separate them into either hard or soft power categories, but
instead they need to be conceptualized together. Wilson (2008), Nye’s later works (2011)
and Gallarotti’s (2011) article represent the mixed-conceptual approach. This school of
thought also produced concepts such as Nye’s (2011) smart power and Kounalakis and
Simonyi (2011) and Simonyi and Trunkos (2015) spectral power concepts. These newer
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conceptualizations of power instruments argue that the academic focus should not be on
the separation of power instruments, but instead the focus should be on the successful
combination and application of them.
One of the initial mixed approaches was laid out by Wilson (2008, 111) who
argued that the national interest was badly served by an imperfect dichotomous power
debate. Gallarotti (2011) also suggests that soft power should not be separated from
hard power as it may lead to mistakes when categorizing instruments. Instead, soft
power and hard power should be evaluated together as they reinforce and weaken each
other. After his initial dichotomous approach in 2011, Nye also proposed merging soft
power with hard power, which he called smart power. Nye (2011 p. xiv) defines smart
power as the ability to combine hard and soft power into an effective strategy.
According to Nye’s (2011) conceptualization, smart power was an intelligent
integration of diplomacy, defense, development, and other tools of hard and soft power.
This mixed concept recognizes that states use different forms of power at different
times to achieve the most appropriate goals. Another mixed approach was the spectral
power concept (Kounalakis and Simonyi 2011, Simonyi and Trunkos 2015) which
offered a visual and a conceptual model for the overlapping nature of power instruments
similarly to the other mixed approaches mentioned above.
Kounalakis and Simonyi (2011) and later Simonyi and Trunkos (2015) a
proposed a conceptualization using light as a metaphor to explain how some
instruments have both soft power and hard power qualities and instead of searching for
the cut points to decide where soft power ends and hard power begins, we should study
them as shades of light as colors can mix and create new colors. If a tool, for instance is
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hard power based on its appearance as well as based on its impact, the spectral power
conceptualization would categorize it as hard-hard power and assign the red color to it,
while soft-soft instruments would be blue color. Any tool that mixes these powers
would end up creating new colors such as orange for hard-soft instruments or green for
soft-hard tools (Simonyi and Trunkos 2015).
The mixed-conceptualization reveals the importance of the interaction and mutual
impact of such instruments in foreign policy, but it does not help with the clear
recognition of soft or hard power tools, in fact, it further confuses them. The mixedconceptualization also did not offer any operationalization methods by which any
measurable values could be attached to soft and hard power tools. This means that
Nye’s (2011) and Gallarotti’s (2011) points are important as they want to shed light on
the interactions of soft and hard power tools, they do not offer any measurement
methods to study such occurrence. While both scholars write about how hard power
actions can diminish soft power tools, other than a few case studies as examples they do
not provide any measurements that would allow scholars to test their implications on a
larger, international scale. Not only the current literature on soft power is not able to
compare all countries’ soft power use, but also, they do not focus on why some
countries seem to rely more on soft power instruments than others.
For example, while the mixed-approach presented by Gallarotti (2011) focuses
on powers enhancing or diminishing the other and to illustrate that, using the example
of a positive image bolstering national defense by gaining allies, he does not help to
categories actions of national defense (such as sending troops). Even more importantly,
as Gallarotti (2011) studies how soft power can enhance hard power instruments, he
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does not offer any ways to validate his claim. He does not develop his theory further to
offer an operational mechanism which could measure how much certain soft power
resources or actions can enhance hard power. Also, by recognizing that some
instruments can wield both soft and hard power, the mixed-approach does not offer a
way to identify these instruments. Instead, they argue that we should just focus on the
effective use of such combination of tools.
This conceptual debate points to a void in literature in addressing a clear
conceptualizations and typology of power instruments. The mixed-approach correctly
points to the overlap of soft and hard power instruments, but it fails to take the next step
to offer an operational solution separating them. On the other hand, the dichotomous
approach recognizes the need for conceptual separation but does not provide clear
guidelines to do so. A good approach must first clarify soft power instruments, then study
how and why countries’ use them.
2.2 MEASURING SOFT POWER
The second problem in soft power research has been the measurement of soft
power and its instruments. In this effort there are two lines of thoughts; one is comparing
countries soft power based on their resources (Nye 1990, 2011, McClory 2017, 2018) and
the other one is doing the same but based on states’ behaviors or actions (Li 2009, Zahran
and Ramos 2010). So far only the resource-based approach was able to produce
quantifiable results in the form of an international soft power ranking called Soft Power
30 (McClory 2018). This composite index of soft power was initially created in 2010 and
only included 26 countries. These countries were strategic partners of the United
Kingdom such as France, Germany, USA, Nordic countries, Brazil South Korea, Japan,
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Singapore and South Africa. It did not include the less important countries that may still
play an important role in soft power analysis such as Argentina, Portugal, New Zealand,
Ireland and Hungary. This initial soft power index included capability indicators from
business/innovation, culture, government, diplomacy and education (McClory 2010). In
other words, this comparison of 26 countries’ soft power was based on mostly (70%) on
governments’ capabilities and 30% of subjective elements collected from experts’ panels
from 20 countries that assessed countries international perception based on seven factors
including cuisine, culture, technology products and foreign policy (McClory 2010).
2.2.1 MEASURING SOFT POWER: THE RESOURCE-BASED APPROACH
McClory has continue to improve his soft power measurement and today, he
includes 30 countries in his index. This leading soft power ranking is still heavily relying
on countries’ soft power capabilities. According to this composite index, the listed 30
countries’ have the most soft power based on a mix of resources, policies and polling data
about the perception of the country abroad (McClory 2018). These capabilities include
countries’ institutions, economic and educational indicators, number of universities,
business and innovation indicators just to mention a few.
While the collection of countries’ soft power resources is achieved well, this
approach led to mismeasurement of countries’ soft powers the following way. Based on
these soft power capabilities such as the number of UNESCO World Heritage sites, the
countries are ranked without much attention to their foreign policy actions. For example,
Egypt has many cultural soft power resources in the form of monuments and museums
and yet it is not one of the leading soft power users in the world. If measurement relies
heavily on these soft power resources such as cultural heritage sites and does not consider
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government actions to estimate the country’s soft power use, it does not provide a valid
picture of the country’s foreign policy strategies.
Another example is when the United States is ranked high in soft power based on
its number of top universities in the world and its number of international students in the
country (McClory 2010), it becomes confusing as to what exactly adds to the soft power
of the United States. Is it the fact that the U.S. has good schools or is it the perception
held by international students that the American schools are superior and, thus, they
strive to attend these U.S. schools for their education? In addition, McClory (2012, 2015,
2016, 2017 and 2018) mixes government and private soft power initiatives and resources
which also makes it difficult to know what the governments’ soft power achievements are
and what are just a result of cultural heritages or private initiatives such as language
spoken, success in popular music and in high technology exports. In other words, while
McClory’s soft power ranking is a great accumulation of countries’ total soft power
resources (public and private), but it is not set up to tell us what governments do to
practice soft power3.
Finally, McClory’s (2018) latest research focuses on the top 30 soft power leaders
in the world which excludes many democracies that according to current literature are
new and emerging soft power users, such as Mexico (Saraiva 2014, 2016, Delano 2015,
Dinnie 2015). A larger sample of countries would be more useful to study global soft
power use to include all rising soft power countries as well.

3 (See Appendix B for comparison of my ranking and McClory’s ranking for the only
overlapping year: 2010).
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Another resource-based approach to study countries’ soft power use was
conducted through the federal annual budget where the programs could be identified as
soft power initiatives (Trunkos 2013). In order to study soft power spending in the U.S.,
budget information was collected from the Department of State’s and from the
Department of Defense’s various programs. The U.S.’s soft power budget was measured
with the combined budget of the 75 programs of the Department of State’s Foreign
Affairs initiatives such as the Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, the National
Endowment for Democracy and the United States Institute of Peace. From the
Department of Defense three temporary programs were counted as soft power programs
which were all Overseas Contingency Operations in various countries. While some of the
U.S.’ soft power commitment was correctly captured by this budget approach, this
method revealed two problems: 1) the annual allocation of the money to these soft power
programs did not actually mean that all of it was used; and 2) since the collection of soft
power programs and institutions has not been done for other countries, budget approach
could not be used to study a large number of countries’ soft power use.
2.2.3 MEASURING SOFT POWER: THE BEHAVIOUR-BASED APPROACH
A few soft power scholars have noted that what countries’ have at their disposal
does not necessarily lead to a correct estimation of their soft power or even to an
understanding of their foreign policy strategies (Li 2009, Zahran and Ramos 2010, Jain
2017). Instead, the focus should be on governments’ specific actions and policies
(behaviors), which will tell us much more about their intentions. This approach is labeled
as behavior-based because observation is centered on interactions and not resources. Soft
power resources, according to this approach are not the main determinants of soft power
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policies. Another important argument of the behavior-based approach is that governments
cannot easily and quickly create soft power resources, but they are able to use behaviors
that reinforce their existing soft power resources (Zahran and Ramos 2010). In other
words, the behavior-based approach brings up the issue of intentional soft power use and
their school of thought continues to conceptually develop such framework in order to
understand countries’ deliberate soft power reliance. Their focus is not so much the
measurement of soft power but instead the conceptual development of soft power
behaviors.
The behavior-based approach (Li 2009, Zahran and Ramos 2010) critiques the
resource-based approach by pointing out the problem of not having a clear theoretical
connection between resources and strategic actions. In other words, Li (2009) and Zahran
and Ramos (2010) argue that the resource-based measurement fails to address what
nations do with their capabilities to utilize their soft power. This means that they only
compare countries’ soft power wielding possessions but do not offer any explanations
about the strategic use of soft power instruments. While the behavior-based framework
recognizes this shortfall, they stop short of developing any measurements that could be
applied and tested as they remain theoretical. In order to resolve this problem, scholars
need to develop a method by which countries’ intentional soft power use can be studied.
2.3 DRIVING FORCES OF SOFT POWER USE
After discussing what soft power is and how we measure it, the next important
analytical question is which factors influence countries’ soft power use, specifically why
do some democratic countries use more soft power than others. As of now, the existing
soft power literature has not provided sufficient answers for this question. On the other
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hand, the conflict literature has been studying the peace-proneness behavior of
democracies. In this scholarship democracies have been identified and studied since the
works of Kant (1970) as a possible group of countries with more peaceful foreign policies
than non-democracies. Building on Kant’s work research have further studied foreign
policy differences between democracies and non-democracies (Maoz and Abdoli 1989,
Valentino et al. 2010). According to the democratic peace thesis, when compared with
non-democracies, democracies use more peaceful policies than non-democracies,
especially with other democracies (Babst 1972, Doyle 1986, Rummel 1983, Maoz and
Abdoli 1989, Russett 1993). This school of thought offered a way to understand
differences in countries’ peaceful foreign policy patterns which helped me identify a
group of countries that would be useful in studying soft power patterns. This group is the
democratic countries.
The literature on the democratic peace thesis offers good insight into democratic
countries’ foreign policy behaviors for two reasons. First, starting with the Kantian idea
of Republics (and not democracies) achieving a perpetual peace, it provides a theoretical
hint towards Republics behaving differently than other types of governments and that the
ultimate outcome is a peaceful behavior in international relations. Secondly, the Kantian
idea of a common cosmopolitan citizenship of these Republics also suggests an
underlying norm or value of the individuals within societies which is welcoming and
peace-seeking. Both theories are useful when trying to explain why some democracies
use more soft power than others.
Soft power use and peaceful foreign policies are not traditionally related concepts.
Because of its definition, while not all soft power actions are peaceful in nature, based on
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Nye’s (1990, 2011) concepts they represent interactions that seek to sway and create
long-term relationships and do not seek to coerce the other side. Since soft power
instruments are generally peaceful in nature and because the soft power literature did not
provide any answers about why some countries seem to use more soft power than others,
turning to the democratic peace literature can provide the missing explanations.
2.3.1 DRIVING FORCES OF SOFT POWER USE: INSTITUTIONS
The previous section showed that from the democratic peace literature we have
learned so far that democracies’ foreign policies might be more peaceful than nondemocracies’. When trying to explain this pattern, scholars have pointed to democratic
institutions. According to this literature, democratic institutions play a key role in
governments’ higher likelihood of selecting peaceful foreign policy instruments over
coercive ones (Morgan and Campbell 1991, Maoz and Russett 1993, Bueno de Mesqita et
al. 1999, Clark and Nordstrom 2005).
In order to explain democratic peacefulness, some of the literature pointed to
institutional constraint as the mechanism that results in democratic leaders’ peaceful
foreign policy choices (Morgan and Campbell 1991, Maoz and Russett 1993, Bueno de
Mesqita et al. 1999, Clark and Nordstrom 2005). Institutional constraint has a number of
manifestations within democracies and each of them is limiting or delaying the leader to
start a conflict. In democracies checks and balances allows each government branch to
limit the other branches’ power and the equally empowered institutions can slow things
down or even stop the conflict initiating process.
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The second constraint of democratic systems is the need for public debate of
issues (Maoz and Russett 1993, Morgan and Campbell 1991, Russett 1993). The open
public debate also makes it harder for democratic leaders to initiate conflict, because in
democracies the public is aware and is watching, and a supportive public opinion is
needed for the leader in the next election term. In addition, the high audience costs of an
unsuccessful war make democratic leaders select other options rather than jumping into
conflict. Democratic leaders can also send more credible threats and signal their foreign
policy actions to the enemy (Fearon 1994a, Schultz 1999) which is often also enough to
avoid conflict. Due to transparency and strong domestic audience in democracies, the
democratic leaders are less likely to back down from threats, which makes the leaders’
signaling more credible. This phenomenon is also the result of the democratically set up
institutions and government where the public influences that leaders by voting them in or
out. Finally, the impact of the large size of the winning coalition also contribute to
democratic leaders’ lower likelihood of using force in international relations (Bueno de
Mesqita et al. 1999).
In terms of studying countries’ soft power use, the mechanism of institutional
constraint provides an important theoretical piece as to how democratic leaders are
constrained by their constituencies and their political structures4 (See Figure 2.1). This
Figure shows the soft power use average for ten democracies with identical (highest)

4 Joshi, Maloy, Peterson (2015) offer a new insight into democratic institutions as they
created the Institutional Democracy Index (IDI) to better illustrate the elite and popular
democratic qualities of democracies. This great effort still does not provide institutional
answers to foreign policy peacefulness variation among countries with the same IDIs
such as UK, USA and Canada.
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institutional scores (Polity 4) for the selected time-period5. The soft power use data is my
recoded ICEWS events data that was recoded into soft power and hard power actions.
The soft power use percentage was created by the number of soft power actions divided
by the total number of actions per state per year. This means that soft power use
percentage shown on Figure 2.1 indicates each countries’ average soft power use for the
time frame of 1995-2010. The selected countries on Figure 2.1 all have an average of 10
democratic institutional scores (Polity 4).

10 Democracies' with the Same Polity Scores
Soft Power Use Avarage
ICEWS Data
(1995‐2010)
100%

95%

Slovenia, 94 %
Finland, 94 %
Norway, 91 %

90%

85%

Germany, 84 %

United States, 81 %
Canada, 74 %
United Kingdom, 74
%
Spain, 74 %

80%

75%

70%

New Zealand, 68 %
Australia, 65 %

65%

Figure 2.1 Ten Democracies’ Variation in their Soft Power Use Average over Total
Instrument Use 1995-2010

5 Soft power average was calculated by dividing the number of soft power actions with
the total number of hard and soft power actions for the years 1995-2010.
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As Figure 2.1 shows there is a significant variation in democracies’ soft power
use (from 94 % to 65 %) which is unexplained by their democracy (polity) scores. This
question is particularly important when trying to explain the soft power variation among
strong democracies such as Finland and New Zealand. Both countries are rated high in
terms of their political institutions and yet Finland uses 94% soft power in her
international interactions while New Zealand only uses 68%.
2.3.2 DRIVING FORCES OF COUNTRIES SOFT POWER USE: RESOURCES
Other competing theories explaining foreign policy choices have focused on resources
and argue that when it is time to select a foreign policy instrument the main influencing
factor for leaders is the amount of resources they have at their disposal (Palmer and
Morgan 2011, Clark, Nordstrom and Reed 2008, Chiba, Machain and Reed 2012).
Palmer and Morgan (2011) argues that all government actions use some kind of resources
(time, money, military personnel, security guarantees, diplomatic agreements, etc.) and in
foreign policy, countries decide what actions to take based on their expected benefits
when using such resources. In this view, countries are utility maximizers in their foreign
policies, and they are limited by their resources (Palmer and Morgan 2006). Clark,
Nordstrom and Reed (2008) along the same lines argue that foreign policy substitutions
are created due to resource limitations. Countries’ with large amount of resources will
also have a large selection of foreign policy choices but countries with low resources will
be limited to the more cost-effective policy choices. The limitation of this approach is
that it does not offer answers about countries’ variation in the foreign policy outcomes
with the same or similar resources. In other words, this approach does not explain why
rich countries such as Finland and New Zealand differ so much in their soft power usage.
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Another work that adds to the resource-based foreign policy explanations is Chiba,
Machain and Reed’s (2012) article, which provides useful data and theory about the
importance of resources when studying major and minor power countries’ and their
foreign policy actions. Their categorization of countries helps to identify the amount of
resources that they have but their study does not seek answers to questions about the
variation of individual democracies’ peaceful behaviors within the major or minor power
groups.
In order to find the leading indicators of high soft power reliance among
democracies, scholars need to turn to new explanations. We have seen that resources and
institutions only provide some answers about countries’ frequency of using peaceful
instruments, therefore my research examines another factor. As the previous sections
demonstrated, when trying to explain countries’ peaceful behavior in terms of the most
influential factors, scholars turn to either institutional explanations (democratic
institutions), or resource-based explanations (more resource more activity in conflict and
peace), but none of these explanations are able to provide answers to why are two
democracies with the same institutions and amount of resources would use soft power
instruments to a different degree.
The search for more answers leads to the normative explanations of leaders’
international behaviors because if two countries with the same capabilities and
democratic institutions still rely on soft power instruments to a different degree, then
there must be another explanation that needs to be explored. Also, if countries’ structural
variables seem to be identical, then soft power scholars’ attention needs to dig deeper into
the individual level differences. The most obvious differences among people in various

28

democratic countries are their core values. These values guide the public when making
decisions about issues such as foreign policy (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Meernik and
Ault 2001) and public opinion impacts the leader’s decision (Tomz and Weeks 2013,
Stein 2015).
2.3.4 DRIVING FORCE OF SOFT POWER: SOCIAL TRUST
In terms of the normative explanations offered by some of the scholars (Maoz and
Russett 1993, Chiba Machain and Reed 2012), we have learned that norms and values
vary among democracies. In addition, Morgan and Campbell (1991, 189) concluded that
democracies prefer negotiations over fighting due to their abhorrence of violence. But we
have also learned that while norms may play some role in democracies’ peaceful
behavior, according to sceptics, democracies abandon their normative commitment to
resolve their dispute peacefully when they are in conflict (Bueno De Mesquita, et al 2003,
221). One side of the normative argument argues that norms matter at all times under all
circumstances, while the skeptics view that norms do not play an important role in
foreign policy decisions while a country is in danger or in conflict.
The listed theories tried hard to find and measure democratic norms. Campbell
and Morgan (1991) found that democratic institutions do not fully explain democracies
peacefulness and pointed (without testing) towards political culture as a possible
explanation. Maoz and Russett (1993) looked at the length of political stability and the
number of death by domestic political violence to measure democratic norms, Chiba,
Machain and Reed (2012) created major and minor power cultures based on their
theorized threat sensitivity and argued that major powers are simply more likely to use
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force as they are more sensitive to other threatening changes than minor powers in the
international world.
While these variables provide some answers about the differences among
democracies, none of them include specific variables for individual level cultural norms
(collected from surveyed individuals) that would represent variation of people’s core
values. Instead, for instance in Chiba, Machain and Reed (2012) they use institutional
indicators and capabilities to group countries into major or minor power status and
theorize that the grouping also indicates a type of major or minor political culture.
Scholars have argued that countries major power culture makes them more war-prone
while countries from a minor power culture would be less war-prone (Ayoob 1991,
Machain and Reed 2012), but they have not looked into individual-level normative
variations within major and minor power cultures. We have seen that democratic
institutions do not vary enough to provide strong predictions (Stein 2015) therefore, soft
power research needs to dig deeper into individuals’ values and study how the core
values impact the elected official’s foreign policy decisions.
While there are numerous norms and values, comparative politics and
international relations scholars have been consistently pointing to the importance of
individuals’ social trust (Coleman 1990, Putnam 1993, 2000, Fukuyama 1995, Landes
1998, La Porta et al 1999, Chong 2000, Brewer and Steenbergen 2002, Brewer et al
2005) and its impact on various political outcomes. Fukuyama (1995, 26) defines social
trust as “the expectation of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on
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commonly shared norms6. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the variation of social trust among
democracies. Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of people who said “most people can be
trusted” for each selected country (data was collected from the World Value Survey for
the time-period of 1995-2010) (See Appendix B). Figure 2.2 also shows that the range of
the average social trust of 44 democracies is from 69 % in Norway to 26 % in Spain.

10 Democracies Social Trust Percentage Avarage
1995‐2010
WVS data
Norway, 69 %
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%

Finland, 54 %

New Zealand, 48 %
Australia, 45%
Canada, 38 %

45%

Japan, 38 %
United States, 36 %

40%

Germany, 32 %

35%

United Kingdom, 29 %

30%

Spain, 26 %

25%

Figure 2.2 Ten Democracies’ Social Trust Percentage Average for 1995-2010 (WVS
data)
In international relations social trust as an explanatory variable has generally been
studied to explain cooperation, which is why it might also play an important role in
peaceful foreign policy actions which also include soft power actions. One side argues
that social trust is necessary for cooperation (Kydd 2005, McGillivray and Smith 2000)

6 Fukuyama (1995) defines trust among people in the same community. I believe that this
definition is also applicable to defining trust with people outside of the community.
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and the other side concludes that social trust as an explanatory variable is not strong
enough to explain cooperative behavior (Cook, Hardin and Levi 2005). The cooperation
scholars pointed to the importance of social trust in international relations, but their
game-theoretical models only provide a dichotomy of trust (or lack of trust). While the
debate about the importance of social trust in the study of foreign policy has not been
settled, a wide variety of empirical studies has shown social trust’s positive effect on
political outcomes. For example, Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) and Knack and Zak
(2001) showed that social trust is positively correlated with economic growth and more
open economic policies (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). In addition, Justwan (2014) found
empirical evidence that social trust is a significant explanatory variable in the crossnational variation of alien voting rights. Fukuyama (1995) argued that social trust is the
key factor in countries’ well-being and their ability to compete. Based on these works
pointing to social trust’s importance, this dissertation will add to the social trust literature
linking it with soft power use.
2.4 CONCLUSION
This literature review pointed to two main issues in soft power research. The first
one is the unclear and unmeasurable concept of soft power and the second one is the lack
of research about the explanatory variables of countries’ soft power use. In other words,
we do not know exactly what soft power is, and why some democratic countries use it
more than others.
Literature in international relations offers institutional and resource-based
explanations as to why countries use different foreign policies. The institutional
explanations held that in democracies’ institutions impact the leaders’ choices, but they
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do not tell us enough about democracies with the same types of institutions. The resource
based- explanation concluded that rich countries will be more active than poor ones, but
again, we did not learn enough about countries with similar amount of resources. The
normative theories pointed to societies’ core values to better understand the differences in
their countries’ political outcomes. The core value that stood out from this literature was
social trust.
It has been clearly noted that some societies are more trusting than others and also
that some countries use more soft power instruments, therefore I argue that the next
theoretical and analytical step should be to study countries’ social trust values and its
impact on their soft power use. Since other scholars have not done this, my dissertation
will be the first to study the relationship between social trust and soft power reliance. By
bringing together the variation of social trust with countries’ soft power use patterns, I am
able to test if democratic leaders with more trusting populations select more soft power
instruments than those with less trusting citizens. This is an important question when we
are trying to understand democratic countries’ foreign policies. As of now, previous
literature has not looked into social trust as a possible explanatory variable when studying
soft power use. Therefore, if this cultural variable is found significant, my dissertation
will be able to provide a normative explanation to countries’ behaviors. This is
particularly important when we are trying to understand the different behaviors of
otherwise similar democratic countries.
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CHAPTER 3
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THEORY
The literature review revealed two main issues in soft power research. First, due
to fundamental conceptual and operational issues, there is still no concrete way to
measure countries’ soft power use. In addition, scholars have not focused on what factors
lead to more soft power use. Therefore, in this chapter I offer my new conceptualization
of soft power and describe my foreign policy instrument classification that includes a soft
power category. Further, I turn to a previously unexamined factor that may explain
democracies’ variation of soft power use. This factor is social trust. I will argue that the
level of social trust will be a good indicator of democracies’ soft power use.
3.1 A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF SOFT POWER
3.1.1 AGENT
A good concept of soft power should recognize several key distinctions regarding
resources and actions of policy instruments, and should clearly imply who the agents are.
Before I move on to my conceptual separation of power instruments, the agent problem
needs to be clarified. While Nye (1990, 2004, 2011) seems to refer to state actors in his
works, his definition of soft power does not include a specific agent. In order to improve
upon that, I build on Nye’s (2011) definition of soft power (See Intro) and I specify the
actor as the government. While it has been noted before that governments do not have
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full control over their soft power (Zahran and Ramos 2010) as there are private actors as
well as non-government agents creating and using soft power, my dissertation will just
focus on governments’ explicit soft power and hard power actions. This way, I am able to
directly evaluate and compare various governments’ soft and hard power activities and I
will leave the remaining agents for future research.
3.1.2 ATTRIBUTES OF SOFT POWER: SOFT POWER ACTIONS AND
RESOURCES
In order to clarify the term soft power, I am building on Nye’s (2011) definition
and adding two new concepts in the form of soft power actions and hard power actions.
My two main reasons for clarifying Nye’s (2011) soft power concept are: 1) soft power
resources are often difficult to identify and measure, and 2) while many states have soft
power resources, only the use of these resources can influence foreign policy, therefore it
is the actions that matter.
The foundation of my approach is behavior-based which means this study will
focus on governments’ actions in order to understand their strategies. To be able to study
only governments’ soft power actions, I had to adjust the definition of soft power and
conceptually define and separate soft power resources from soft power actions in the
following way:
Soft power resources are a country’s national possessions that can be employed to make
the country attractive abroad.
These possessions include both private and government properties such as
facilities, institutions, language, music, values, money, artistic and athletic talent as well
as food, innovation and educational institutions in addition to navy ships and military
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personnel. As my definition above states, countries can employ their resources to achieve
their goals, however, they may elect not do so. These soft power resources therefore are
any possessions that add to the positive perception of the country. This of course as Nye
(2011) have discussed it includes both tangible and non-tangible items such as a
country’s popular dishes as well as its norms and values. Naturally, some of these items
are privately owned such as Hollywood movies and Disney World but this does not stop
the government from trying to use it for its benefits. (Example: The U.S State Department
allowing basketball star Dennis Rodman to meet with the North Korean leader, which
encounter was not previously achieved by any of the American diplomats for a long
time.)
I argue that only when scholars are able to clearly distinguish a country’s foreign
policy actions from its resources can they successfully classify and measure such choices.
Until this point, this separation has not been achieved. My new conceptualization of soft
power therefore, is crucial for future research. My study builds on governments’
intentional foreign policy interactions. To be able to isolate them, I created the following
definition:
soft power actions are a government’s activities undertaken to increase its national
attractiveness abroad.
While it has been noted that governments do not have full control over all of the
country’s soft power resources, they have full control over their own actions. Examples
of soft power actions are engaging in a symbolic act, expressing an intent to cooperate,
engaging in negotiations or making a visit.
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Following the behavior-based dichotomous framework of soft power
conceptualization, I argue that hard power resources should also be separated from hard
power actions when analyzing foreign policy outcomes. A country's hard power
resources such as military size, number of military personnel or nuclear arsenal tells us
about their capabilities but does not provide enough information about the actual use of
such hard power instruments. Hard power actions are steps that governments take in
order to force the other side to do something they otherwise would not have done.
Examples of hard power actions are declaring war, posing economic sanctions or
threatening to withdraw financial aid7. I argue that studying hard power actions will allow
a deeper understanding of a government's foreign policy instrument selection. Based on
this, my two other subcategories and their definitions are:
hard power resources are a country’s possessions that can be used to force another state
to do what it otherwise would not do. And my definition for hard power actions is:
hard power actions are a government’s activities to force another state to do what it
otherwise would not do.
By creating these four new conceptual categories, two for soft power and two for
hard power, I am able to better categorize countries’ soft power (and hard power)
behavior and able to systematically analyze and compare them. I argue that the reason
why these new concepts are necessary is because previously used dichotomous
conceptualizations of soft power (Nye 1990, 2011, Nau 2005, Sun 2008, Jain 2017,
McClory 2017) viewed soft power as both the resources of the executing state and its

7 My study treats governments’ threatening actions the same as if they completed the
action. These are all code as hard power actions because they coerce the receiving state.
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influence on the receiving state. Even though recent scholarship has found that certain
countries have more soft power resources than others (McClory 2012, 2017), this type of
component index mixed up countries’ soft power resources and actions in a way that
made it impossible to separate them. This is an important conceptual and methodological
problem that leads to confusing results and I argue that it does not provide adequate
analysis about countries’ soft power policies.
For example, while McClory (2017) has found that the United States, the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, and the Nordic states are the leaders of his soft
power index. According to McClory (2017) this outcome is measuring countries soft
power resources but looking deeper into the factors he is using it becomes apparent that
he included policy outcomes as well. Stating differently, when mixing previously
established soft power resources such as number of universities with new policies such as
changes in visa regulations, we are adding previously already measured soft power
contributions to the countries’ current policies and we are not measuring any policy
changes that may have occurred. If we know, for instance that the United States is
restricting visa regulations in 2017 and limiting its diplomatic outreach with its former
allies, this change must show up in our soft power measurement more than just one
ranking spot decline. Previous studies were unable to capture such policy changes in their
measurement.
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Governments’ International Actions

Soft
Power
Resources

Soft Power Actions

Hard Power Actions

Hard
Power
Resources

Soft Power Actions Hard Power Actions

Figure 3.1 Conceptual Overlap of Soft and Hard Power Resources and Separation of Soft
and Hard Power Actions
The creation and separation of soft and hard power resources and actions provide
scholars a new analytical approach that makes it possible to assess a country’s foreign
policy strategies especially since many resources can be used for both soft and hard
power actions (Figure 3.1). Based on this logic my conceptualization helps to separate
hard and soft power instruments and clearly classify foreign policy tools (See Table 3.2).
For instance, this conceptualization not only allows scholars to explain why certain hard
power resources such as battleships (resources) can be used to deliver soft power actions
such as providing humanitarian aid, but it also provides information about countries’
general foreign policy tool reliance such as the percentage of their soft power actions
over time.
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Resources

Hard Power
Actions

Soft Power Actions

Figure 3.2. My Classification of Foreign Policy Instruments Based on the Separation of
Resources and Actions into Soft Power and Hard Power Categories
As Figure 3.2 shows according to my framwork, in order to study what
countries’ intended actions are, soft power schoalars should focus on the separation of
soft and hard power actions without the impact of the types of resources that were used.
In other words, it does not matter if the used resource was classified into hard or soft
power categories, but instead the nature of the action must be categorized and studied.
By classifying foreign policy instruments based on the government’s actions
we do not need to consider the employed resources. I will classify actions as either hard
power or soft power based on a more nuanced matrix. For example, diplomats are good
examples of resources that can be categorized as both hard power and soft power
resources. But diplomats can conduct both soft power and hard power actions8. For

8 Diplomatic actions such as making an empathetic comment or appeal for diplomatic
cooperation were coded as soft power actions and disapprove or demand for diplomatic
cooperation were coded as hard power actions.
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example, when instructed by the government, a diplomat can cooperate diplomatically or
refuse to cooperate diplomatically. As this example shows by only looking at the
resource, we cannot tell if this action should be hard or soft power. Instead, we must
study the action of the diplomat to categorize the interaction (Figure 3.2).
In order to better explain the separation and to provide concrete examples of soft
and hard power actions, I created the following tables (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2). As
Table 3.1 shows, countries’ resources include a long list of private and public items. My
framework suggests that we do not need to be concerned with the separation of soft
power and hard power resources as many of them are able to produce both types of
actions. While in McClory’s Soft Power 30 index, the number of top 10 albums in
foreign countries is an indicator of the country’s soft power ranking, my approach does
not consider any of these private (or public) resources as it focuses on government
actions.
Table 3.1 Examples of Foreign Policy Resources
Resources
diplomats, monuments,
cultural and sports facilities,
famous people, popular music,
famous brands (Coca-Cola, Nike),
language, ministry of culture,
level of democracy,
budget, number of trade agreements,
GDP, military attachés,
generals, military capability,
number of economic embargoes and boycotts,
military budget, military size,
number of military personnel,
number of military bases abroad
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As Table 3.1 shows, the classification of resources becomes irrelevant when
scholars try to understand governments’ soft power use. The popularity of Coca-Cola
products abroad does not help to explain the U.S. foreign policy instrument selection
when dealing with conflicts in Yemen and in Syria. Actions speak much louder than
resources do. The important implication of this framework is the ability to study
countries’ foreign policy instrument choice patterns. It is important to know how
countries tend to react in both every day international interactions and also in the longterm especially considering that based on my data analysis, most interactions (over 80%)
among governments are soft power actions (Trunkos 2017).
In addition, as Table 3.2 shows, the academic focus of this dissertation is shifting
towards the specific government actions. When scholars are able to identify and count the
number of soft power actions for each country, it becomes possible to compare their soft
power activities, identify patterns and point to changes in their behaviors. For example,
when a country significantly drops the number of its soft power activities compared to
previous years that raises the academic and political question of the future behavior of
such government. Also, referring to Table 2.1, learning that Finland uses an average of
94.17% of soft power actions when interacting with other government but Australia only
relying on 65.64% of soft power actions tells us about the soft power patterns of such
countries.
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Table 3.2 Examples of Soft Power and Hard Power Actions
Soft Power Actions
engage in symbolic act, grant asylum,
return or release person; appeal for
diplomatic cooperation, nation building,
supporting women’s rights and education,
host a visit, make a visit, provide
humanitarian aid, inducements, positive
sanctions, provide economic aid,
cooperate economically, cooperate
militarily, deployment of peacekeepers

Hard Power Actions
cooperate militarily, demand diplomatic
cooperation; reject plan or agreement to
settle dispute; threaten to reduce or break
relations; demand settling a dispute,
accuse of crime or corruption; reject
request for rights; threaten to boycott,
embargo or sanction; threaten to stop aid,
use conventional military force, occupy
territory, assassinate, use human shield,
violate cease fire

It is important to note that these behavioral nuances play a significant role in
countries’ everyday interactions. It is diplomatically and socially crucial for each
government to have at least a working relationship with other countries, and even better if
they can establish long-term good relations with them. This nearly 30% difference in the
two compared countries’ (Finland and Australia) soft power usage in the previous
paragraph can represent over 100,000 interactions and explain the success or failure of
diplomatic events such as a head of state visiting a country or a government releasing a
person from jail.
Finally, it is true that governments are most interested in shaping the perceived
image of their country and, the applied public relations channels also play a key role in
their soft power use. The concept that best describes this process is public diplomacy.
Public diplomacy is only one aspect of countries’ soft power tools and this dissertation
aims to study a wider range of soft power use. Instruments that are not part of Public
Diplomacy include economic tools, cultural and athletic tools.
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3.2 NEW CLASSIFICATION OF SOFT POWER AND HARD POWER FOREIGN
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
One of the goals of this dissertation is to create new guidelines between hard and
soft power instruments and ultimately create a foreign policy framework which includes
soft and hard power categories. After describing my new categories next, I would like to
explain how I created my main instrument groups.
My classification builds on Nye’s (1990) initial dual-categorization of soft and
hard power instruments with clear division between them. Following the conceptual
separation of resources and actions. My classification is able to categorize the previously
overlapping foreign policy instruments such as embassies or money. One of the main
confusions about recognizing soft power and hard power wielding instruments is the fact
that resources such as money or diplomats can be used to wield both types of power. My
conceptual framework offers clear guidelines between the types of action that were taken
by the government to achieve its foreign policy goals.
Overall, understanding why certain democracies are more peaceful and use more
soft power actions than others is the goal of this dissertation. By creating a system in
which all foreign policy instruments can be categorized and offering comprehensive
guidelines between instrument types is the first academic step towards learning more
about democracies soft power use. This conceptual step is also necessary when trying to
measure any policy changes that may have occurred from one year to the next. My
framework connects soft power actions and policies and studies government actions to
make inferences about their policies. Other soft power measurements were unable to
achieve that. Therefore, the creation of my framework is not only necessary in
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recognizing various governments’ moves but also it is crucial for any future soft power
policy measurement.
It is important to note here that my dissertation does not argue against what many
have said before about using the right amount of soft and hard power in conference with
each other (Nye 2011, Cobaugh 2017). In fact, with my classification, I only wish to
strengthen the strategic and effective use of soft power and hard power instruments by
offering an operationalization method. By clearly separating soft and hard power
instruments, I am able to for the first time in soft power research, apply my coding to
over 1.5 million interactions and measure the percentage of soft power use per country
per year on an international scale. I argue that by classifying government actions based
on soft or hard power action definitions, we will be better equipped to understand the
preferences and strategies of countries and for the first time provide a measurement
opportunity for soft power scholars.
3.3 SOCIAL TRUST AND SOFT POWER USE
The next step in this dissertation is to point to a new explanatory variable that
might be able to explain the previously discussed soft power use variation of
democracies. In order to create a theory of international variation in societies’ mass
attitudes towards peaceful instruments, I have to first discuss how those attitudes are
formed and then explain how they impact the leader’s decision. A significant body of
research on public opinion formation has identified core values as a fundamental source
of political attitudes (Feldman 1988; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Chong 2000, Jacoby
2006). Core values refer to an individual’s deeply held beliefs about what is good, right,
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and important in life (Rokeach 1973). In international relations, these beliefs serve as
shortcuts for the public for forming opinions about issues that can be unclear (Goren
2000; Sniderman et al. 1993). Lack of knowledge about international matters can make it
difficult for the average people to have a clear opinion about the best foreign policy in
which case they tend to rely on their core values to decide (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987,
Meernik and Ault 2001). Scholars have also argued that social trust is one of these core
values (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995, Inglehart 1999) and that these core values and
preferences of societies’ can be measured and used to compare countries (Hofstede 1980,
2001, Wildavsky 1987, Thompson et al. 1990, House et al 2004, Inglehart and Welzel
2005, Schwartz 2006).
Social trust (Inglehart 1999, Cook Hardin and Levi 2005) is a relatively enduring
characteristic of societies as it reflects their historical and cultural heritage (Inglehart
1999) and it varies among populations. I theorize that the strong cross-national variation
among democracies in their populations’ social trust at the individual level relates to the
differences in their support for soft power use. That is because in trusting countries
cooperative and peaceful foreign policy instruments are favored over coercion (Putnam
1993, Fukuyama 1995) and in democracies the public opinion restricts foreign policy
outcomes by voting leaders out of office if they do not create policies that the general
public can support (Tomz and Weeks 2013, Stein 2015). Therefore, in order to explain
democratic leaders’ variation in soft power reliance, my dissertation will build on
democracies’ variation in their attitudes regarding trusting others.
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In international relations trust as an explanatory variable has generally been
studied to explain cooperation, which is why it might also play an important role in
peaceful foreign policy actions which also include soft power actions. The two sides of
the academic debate are regarding the significance level of social trust in countries’
likelihood of cooperation versus defection (Axelrod 1984, Kydd 2005, McGillivray and
Smith 2000). One side argues that trust is necessary for cooperation (Kydd 2005,
McGillivray and Smith 2000) and the other side concludes that social trust as an
explanatory variable is not strong enough to explain cooperative behavior (Cook, Hardin
and Levi 2005). While I praise these scholars’ work as they have pointed to the
importance of social trust in international relations, I argue that while game-theoretical
models are great for illustrating the mechanism of influencing factors, they only provide a
dichotomy of trust (or lack of trust) in their models. My research will add to their efforts
as I plan to further study the variations of social trust as it relates to variations of different
types of cooperative and other peaceful actions. I argue that by looking into the variation
of social trust level among societies we will learn much more about individual state’s
foreign policy preferences.
In addition, it is also important to discuss a possible spurious correlation between
countries’ social trust and their soft power use. Walt (2020) argues that states’
competence/strength impact their soft power use. In fact, Walt (2020) specifically argues
that the decline of American competence has been greatly affecting its ability to influence
in foreign policy. While it is a fair (Realist) argument that a country’s attraction is
influenced by its strength and competence, so far none of the scholars were able to
explain why some of the less strong and competent nation such as Italy, Greece or Brazil
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also score high on soft power. For this reason, this dissertation looks for alternative
explanations to strength or competence9.
Further addressing a possible correlation between social trust and this alternative
factor, namely competence or strength, it is important to note that social trust does not
refer to trust in government but instead it is society’s trust of other people. This
individual-level value develops early in life, it reflects the culture and heritage of the
society and it is rarely affected by factors such as the good or bad performances of
foreign governments. Even more importantly, the core value of social trust applies to all
other people regardless of political borders. Stated differently in societies where there has
been a high value of social trust the individuals turn to people from all over the world
regardless of nationality with trust and in the hope to cooperate. Therefore, government’s
competence or strength cannot strongly influence the perceiving states’ individuals’
social trust as those had already been formed.
The mechanism between social trust and soft power use must also be further
explained. In foreign policy the target audience of governments’ soft power actions are
the general foreign public. While it is true that their domestic population is also impacted,
in order to achieve foreign policy goals, governments’ must focus their soft power actions
to the entire foreign public. The public will then impact its leadership through the
democratic process in democracies and through the political elite in non-democracies.

9 To further study this relationship, Chapter 4 of this dissertation specifically test the
correlation between some of the indicators of countries economic and military strength in
the form of their GDP, unemployment rate and CINC scores and finds that none of these
indicators are statistically significant. With respect to competence of governments, that
factors could be tested in a future once a good measurement is available.
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The level of attentiveness differs amongst people, so the governments’ goal is to reach
the maximum range of society with various soft power actions.
The one method by which governments are able to focus their soft power actions
on specific groups of foreign people are their government programs. For example, the
United States uses the Fulbright program within the State Department to impact the
foreign elite through academic exchange programs and in Finland the government uses
the Sports Department (Ministry of Culture and Education) to impact the sports fan
segment of the foreign public through organizing sport events.
Trusting populations by definition feel that others are generally benign, cooperative
and honest (Brewer and Steenberger 2002) which makes persuasion and not coercion the
most cost-effective, logical and legitimate choice of interaction with other nations. The
normal behavior of trusting individuals is to reach out to strangers and persuade them into
a cooperative relationship (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995). This is due to trusting
societies beliefs that the other party shares these cooperative beliefs therefore the most
cost-effective way to interact is by cooperation. These shared beliefs include deep values
such as the nature of God or justice but also include professional standards and codes of
behavior (Fukuyama 1995, 26).
I theorize that trusting societies find the use of soft power tools the most effective
as their goal is to sway others into working together with them as opposed to coercing
them to do so. This thought process manifests itself when the population supports their
leader to prefer and select soft power instruments over force when possible. Based on
this, I theorize that trust plays a dual role in the foreign policy selection process. 1)
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Creates a shortcut when not enough information is available about the international
situation; and 2) suggests a legitimate option for the leader.
There are certain countries that consistently seem to advance more peaceful
solutions then other nations in the form of soft power use (McClory 2012, 2015, 2016,
2017, 2018). The first step of my theory suggests that when making a decision about
issues such as foreign policy, the public will turn to their core values when there is not
enough information. This means that based on my theory, trusting societies will prefer
that their leaders’ also act according to the public’s trusting values when selecting foreign
policy instruments, and since public opinion impacts the incentive structure of the
leaders, they will be pressured to act accordingly (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). In other
words, democratic leaders with trusting populations will not only believe that instruments
based on peaceful interaction will be the most effective and legitimate, but also the
accountability of the democratically elected office will pressure them to do so.
The next step in my theory is the connection between societies’ social trusting
values and their constraint on their leaders’ choices. Values and norms are created early
in life and they create a ranking of preferences (Hudson 1997) and provide ways to make
decisions and to resolve conflict (Triandis 1994). My theory builds on this interpretation
as I argue that due to the influence of society’s social trust, leaders prefer certain
instruments over others. Scholarship has also concluded that democratic10 leaders take

10 In autocracies institutional constraint will be a better predictor for two reasons: 1)
Autocratic leaders with small electorates can maintain their positions simply by giving
out rewards or punishments (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). This method is simply too
expansive in democracies as they have large selectorates. 2) The political elite plays an
important role in the decision making of the leader, but the elite will rely less on their
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public opinion into account when deciding between peaceful and aggressive foreign
policy choices (Sobel 2001, Baum 2004, Brule and Mintz 2006). When public opinion is
averse to war, accountability will provide a check on the use of military force. The
potential political cost of an unpopular war can create an incentive for democratic leaders
to choose nonmilitary options and opt for peaceful interaction. This of course does not
mean that trusting societies’ leaders would never go to war, but it simply means that all
else equal, in democracies with trusting populations the preferred actions are peaceful in
nature.
2.4 PUBLIC OPINION’S ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY OUTCOMES
This final section will connect social trust and soft power use. Recent works have
identified public opinion as an alternative mechanism to influencing foreign policies in
democracies (Tomz and Weeks 2013, Stein 2015). When studying the choice of using
peaceful instruments or force, public preferences vary in different countries (Hurwitz and
Peffley 1987, Feldman 1988) and attitudes towards peace have their roots in individual
core values (Jacoby 2006).11 Scholarship has also found that democracies in general are
more equipped to settle disputes in a peaceful manner (Dixon et al. 1994); however, there
is no adequate information about the quantifiable differences among democracies in
terms of their motivations to select peaceful instruments.

core values than the public when deciding to use soft power instruments as they have
more information and policy experience than the general public (Stein 2015).
11 It has also been noted that the public’s mood (Caspary 1970) impacts foreign policy.
In the case of major events such as 9/11 in the United States, the mood can change but in
general the basic core values of societies remain consistent (Inglehart 1999, Cook Hardin
and Levi 2005).
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Building on the current literature about the importance of public opinion’s impact
on leaders’ foreign policy choices (Baum 2004, Sobel 2001, Stein 2015) and the
undeveloped and untested impact of people’s social trust in their foreign policy
preferences, I will test social trust’s impact on democracies’ peaceful foreign policy
choices in the form of soft power actions. Based on the described literature combined
with my theory, I hypothesize the following:
H1: Democratic leaders’ with trusting populations are more likely to rely on soft
power actions than less trusting ones because they can generate public support for
peaceful actions more effectively.
Overall, by bringing together the variation of social trust with countries’ soft
power use patterns, I am able to test if democratic leaders with more trusting populations
select more soft power instruments than those with less trusting citizens. This is an
important question when we are trying to understand democratic countries’ foreign
policies. As of now, previous literature has not looked into social trust as a possible
explanatory variable when studying soft power use. Therefore, if this cultural variable is
found significant, my dissertation will be able to provide a normative explanation of
countries’ soft power reliance.
This is particularly important when we are trying to understand the different
behaviors of otherwise similar democratic countries. In order to achieve that, I plan to
offer a more detailed picture of why and how some countries use more soft power
instruments than others despite their similar capabilities. For this reason, I will compare
societies’ social trust to better understand the motivation of their decisions. In order to
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further study the way these leaders’ use soft power instruments, I will use reclassified
international actions to illuminate the amount of soft power actions leaders rely upon in
various democracies.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN
This dissertation focuses on democracies’ use of soft power instruments. Based on
my theory, I test if countries with higher social trust values also rely more on soft power
tools than countries with lower social trust in. The theoretical foundation of this
hypothesis is that countries with more social trust feel that the others can be trusted, and
an outreaching, cooperative behavior is the most effective behavior in international
relations. As a result, the population of these trusting countries will encourage (through
the democratic process) their leaders to use more soft power instruments.
My statistical analysis examines the effects of social trust on countries’ soft power
use for the time-period of 1995-2010. The goal of this analysis is to test the influences of
social trust on the use of soft power instruments against the resource-based and the
institutional theories. I use statistical analysis of 51 democracies to test if higher values in
social trust leads to more soft power use. I argue that the variation in social trust will
offer new, previously undiscovered answers about the differences in countries’ soft
power use patterns. The result of my statistical analysis shows that the variation in social
trust is positively correlated with countries’ soft power use, however, the multivariable
regression analysis is only able to explain 18% of the soft power variation among
democracies.
54

In this chapter first I will explain my unit of analysis and my dependent and
independent variables. Later, I move onto the statistical analysis and conclude with the
results.
4.1 UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND SAMPLE
The unit of analysis is the state-year. My sample consists of 51 democratic
countries. I included all countries with a polity score average higher than 6 in
democracies with the exceptions of those that were missing from one of the datasets12. In
order to test my hypotheses and control for all of my selected variables I had to restrict
my analysis to the time-frame of 1995-2010 as the latent social trust data (Justwan et al.
2018), the COW's Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) (Palmer et al. 2015) and its World
Religion data (Maoz and Henderson 2013) are only available until 2010 and thus I had to
end my analysis at that year. This time-period gives me 16 years which is sufficient to
examine any patterns in foreign policy decision-making in various countries.
4.2 DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCE
4.2.1

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

My dependent variable is the percentage of soft power action per state-year. I
selected this variable because I would like to study countries’ frequency of relying on soft
power.
Percentage of soft power action: the percentage of governments’ actions to increase its
national attractiveness abroad over the total power instruments used. The total power
instruments used includes the sum of all soft and hard power actions.

12 Democracies not included in the sample of 51 countries are Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Netherlands, Iceland, Malta and Luxemburg due to lack of data.
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Selecting this format was an important analytical step as I had two other options for a
dependent variable after recoding the data into soft and hard power use. One option was
to use the total count of soft power actions and hard power actions per year per country.
This method significantly disadvantaged the less active international players and without
a comparison with hard power tools selected, therefore it did not provide an adequate
picture about countries’ soft power instrument patterns. Another option was to use the
soft and hard power ratio for each country. This approach was also dismissed as it did not
provide an adequate picture about countries’ patterns of foreign policy instrument
selection over all of their tools (soft and hard power). This pointed me to use the
percentage of soft power actions over the total (soft and hard power) instruments. This
approach provides a comprehensive picture in the form of the percentage of soft power
choices over both instrument categories. In other words, my dependent variable reflects
the percentage of soft power choices each country made over all its instrument choices
for each year.
To produce my dependent variable, I collected global events data from the ICEWS
dataset. The international events are based on news reports from a variety of international
news sources and coded according to the CAMEO13 (Conflict and Mediation Event
Observations) ontology. The event data is machine coded and it is provided in a dyad
format which I collapsed into a monadic format for all my models. This means that the
TABARI machine coding system produces interaction codes for each event between two

13 Developed by Deborah J. Gerner, Philip A. Schrodt, Ömür Yilmaz, and Rajaa AbuJabr.
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countries. Since this research is not concerned with the receiving state’s characteristics, I
only included the giver state’ and its interaction code for each interaction.
Since its creation in 2002 (Gerner, Schrodt, Yilmas, Abu-Jabr) the CAMEO
codebook has been evolving to include more detailed events. The creators of the ICEWS
data set (Boschee et al. 2015) added their own adjustments to the original CAMEO
codebook to clarify the events. In addition, my coding of the CAMEO coded events has
also evolved. For example, one of the most used event categories (10) is “making a
public statement.” This refers to any government official who makes a public statement.
Originally in 2015, I have coded this event as an interaction that cannot be decisively
categories as attraction or coercion, since the correct coding should depend on the subject
of the statement. More specifically, President Trump announcing to send troops to the
Southern border is a coercive (hard power) action, but President Trump announcing the
opening of Easter festivities at the White House is a soft power action. Since the machine
coded event does not provide more information about what kind of statement was made,
originally, I coded this event as 0 and dropped it from the database. But lately, new
scholarship has pointed to the soft power importance of making a public statement
(Rutland 2018). I realized that regardless of the message of the statement, the general
nature of “making a public statement” must be coded as a soft power action because the
appearance of a government official combined with his/her statement already express the
intent to communicate about an event.
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4.2.2

RECODING THE ICEWS EVENT DATASET

I created the dependent variable by recoding the ICEWS event data into two
categories either as a soft power action or as a hard power action and then calculate the
soft power action percentage over the total power usage. The reason used the ICEWS
dataset is that it is one of the most current applications of machine coded global events
data and it will allow me to recode the specific government actions14. This dataset
includes the range of different interactions that took place between states including, but
not limited to, providing humanitarian aid, returning/releasing a person or granting
diplomatic recognition. ICEWS is a new CAMEO-coded dataset containing more than 15
million events with global coverage from 1995 to 2014.
Sources that were examined to identify events include all international news
coverage from AfricaNews, Agence France Presse, Associated Press Online, Associated
Press Worldstream, BBC Monitoring, Christian Science Monitor, Facts on File, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, United Press International, and the Washington Post.
Additional sources examined include all national and international news coverage from
the New York Times, all international and major US national stories from the Associated
Press, and all national and international news from Google News with the exception of
sports, entertainment, and strictly economic news (Leetaru and Schrod 2013).
The CAMEO coding system is based on extensive dictionaries which identify
actors and events and then associate these with specific codes. Using a machine-coding
program called TABARI, the events are coded 1 through 20 based on the nature of the

14 Events datasets were specifically created to capture the interactions between actors
and not the transactions between them (Laurence 1990).
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action. The codes were originally designed to indicate cooperation or conflict on a scale
of 1-20 with 1 making a public statement and 20 being mass violence (Leetaru and
Schrodt, 2013). The actions range from diplomacy to waging war and have multiple
subsections such as hosting a visit and expressing diplomatic cooperation which today
extends the scale to near 300 different event categories. After recoding the events I was
able to study countries’ soft power actions.
I used MySQL, which is an open-source data management system to recode the
ICEWS dataset. All events that I re-classified as soft power actions were recoded as 1.
All events that I re-classify as hard power action received 2 (See Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Re-coding ICEW’s CAMEO coded events into hard and soft power actions
Soft Power (1)
Hard Power (2)
Type of Action
positive influence/payment coercion/payment
Type of Impact

Attraction

deterrence/fear

Specific Actions

making a public statement,
express intent to cooperate,
engage in diplomatic
affairs, support publicly,
appeal, consult or visit

demanding, disapproving,
rejecting, threatening,
protesting, exhibiting
military postures, coercing
or fighting

In cases where it could not be decided for sure if the action was taken to create
attractiveness or coerce were dropped from the analysis. Events were dropped in two
basic instances:
1) When the description of the event was more specific, but the giver or initiator
state’s intentions such as coercing of building attractiveness could not be determined. For
instance, 1.11 decline comment, 2.241 appeal for changing leadership or 2.244 appeal for
military cooperation.
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2) If the initiator state asked a third party to do something. This action did not
provide information about the initiator’s action. The specific coding of each action type is
listed in Appendix A.
The ICEWS dataset grew out of a large body of academic research 15 on using
discrete events for studying international (and domestic) relations (McClelland 1976,
Azar 1980, 1982, Goldstein 1992). The results of such data collection is applicable to my
coding of soft and hard power actions. Some of the earlier criticisms of using machine
coded events data included problems with source selection, coding rules, data
management and the scale (Laurance 1990, Goldstein 1992)16. My method uses the
counting approach as I am only interested in the number of soft power actions per state.
One of the main criticisms of aggregating event data without weighting it has been that
weighted events are more conceptually grounded in the theory than events that are just
counted (Goldstein 1992). My conceptual framework, however, will not focus on the
intensity of the event or the responses from the receiving state. This makes my counting
approach the applicable method.

15 Initially there were two basic event coding frameworks, namely McClelland’s (1967,
1976) WEIS (World Event Interaction Survey) dataset and Azar’s (1980) COPDAB
(Conflict and Peace Data Bank) dataset. Later other event datasets were created using
machine coded events such as KEDS (Kansas Event Data System). In the 2000s two new
event coding taxonomies appeared, CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Observation
(Gerner et al. 2009) and IDEA (Integrated Event Data for Events Analysis) (Bond et al.,
2003).
16 The issue of how to best use discrete events to study interstate interactions resulted in
two approaches which are either counting the events and using an ordinal scale or
weighting the events (Goldstein 1992).
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Finally, I resolve the issue of representing interstate conflict on a continuum
(Sayrs 1990, de Vries 1990) because I am recoding the 20-point scale into two categories:
soft or hard power and I am studying the percentages of soft power actions per year. The
process of re-coding is based on my categorization of all occurring events into either soft
or hard power actions, or in case the category cannot be clearly selected dropping the
event from the dataset. Although hard and soft power actions are mutually exclusive
according to my codes, each event represents only a small fragment of each nation’s total
annual hard and soft power actions because hundreds of events are included in the
dataset. In other words, state A can have hard power and soft power actions many times
in the same year with the same country.
Recoding the dataset by applying my conceptualization of hard and soft power
actions is the core of my method. As the results show, there is only some overlap
between mediation and soft power actions, and conflict and hard power codes. The
results also show that all cooperation and mediation events do not code as soft power
actions (See Table 4.2). One of the main operational contributions of this study therefore
is the recoding and measuring of such events as hard or soft power actions.
Table 4.2 Analysis of re-coding CAMEO Coded Events into Soft Power and Hard Power
Actions
Number of Various
Dropped Events
Coded Differently
Events

from CAMEO

Soft Power

87

26 (29.88%)

22 (25.28%)

Hard Power

121

21 (17.25%)

19 (16%)

Total

284

47.13%

41.28%
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4.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Social Trust (Latent_Trust). To measure my main independent variable, I relied
on Juswan, Bakker and Berejikian (2018) latent trust variable. Adopting a Bayesian
measurement model, they treat social trust as a latent concept. Their latent trust variable
was constructed with a broad set of correlates (19 variables) providing a cleaner and more
reliable estimates than previous survey data such as the World Value Survey. Justwan et
al.’s (2018) dataset also solved the problem of missing data as they have produced a
state-year variable for my selected time-frame while the World Value Survey’s dataset
was missing 80% of the needed data points.
The collected observables were used in multiple disciplines including political
science, psychology, sociology and neuro-economic combining survey data as well as
institutional social and environmental correlates of social trust (Justwan et al. 2018). The
full list of the variables used can be seen in Appendix B. The latent trust variable ranges
from -1.92 to 2.18 (In my selected countries the range is (-.46-2.18). The units of this
latent variable are not directly interpretable, but we can say that higher values show
higher social trust in each country (Justwan et al. 2018). This means that in this
dissertation based on my hypothesis a positive correlation is expected between soft power
use and social trust. Data is available from 1946-2010.
4.3.1. INSTITUTIONAL AND RESOURCE VARIABLES
In my models the variable that represent the institutional theory is Polity4 and the
variables that reflect the resource-based theories are gdp and CINC. The Polity4 variable
reflects countries democracy levels and gdp and CINC represents countries’ economic
and military capabilities.
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National Material Capability (CINC). I used COW's Combined Index of
National Capability (CINC) (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Singer 1987) for Model
1. Scholars have identified resources and the national capability of countries as
significant variables in foreign policy decision making and as being positively
correlated with the amount of foreign policy actions taken (Palmer and Morgan 2006).
This index is constructed with two measures of each of three dimensions: industrial,
demographic, and military which encompasses six indicators (military expenditure,
military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population,
and total population). This combination of dimensions captures the national capability
of states. The impact of states’ military capabilities in interstate conflict is one of the
most addressed issues in international relations. While there is still disagreement about
the exact effect of military capability on conflict (Morgan 1984, 1990, 1994; Morrow
1989; Fearon 1994b; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick 1997), it is without a
doubt a significant variable in foreign policy analysis (Palmer and Morgan 2000).
For my theory this explanatory variable tested if a country’s resources are
positively correlated with the percentage of their soft power actions, and if national
capability is a significant variable in a state’s choices of soft power actions. As my
theory suggests, selecting soft power actions over hard power actions is a policy choice
that is influenced more by the trusting level of the population than available resources.
Thus, including CINC in my regression models allowed me to test CINC’s statistical
significance when CINC represents the military capability of the country. Data is
available for the years 1816-2012.
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Gross Domestic Product (gdp). This economic variable reflects the product or
value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year and in this
study, it tests the resource-based theory. I collected data from the World Bank. I used
gdp to indicate countries’ economic power in the world as it has been a commonly used
variable in international relations scholarship (Pzeworski and Limongi 1995, Gilpin
2011, Inglehart 1997, 2000). I expect to find that countries with higher gdps will have a
higher percentage of soft power actions/year compared to countries with lower gdps. I
find the World Banks dataset on gdp specifically useful as it will allow me to use
current USD so I will not have to adjust it any further for inflation. Data is available for
the years 1960-2014.
Democratization Level (polity). The Polity IV project is sponsored by the
Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall, Gurr and Jagger 2016). In my regression models I
use Polity IV scores to capture the democratization level of states, which represents the
institutional theory in my dissertation. Polity IV captures the regime authority spectrum
on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated
democracy). On the monadic (national) level scholars concluded that due to various
internal dimensions or assumptions, liberals tend to be pacifists, and liberal
(democratic) governments (especially larger democracies) prefer negotiations over war
and pursue peaceful foreign policies (Morgan and Campbell 1991). Polity IV considers
countries with scores from 6-10 as democracies and that is what I used when selecting
my democracies (Marshall 1). I expected to find that the higher a country’s democracy
score is the more likely it is to use more soft power actions over hard power actions.
Data is available 1800-2016.
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4.3.2 CONTROL VARIABLES
In order to include other important factors that can impact countries’ foreign
policy decisions, I included thirteen other sets of control variables from the Correlates of
War Project; MID, MID count, formal alliances, import, export, gdpgrowth,
unemployment, five religions and non-religion. I collected data about unemployment
from the IMF and about gdp growth from the World Bank. My main interest is in the soft
power actions of states relative to their total interactions, but these can only be estimated
accurately if other conditions and capabilities are also represented in the analysis and
controlled for.
MID (MID): Militarized Interstate Dispute data (Palmer et al. 2015) collected by
Correlates of War Project provides information about conflicts in which a country
threatens, displays, or uses force against one or more other states between 1816 and 2010.
By definition, “militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in
which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one-member state is
explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces,
property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents that range in
intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war” (Jones et al. 1996, 163).
The data is coded as a dummy variable in which 0 indicates the lack of any
conflict for the year and 1 signals conflict. The inclusion of conflict for each country
helps me to explain soft power use as countries with more conflict are less likely to rely
on high level of soft power tools as due to their conflict, they are prone to rely on hard
power tools. For this reason, I expect to find that MIDs are negatively correlated with soft
power use.
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MID Count (MIDCount): In addition, to control for the number of conflicts for
each state, I also included the Correlates of Wars’ MID data (Palmer et al. 2015) coded as
MID count data, which indicates the variation of countries’ number of interstate disputes
per year. Ever year when any kind of conflict started according to the dataset, it was
counted as 1 conflict. The range of the MID count per year is 8 conflicts (USA) to 0
conflicts (Switzerland). This control variable allows the variation of conflict heavy and
little or no conflict countries to be indicated in the regression models. I expect MID
count to be negatively correlated with soft power use as in conflict prone countries there
is more attention and effort paid to hard power instruments.
Formal Military Alliance (militalliance): This data set is also part of the
Correlates of War Project (Gibler 2009) and it records all formal alliances among states
between 1816 and 2012, including mutual defense pacts, non-aggression treaties, and
ententes on monadic level. The data is used as a dummy variable where 0 indicates the
lack of any formal alliance for a country for each year and 1 indicates the existence of at
least one formal military alliance. Based on my theory, countries that are in military
alliances do not feel safe (for geographic or historical reasons) and therefore rely on soft
power instruments less frequently than nations with no formal alliances. Therefore, I
expect military alliances to be negatively correlated with soft power use.
Trade (import, export): to capture the effect of economic dependence of
countries’, I included the Correlates of War Project’s monadic trade data (Barbieri and
Keshk 2016) which reflects the incoming and outgoing volume of trade of each selected
country17. The variable measures the annual completed trade in current USD and

17 Missing countries are South Korea, Czech Republic, Hong Kong and El Salvador.
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provides an economic dependency indicator in the models. The amount of trading
indicates an amount of economic dependency and connection with other countries which
makes it more likely to turn to soft power instruments for countries that import and
export heavily. For this reason, the expected relationship is positive. Data is available for
1816-2014.
Religion: to collect data about countries’ religious affiliations I turned to the
Correlates of War’s World Religion Project’s (WRP) (Maoz and Henderson 2013) most
specifically to the National Religion Dataset. The data records the percentages of the
state's population that practice a given religion. I used the five main religions indicators
in percentages as control variables; Christian-Catholic (catholic), Christian-Protestant
(protestant); Islam (islam); Buddhism (budhism); Hindu (hindu). Also added non-religion
(nonrelig) as a variable. Based on previous studies, I expect Protestant, Buddhism,
Hinduism and Non-religion affiliation to be positively correlated with soft power use
(Landes 1998, La Porta et al 1999). On the other hand, I expect Catholic and Islam to be
negatively correlated with soft power use (Landes, 1998, La Porta et al 1999). The unit of
analysis in this dataset is the individual state, observed at five-year intervals. This dataset
provides information the percent of the state's population practicing a given religion. Data
is available from 1945-2010.
Unemployment (unempl) to include the effect of unemployment rate I used the
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database’s unemployment data.
The World Economic Outlook (WEO) database contains selected macroeconomic data
series from the statistical appendix of the World Economic Outlook Report, which
presents the IMF staff's analysis and projections of economic developments at the global
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level, in major country groups and in many individual countries18. The unemployment
rate indicates the economic strength of each country but also serves as an indicator of
social openness towards outsiders (La Porta el at 1999). Higher unemployment rate
indicates a weaker economy and less openness towards outsiders. I expect unemployment
rate to be negatively correlated with soft power use. The information is provided in
percentage of the population for each year from 1980-present.
GDP Growth (gdpgrowth): I also included gdp growth as a control variable to
indicate the annual changes of economic strength in a percentage. I expect that this
variable will be positively correlated with soft power use as with a stronger economy the
country can afford to spend more on non-defensive foreign policy instruments such as
soft power tool and actions. This data is collected from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators and it is available for 1960-2017.
4.3.3 MULTICOLINEARITY AND REVERSE CAUSATION
There are two additional statistical problems that must be address.
Multicollinearity and reverse causation. With respect to multicollinearity some of the
listed independent variables are also correlated with each other in addition to soft power
use thus inflating the error term in the regressions. For example, many of the high soft
power user countries have strong democratic institutions and plenty of resources as well
as they have a Protestant religion and cultural background with low unemployment. My
solution to address this problem was to run a Pearson correlation estimate amongst all my
explanatory variables to see how strong the correlation was between them. Once the
Pearson coefficient was higher than r=0.50 between two of my independent variables,

18 IMF’s unemployment rate data is missing India from the democracies.
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they could only remain in my linear regression model if the model was still significant,
and they added to the R² of the regression model. COW imports and COW exports, for
instance has a 0.93 bivariate correlation, but keeping both variables in my models still
resulted in a statistically significant model and raised the R².
Finally, the last statistical issue is reverse causation. As Delhey and Newton
(2005) explains, between the association of trust and another variable is that trust can be
the cause or the effect of another indictor. For example, richer countries may be more
trusting than poor countries, but that may be because their wealth and financial security
allows them to risk possible loses and approach others with trust and openness. On the
other hand, they might be richer than others because they are more trusting. Same logic is
true for using more or less soft power. Some democracies may use more soft power
because they are trusting. On the other hand, they might be more trusting because they
have always used soft power instruments to a large degree. Also, as it is evident from my
analysis and from other scholars’ work, social trust is deeply embedded with other social
and economic factors (Inglehart 1999, Inglehard and Welzel 2005, Delhey and Newton
2005). I used control variables to resolve this issue.
4.3 VALIDITY CHECK
In order to check the validity of my social trust data I used two different datasets’
social trust data to test the correlation between latent trust and the others. First, using the
OECD (Organization of Economically Developed Countries) social trust data which was
only available for one year (2007), I ran a bivariate linear regression model and I found
that the correlation was weak (r=.0021) with n=23. Next, I used Inglehart and Welzel’s
(2005) social trust data to check the correlation between my latent-trust variable and their
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social trust. I found that the correlation is considerable (r=43) with n=51. Overall, while
the OECD’s limited data did not appear to have a strong correlation with my dataset, the
wildly used WVS’s social trust data appears to be strongly correlated with my latent trust
variable and by running two regressions with two other social trust data, the validity of
my independent variable appears robust enough for the analysis.
4.4 RESULTS
In order to be able to compare the competing theories about the main factors that
influence soft power actions, I created three linear cross-sectional regression time-series
models.
4.4.1 MODELS 1-4
In Model 1 (Resources) using an OLS regression, I only included the resource
variables (gdp and CINC19) in addition to the control variables (military alliances, MID,
imports and exports, Catholic, Protestant, Islam, Hindu, Buddhist, non-religious,
unemployment, gdpgrowth and midcount). I wanted to find out how much soft power use
variation can only the resource variables explain. The result showed that the Resource
Model (Model 1) can explain 21 % of the soft power reliance variation (See Table 4.3).
Model 1 also showed that gdp and CINC are statistically significant indicators and that
gdp is negatively correlated with soft power use. In addition, the results revealed that
CINC is positively correlated with countries’ soft power reliance.

19 Because GDP and CINC are both resource variables, I tested a Model with each of the
variables without the other, to see if the Model was still significant. I found that the
Model is still significant when only GDP or only CINC is present with the other
variables.
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Table 4.3 Resource and the Institutional OLS Regression Models on Soft Power Use
Percent as a Dependent Variable (1995-2010).
Model 1
(Resources)
Trust
Polity
GDP
CINC
Military alliance
MID
Imports
Exports
Unemployment
Protestant
Catholic
Islam
Buddhism
Hindu
Non-religious
GDP Growth
MID Count
Cons

Model 2
(Institutional)
-0.25

-7.36e-12**
264.04*
-9.11**
0.80
0.00**
-0.00*
.21*
-2.23
-1.44
-3.9
32.12**
-1066.13**
18.10**
0.25*
-1.31
89.00

-8.77**
1.00
4.60e06
2.03e-06
.17
-4.01
-1.47
-2.99
10.02*
-1048.633**
17.68**
.25*
-1.26*
92.68

R²
.2063
Obs.
598
Notes: *p< .10 **p< .05 Significance: p > 0.05

.1898
598

This means that a lower gdp and a larger military capability both reduces soft power
use. In other words, according to the analysis, poor countries use more soft power and
countries with more military capabilities also rely more on soft power actions. This is an
intuitive finding as countries with more military capability probably feel that they do not
need to use soft power tools as much because they view their military tools as more
effective in international interactions than soft power instruments. With respect to poorer
countries using more soft power actions, this finding makes sense soft power instrument
costs less hard power tools. It is also interesting to note the low R² of 0.206 for this
model.
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In Model 2 (Institutional) using a multivariable OLS regression again, I only
observed the institutional variable’s (polity) impact on soft power use. The results
showed that polity is not a statistically significant variable and it is negatively correlated
with soft power use. This confirms my expectation that countries with lower democracy
scores rely more on soft power use. The results based on Model 2’s R² value was slightly
higher at 0.19. This meant that none of these two competing theories represented by the
appropriate variables were able to explain more than 21 % of democracies’ variation in
soft power use which result suggested that I keep looking for more robust results.
In order to capture the effects of each individual country in the regression and to
avoid unobserved heterogeneity, I ran fixed effect estimators on Model 1 and on Model 2.
The result can be seen in Table 4.4 in Models 3 and 4 respectively. The fixed effects
estimator revealed that when the unique qualities of each country is taken into account,
the military alliance, GDP Growth and Hindu variables remain significant.

72

Table 4.4 Resources and Institutional OLS Regression Models with fixed effects
estimators on Soft Power Use Percent as a Dependent Variable (1995-2010).
Model 3
(Resources)
Trust
Polity
GDP
CINC
Military Alliance
MID
MID Count
Imports
Exports
Unemployment
GDP Growth
Protestant
Catholic
Islam
Buddhism
Hindu
Non-religious
Cons
Obs.
Notes: *p< .10 **p< .05
Significance: p > 0.05

Model 4
(Institutional)
-.01

-5.22e-13
7.93
-5.41*
-.25
-.25
-5.56e-07
3.88e-07
.15
.15*
.39
.96
-3.96
14.55
-739.21*
.96
87.06

-5.45*
.74
-0.25
-3.88-06
5.39e-06
.15
0.15*
5.55
1.19
-3.60
12.73
-744.65*
.74*
87.08

598

598

4.4.2 MODELS 5 AND 6 TESTING SOCIAL TRUST’S IMPACT
The research question of my dissertation is how does social trust impact soft power
use? According to my theory and hypothesis, social trust is positively correlated with
soft power use. Including social trust in the multivariable regression therefore was
supposed to increase the strength of the model and provide more robust results. With my
final regression models (Table 4.5 Models 5 and 6), I tested the correlations between
social trust and countries’ percentage of soft power actions including all other control
variables. The results of Model 5 indicated that social trust is positively correlated with
countries’ percentage of soft power use (See Table 4.5), but the R² was only 18%. Model
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5 also revealed that military alliance, protestant, Hindu and Non-religious were also
strong indicators of soft power use. Finally, to capture the unique effects of each country
in the regression and to avoid unobserved heterogeneity, I ran a mixed effect estimator in
Model 6. Since my linear regression was not using log likelihood, I ran a mixed effect
estimator. The command in Stata treats everything as fixed effect unless it is otherwise
specified. As Table 4.5. shows in Model 6 social trust is negatively correlated with soft
power use and it is not statistically significant. The change from a positive to a negative
correlation also indicates the lack of robustness of social trust on soft power use.
Table 4.5 OLS Regression Models with Mixed Effects Estimators on Soft Power Use
Percent as a Dependent Variable and Social Trust as the Independent Variable (19952010)
Model 5
Model 6
(Social Trust)
(Social Trust+
Mixed Effects)
Trust
1.07
-.52
Polity
GDP
CINC
Military Alliance
-7.87**
-5.55*
MID
1.03
0.75
MID Count
-1.06
-.25
Imports
1.15e-06
-3.87e-06
Exports
5.86e-06
5.49e-06
Unemployment
.16
0.14
GDP Growth
.25*
-.25
Protestant
-6.44*
6.16
Catholic
- 2.13
1.19
Islam
-2.51
-3.91
Buddhism
.04
13.05
Hindu
-1029.39**
-754.38*
Non-religious
15.73**
1.11
Cons
89.42
87.56
R2
Obs.

0.18
598

598
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This also means that Model 5 confirmed my hypothesis that countries with higher
trust in the population use more soft power in their foreign policies. I also learned that
social trust’s statistical impact is not significant. Further, the coefficients of Model 5
indicate that one unit increase in social trust leads to 1.07% increase in countries’ soft
power use. In addition, Model 6 showed that after running mixed effects, the coefficient
of social trust changed to negative indicating the weak correlation.
In addition to comparing the R² s of each of my models, also wanted to compare
their BIC’s (Bayesian Information Criterion), therefore the final step in my statistical
analysis was to complete my model selection using the BIC (Bayesian Information
Criterion) number for each model. There are two ways to read the BIC numbers. One is
to compare the BIC numbers of each of my models to compare the robustness of each
(when log likelihood is used). As Table 4.6 shows, Model 1 has the lowest BIC number
there’re it is the most robust of the three. The second way to understand the BIC numbers
is to compare the BIC number changes between Models 1 and 3 and Models 2 and 3 and
look for the largest (larger than 10) change between two models. In this case, as we can
see there is not a significant change in the BIC numbers between Model 2 and 5 but there
is a significant change between Model 1 and 5. Stated differently, compared with the
most robust model, which is Resource Model (1), the Institutional Model (2) produced
the least robust result. Also, comparing the Resource Model (1) with the Social Trust
Model (5), we can see that based on the BIC numbers, the Resource Model (1) is more
robust.

75

Table 4.6 Model Selection. Comparing BIC Numbers
BIC

Number of Observation

Model 1 Resources

4556.704

598

Model 2 Institutional

4569.058

598

Model 5 Social Trust

4569.099

598

Overall, the real importance of my statistical analysis is that I was the first soft
power scholar to test social trust value’s impact on countries’ soft power reliance. More
specifically, I was able to test the statistical impact of the variation of a normative value
(social trust) on countries’ soft power reliance over a 16-year timeframe. While my
results do not support my hypothesis about trust’s robust impact on democracies’ soft
power patterns, but my statistical analysis also showed that the resources and institutions
can only provide about 20% explanation about soft power variation. This raises the
question of what other variables must be examined in the future. Based on my results, I
would start looking into democracies resources. I am inspired by the results and the lack
of explanatory power of the included variables to keep searching for the explanatory
variable that will tell soft power scholars much more about countries’ soft power use.
It is interesting to note here that one of my control variables, military alliances
proved to be statistically significant and negatively correlated with soft power use. In my
case studies comparing Finland high soft power user (94%) and New Zealand low soft
power user (65%) I found that in these two countries’ Finland had no military alliances
and the government relies on high soft power, while New Zealand, which had military
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alliances uses soft power actions to a much lower level. A larger n study focusing on the
impact of military alliances could explain more of the negative correlation.
Overall, I offered a new operational framework to studying soft power instrument
use. This is an innovative academic step as previous literature struggled with separating
and measuring countries’ soft power reliance. What leads to such variation in soft power
usage is the main research question of this dissertation. My statistical analysis revealed
that social trust is not a statistically significant factor in soft power use, and I have also
learned that the institutional and the resource-based models were also not robust enough.
This means that new variables need to be found and tested to better explain why
countries’ use soft power tools. Based on the statistical results, the resource route is the
more promising one, as polity remained insignificant. Perhaps future analysis can study
the impact of countries’ soft power budgets.
4.6 LIMITATIONS
One of the main limitations of using the ICEWS data set is that not every kind of
interaction is recorded in it. For instance, drone strikes are not represented. Athletic
interactions and cultural events between countries usually constitutes soft power actions,
however, these are also excluded from the dataset. Perhaps future changes made to the
TABARI dictionary could include official athletic exchanges and events such as hosting a
multilateral mega sport event like the Olympics or simply include leaders and diplomats
attending a specific sport events abroad as a part of a diplomatic mission.
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Finally, a conceptual limitation of this project is that it only focuses on means of
power and does not address other important dimensions such as scope, domain and
weight. A future project needs to incorporate those dimensions into the analysis of
countries’ foreign policy choices.
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CHAPTER 5
MOST-SIMILAR CASE DESIGN: FINLAND AND NEW ZEALAND. WHY
FINLAND USES MORE, AND NEW ZEALAND USES LESS SOFT POWER

In Chapter 4, I outlined factors that may impact countries’ soft power use and
using statistical models I tested their impact. The results revealed that social trust has a
positive impact on soft power use in my 51 democratic countries, but the statistical model
was only able to explain about 18% of the soft power use variation. In order to
understand what other factors impact the use of soft power instruments, I now turn to a
qualitative approach in the form of a most-similar case design to study in-depth the
already included factors and to explore previously left out independent variables.
5.1 CASE SELECTION AND THE MOST-SIMILAR CASE DESIGN
There are 51 democracies in my dataset that are spread out geographically in all
five continents and have diverse economic and institutional characteristics. In my sample
there are 28 European, 12 from the Americas, 7 Asian, 1 Middle-Eastern, 2 Australian
and 1 African nation. Finland and New Zealand have been selected for a most-similar
case design for the following reasons.
In terms of their general geographically, political and economic indicators,
Finland and New Zealand are similar in the following ways: geographically they are both
considered small countries. Finland is 338,145 km² with the population of 5.5 million.
New Zealand is 268,000 km² with a population of 4.79 million people.
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In addition, according to my statistical analysis, both countries have similar
values in the independent variables. More specifically, both countries score high on social
trust (Finland has 2.04 and New Zealand has 1.88) and both countries are considered
wealthy. The average GDP of Finland for the observed time-frame (1995-2010) was 180
Billion USD while for New Zealand it was 90 Billion USD. In terms of their military
capabilities, both countries have low CINC values (Finland is 0.002 and New Zealand is
0.0008). Finally, both countries are strong democracies receiving a perfect 10 scores on
the Polity scale (Polity IV). Table 5.1 shows the comparison of these independent
variables.
Table 5.1 Average values for the main interdepend variables from the statistical analysis
for time period of 1995-2010. GDP is in current USD.
Social Trust
GDP
CINC
Polity
Finland

2.04

1.80E+11

0.0020

10

New Zealand

1.88

9.03E+10

0.0008

10

Scale min

-0.46

1.97E+09

0

-10

Scale max

2.18

1.50E+13

1

10

Despite their similarities in their independent variables, Finland and New Zealand
vastly differ in their soft power outcomes. Out of the 51 democracies included in this
study, Finland established itself as a high soft power user country by relying on 94% soft
power use. New Zealand, on the other hand belongs to the low soft power user group
with 68% soft power use. I turn to a most-similar case design to explore what factors led
to the differences in these two otherwise similar countries’ soft power use
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The most-similar case design can evaluate pairs of cases in various ways in order to
isolate the differences between them (Lijphart 1971, Collier 1993). In the cases of
Finland and New Zealand, both have similar values on their independent variables which
allows for the isolation of new independent variables. Finland has a threatening neighbor
and this geopolitical situation has been deeply impacting Finnish foreign policy. On the
other hand, New Zealand seems to be buffered from threat by its peaceful neighbors. In
this section I will further explore these differences.
International relation literature has offered an alternative explanation regarding the
geopolitical differences between countries. Specifically, realist literature suggests that a
country that perceives threat will seek to form alliances (Walt 1985). The political elite of
the country that is being threatened will create a narrative that emphasizes national
security and the need to form alliances for protection (Zhu 2012). The alliance formation
serves as a defense mechanism against the perceived threat. This is called balancing
(Walt 1985).
In terms of soft power use this means that countries that feel threatened may use
soft power instruments to create a climate of attractions and a web of personal ties. The
high level of positive interaction between countries makes alliance formation more likely.
Specifically, this means that using a most-similar case design, I will evaluate if Finland
has a high soft power use as a reaction to its threating neighbor (Russia), while the lack of
a geopolitical threat led New Zealand to a much lower soft power reliance.

81

5.2 EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCES IN SOFT POWER USE
In search of stronger soft power use indicators, I turned to the foreign policy
literature, which have pointed to alternative factors. One of them was geopolitics.
According to the literature, geopolitical threat can make countries take actions that are
designed to mitigate the threatening neighbor (Clerk 2015, Sberro 2015, Moisio 1998,
Browning 2002). In international relations threat has been defined as a situation in which
one agent or group has either the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence
on another agent or group (Davis 2000, 10). Realist and neorealist literature have also
suggested that when a country is framed as a strong military power, it will impact the
others by causing them to perceive them as a threat (Sherif 1966, Levine and Campbell
1972, Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001).
Realist literature also suggested that states that appear aggressive can make others
react with the goal of strengthening alliances against this perceived threat. This is called
balancing (Walt 1985). When the aggressor is believed to be unalterably aggressive,
balancing with others is also the best way to avoid becoming a victim20 (Langer 1950,
Walt 1985). In this chapter I theorize that threatened countries are more likely to use a
high level of soft power to balance out the strong regional threat by trying to build
alliances.
It is also one of the underlying assumptions of this theory that a large number of
soft power interactions with other countries can enhance alliance building by creating,
what Nye (2011) called a climate of attractions and a web of personal ties. The high level

20

Walt (1985) specifically used Finland as a country that bandwagons but I argue that in
terms of its soft power use, Finland has been balancing since its independence in 1917.
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of positive interaction between countries makes alliance formation more likely. In terms
of my most-similar case design, this means that, according to my theory, Finland should
be expected to use a large number of soft power actions to balance against the perceived
Russian threat, while without having an aggressive neighbor, New Zealand relies on a
low number of soft power actions.
Further, international relations literature has also suggested that major geopolitical
actors, such as Russia, create a situation in which the political elite of the neighboring
countries perceives them as an existential threat (Zhu 2012). The political elite consists of
people with a voice in the political process for example presidents, prime ministers,
ministers and directors of key political institutions. In order to communicate this threat to
the public and to policy makers, the political elite creates a narrative that emphasizes
national security and frequent interaction with other countries (Moisio 1998) as well as
the importance of alliances building in the form of balancing (Walt 1985).
The political elite’s narrative also supports the creation and expansion of the
institutions and programs which results in a political and institutional commitment of
high soft power use in foreign policy. As a result, governments that are facing a threat,
create soft power institutions, which strengthen their alliances using programs that build
bridges and enhance the connections between governments. For this reason, the history
of the programs signals the age of each soft power program and possible reveals path
dependency.
When programs exist for many years, this can create a self-reinforcing process
which results in the continuation of the program for a long time instead of its cancelation
because it is easier to rely on the old programs then to create new ones (Pierson 2000).
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This process is captured well by the concept of increasing returns (Pierson 2000).
Increasing returns means that the probability of further steps along the same path
increases with each move down that path because the relative benefits of the same steps
compared to a new direction increases over time (Pierson 2000). Stated differently, the
longer a program is in place, the more likely it is that they will remain in use and thus
they enhance the country’s soft power use abroad. This can also lead to an institutional
commitment of high soft power use. On the other hand, where the soft power institutions
have not been created, like in New Zealand, there cannot be the same degree of
institutional commitment to soft power use.
Finally, allocating national budget to soft power programs is also closely related
to the political elite’s narrative and it can also reveal path dependency. Because of the
political elite’s narrative about the constant threat to their national security, and the need
to strengthen alliances, this defensive narrative builds into the budget calculation and
increases the amount of funds approved for soft power programs. This often results in a
lock-in mechanism, which makes it more likely that the government will continue to fund
these programs instead of canceling them. As the later section of this chapter illustrates
Finland spends over 2% of its national budget on soft power programs, which is a high
percentage. On the other hand, New Zealand spends less than 0.04% on its soft power
programs annually, which represents a low soft power budget. The consistent and high
soft power budget allocation signals the general policy direction of the government21
(Jones et al. 2009). In the cases of high soft power user countries, the political leadership

21 Changes in the distribution of budgetary outcomes in crucial to the study of policy
changes (Jones et al. 2009) and in in this dissertation indicates a change in the support of
soft power use.
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funds soft power programs well and consistently with the intention of balancing against
the threat by strengthening alliances. In other words, high soft power budget leads to high
soft power use.
Overall, in countries with a threating neighbor, the political elite is likely to
emphasize the importance of national security and alliance building, constructing a
narrative that influences institutions and the federal budget allocation. Based on this
theory, when a country perceives a threat, the political elite constructs a narrative that
promotes alliance building. In order to build alliances, the threatened country uses soft
power instruments by creating soft power programs and funding them well. The longer
this narrative persists over time, the resulting soft power programs will become bigger
and a normal part of the country’s foreign policy. In countries such as in New Zealand
where some or all of these factors are missing, the country is expected to use less soft
power.
In the next section first, I discuss Finland’s and New Zealand’s geopolitics with
special attention to the perception of threat. Second, I turn to the narrative of the political
elite to find out if it indicates a perception of threat and whether it constructs foreign
policy goals that emphasize national security, alliance building and balancing. Third, I
study soft power institutions and programs to see if they support the alliance building
goals and to see if they have been in existence for a long time. Fourth, I collect budget
information from each selected soft power programs and study the amount and the
consistency of such budget allocations in order to establish if the budget is provided to
support alliance building. In the conclusion, I trace the connection between the examined
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factors and soft power use and answer the question: why does Finland (94%) use so much
more soft power than New Zealand (68%)?
5.3 FINNISH SOFT POWER
The statistical analysis showed that Finland is one of the highest soft power user
countries (94%). This means that, out of 100 international interactions, the Finnish
government selects soft power instruments 94 times. Finland has been known for its
stable government, high living standards, successful private companies such as 22Nokia
and video games like Angry Birds.
5.4 GEOPOLITICS OF FINLAND
Based on my theory, geopolitics impacts countries’ foreign policy including its soft
power use. For this reason, Finland is said to be one of the best cases to illustrate the
influence of geopolitics in foreign policy (Moisio 1998). Finland’s location on the map
has been shaping its foreign policy even before the Cold War (Moisio 1998). Finland’s
geopolitical history with Russia began with the formation of the Finnish nation and
territory as an autonomous quasi-state under the Russian Empire (1809-1917) (Moisio
1998) and continued with Finland’s independence in 1917 (Browning 2002). During this
time, Finnish autonomy was threatened by the rising Russian empire (Apunen and
Rytövuori 1982). While Finland became an independent sovereign state in 1917, the
Russian threat did not disappear.
In 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact, which
included a secret protocol transferring Finland to the Soviet sphere of interest. When

22 While private soft power resources are also part of a country’s soft power resources,
this study focuses on the government soft power actions.
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Finland refused to allow the Soviet Union to build military bases on its territory, the
Soviets attacked Finland. The “Winter War” ended in a peace treaty drawn up in Moscow
on March 13, 1940, giving southeastern Finland to the Soviet Union (This is Finland.
History. 2019). The Soviets did not give up their future plans to occupy the Finnish
capital until 1944. That is when the border between Finland and Russia were finalized
based on the lines where the military front lines were stabilized late in summer of 1944
(Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). While Finland lost some of its territory, it was able to
preserve its independence and was forced to handle the continued threat from Russia for
the years to come.
After WWII, the Soviet leaders made it clear that they do not tolerate any hostile
governments on their borders (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). This approach was accepted
at the Yalta conference (Tuomo 1980, Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). As a result of the
great powers’ acceptance of such concept, in order to defend its autonomy from the
Soviet Union, Finland carefully formulated a sophisticated foreign policy in 1948
(Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). According to this plan, Finland dealt with the perceived
threat from the USSR by staying neutral and did not join the Western defense community
(Apunen and Rytövuori 1982).
The Finnish proximity and history with Russia have led to the development of the
perception of threat (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982, Moller and Bjereld 2010). Since
Finland’s national security has been threatened for over two centuries by the Russian
geographic proximity, the main Finnish foreign policy goal was to protect the country
from an invasion by not provoking any forceful actions from Russia. And since Finland
perceived Russia as a much stronger military power, Finland felt it had to balance against
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Russia with its non-aggressive soft power tools. For this reason, the Finnish leadership
decided to react to the perceived threat by building alliances with the West. As a result,
Finland learned to use soft power to strengthen its alliances in order to protect itself from
Russia (and the Soviet Union) (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982, Browning 2002).
5.5 THE FINNISH POLITICAL ELITE’S NARRATIVE-HOW FINLAND BALANCES
WITH SOFT POWER
My theory suggests that the political elite’s narrative plays a key role in countries’
soft power use. As it was explained before, the Finnish political elite is expected to
construct a narrative that directs Finnish foreign policy to alliance building against the
perceived Russian threat. Specifically, in this section I am looking for indications of the
Finnish elite’s concern about the threat and the encouragement of international alliances.
In other words, I am looking for indicators of the Finnish government’s balancing with its
soft power actions.
In Finland, presidents play a crucial role in foreign policy. As part of the political
elite, their narrative is represented in the foreign policy formulation and their agendas and
soft power policies can increase or decrease soft power use. Finland is a parliamentary
representative democracy. The head of state is the President who is also in charge of
foreign policy. This means that the use of soft power to achieve foreign policy goals is
also vested in the hand of the President. This section will highlight some of the
presidents’ speeches to study if there is a national security threat present and if they were
likely to rely on soft power instruments in order to create alliances. This section will also
look at the alliance that were formed during this time-period to see if they were created to
defend against the perceived Russian threat.
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After Finland earned its independence from Russia in 1917, and later after WWII
the great powers agreed that Finland cannot be allowed to become hostile to the USSR, it
was the job of the Finnish presidents to promote a carefully designed foreign policy in
which they do not provoke the aggressive Russian neighbor. As President Kekkonen said
in 1956, Finland will not and cannot pursue good relations with the West at the expense
of its relations with the Soviet Union (Apunen and Rytövuaki 1982).
As a result of the Russian threat, this carefully crafted foreign policy of balancing
with Finnish soft power continued after the Cold War by future presidents with additional
goals. The new Finnish foreign policy included an E.U. integration, increased
engagement with international organizations and the support of an E.U. common security
and defense policy in the form of peacekeeping operations (Palosaari 2013). All of these
goals required high interactions with other countries.
President Ahtisaari was elected president (1994-2000) at a historical moment in
Finland’s life which also altered its foreign policy. This moment was Finland’s E.U.
membership in 1995 which also changed a policy of neutrality into a policy of E.U.
integration (Browning 2008, Palosaari 2013). In terms of President’s narrative in foreign
policy, in 1994 he stated the following in light of its effort to gain E.U. membership:
“Yesterday’s tools are not sufficient to solve the future’s problems. […] In history all
upheavals had an impact on Finland’s security. This was particularly true during and after
the Second World War. Communism collapsed and the bipolar system yielded. […]. New
tools and new shared views are needed to deal with the new security challenges of
Europe. […] An important part of this Northern dimension is the 800 miles of land border
that we share with Russia. With Finland in the E.U. and Russia will meet at this point.
[…] Ladies and gentlemen, Finland is a firm advocate of cooperative security. […] We
favor closer cooperation and joint efforts by all democratic states not only in Europe but
across the Atlantic and on the global level.” (Ahtisaari 1994)
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The above-referenced speech illustrates President Ahtisaari’s narrative about
Finland’s national security issues connected to Russia. More specifically the speech
shows that the 800 miles of shared border between Russia and Finland together with
Russia’s historically aggressive behavior in the region still causes a perceived threat for
the Finnish political elite. The speech also explains the government’s new direction
towards E.U. integration. Regarding the threat from Russia, a closer membership and
cooperation with the European community strengthens Finnish alliances with all other 26
members and connects Finland with the West. In terms of soft power, this meant that
President Ahtisaari’s main foreign policy promoted soft power use with E.U. members as
well as strengthened Finland’s global mediator role on the world stage (Browning 2018).
The fact that during the Ahtisaari presidency Finland became member of the E.U
and engaged in numerous crisis management and peacekeeping operations further
illustrates this foreign policy shift (Browning 2008). Based on the conceptualization of
this dissertation providing peacekeeping operations is a soft power action, Finland found
another way to use soft power to build alliances without provoking Russia. For instance,
some of these peace keeping operations included the Concordia operation in Macedonia
in 2003 and the Althea operation in Bosnia in 2004 (Palosaari 2013). By actively
supporting the stabilization of the Balkan, Finland showed that they were reliable
partners of European nations. This tightened its alliances within Europe and signaled to
the world that Finland is a reliable ally.
In terms of building new alliances, Finland continued to join alliances after the
Cold War (Moller and Bjereld 2010). In fact, by 2000 the Correlates of War IGO
(International Government Organization) data analysis concluded that Finland joined the
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greatest number of alliances of all countries (Pevenhouse et al 2004). Stated differently,
looking at the new alliance memberships of Finland, since the Cold War ended, the
Finnish presidents’ foreign policy encouraged and implemented high soft power use to
build alliances regionally and globally.
Tarja Halonen (200-2012) followed Ahtisaari as President. She was a Foreign
Minister before becoming the 11th President of Finland. In terms of using a narrative that
points to the Russian threat, the below speech illustrates that national security has
remained a key issue in her speeches as well. In a meeting of ambassadors in 2002,
President Halonen stated the following about Finland’s international engagement:
“I am a supporter of multilateralism on both a global and a European level. In the existing
crisis-management tradition we have many actors. On the global level, the UN still holds
an overwhelmingly dominant position. We are actively participating in the development
of a common foreign and security policy.” (Halonen 2002)
As the above speech indicates, Halonen’s foreign policy’s general goal was to
maximize Finnish influence abroad by using peaceful instruments (Haukkala 2010).
Specifically, this meant that President Halonen’s government used all diplomatic tolls
necessary to secure a seat at most international organizations, especially within the E.U.
(Haukkala 2010). By achieving and strengthening Finland’s E.U. membership, Halonen
also strengthen Finland’s connections and alliances within the European community. As
the speech stated, one of Finland’s main foreign policy goal is to keep working with
international organizations. In the same speech Halonen also noted:
“I see Europe as being better at development work than at using force. It is better at
managing crises than at waging wars. […] Finland has been active, both alone and
together with Sweden and other countries which are not members of military alliances, in
the development of European security policy.[…] In reality, independently taking care of
crisis management in Europe is already a very demanding task for the E.U. and its
European partners, by which I mean also Russia.” (Halonen 2002)
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President Halonen’s preferences of non-coercive foreign policy tools have also
been recorded (Doeser 2017). Specifically, Halonen continued the previous
administration’s peaceful approach and favored political, humanitarian and civilian
efforts to resolve conflict, and while the narrative of threat and national security
persisted, Finland’s foreign policy direction also states the preference for non-hard
power-based tools and demonstrates the goal of alliance building.
In terms of Finland’s NATO membership, the issue had come up numerous times
during Halonen’s presidential campaign and during her tenure. Halonen and the Finnish
leadership decided that Finland would not join NATO (Doeser 2017). It is interesting to
note that due to its close location to Russia, Finland to date has still not joined NATO but
instead focused its foreign policy towards promoting a strong international role for
Finland23 (Browning 2008). It must also be stated here that the last two presidents’
speeches mention Russia as an in important actor in the context of national security, crisis
management and conflict. This suggests that the Finnish political elite continues to be
worried about the Russian threat and this concern builds into their narratives and
speeches.
Overall, by studying the political speeches of Finnish presidents as part of the
political elite, it became apparent that they include national security as one of the main
issues in foreign policy. The speeches also implied the Russian threat. In addition, they
all favored an outgoing foreign policy in which Finland builds alliances in Western

23 Also important to note that slightly before the time-frame of this dissertation, based on
COW data, Finland has only signed one military agreement, and that was a nonaggression agreement with Russia in 1992. This agreement allowed Finland to proceed
towards its E.U. membership. It can also been seen as a great foreign policy win for
Finland as she was able to influence Russia to sign such as non-aggression agreement.
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Europe and beyond (Doeser 2017). In terms of soft power actions, this meant that the
presidents were creating the narrative that encouraged soft power actions to engage with
the world in order to build alliances. These narratives ultimately resulted in high soft
power use.
5.6 SOFT POWER PROGRAMS AND INSTITUTIONS OF FINLAND
My theory suggests that in countries where there is a perception of threat, the
political elite creates a narrative that leads to the creation of soft power institutions and
programs with the goal of strengthening alliances. My theory also suggests that by
balancing with soft power, the creation of such programs ultimately can lead to
institutional and political commitment to use high level of soft power in foreign policy.
For this reason, in this section I identify the Finnish soft power institutions and programs,
discuss the reasons they were created and trace how the programs have developed over
time. The goal is to reveal any connections between the elite’s narrative about national
security issues caused by the Russians and the level of soft power use via these
institutions.
In order to better understand the Finnish government’s strategic priorities in soft
power and to find out if there is an institutional and political commitment to high soft
power use in this section, I turn to the analysis of soft power programs to reveal which
Finnish programs support alliance building using soft power tools. I also study the timespan of the programs to find out if they have been in existence for a long-time. In order to
do so, I collect information from various government websites and from federal budget
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documents about the Finnish government’s long-term programs24. In addition, I refer to
articles on foreign policy analysis to evaluate Finnish soft power use facilitated by
government programs.
Even though there is no specific soft power program or department within the
Finnish government, the evaluation of the below listed programs reveals their soft power
elements. In the Finnish government’s budget documents, I found that some of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) programs and some of the Ministry of Education
and Culture’s (MEC) programs were compatible with my soft power definition. The
following list presents the found soft power institutions and programs starting with the
oldest and ending with the newest.
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Programs (MFA)
o The Foreign Service (1918)
o International Development Cooperation (1988)
o Neighboring Area Cooperation (short-term)
o Civilian Crisis Management (1990s)
o Cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and other CIS
Countries (short-term)
o Commercial-Industrial Cooperation (short-term)
o Unit for Public Diplomacy (2008)
Ministry of Education and Culture Programs (MEC)
o The Sports Department (1966)
o Art and Culture (1974)
o International Cooperation (1974)
 Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute (2005)
o Cultural, Museum and Library Activities (1990s)
As this list of soft power programs show, in Finland there are 2 ministries and 12
programs that are practicing soft power in order to support Finnish foreign policy efforts.

24 There are also short-term programs such as Neighboring Area Cooperation,
Cooperation with Central and Eastern European, Russia and CIS Countries, CommercialIndustrial Cooperation. These programs were only created for a few years and then were
discontinued.
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In the next section, I will evaluate the 2 ministries (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry
of Education and Culture) to reveal how they facilitate Finnish soft power use with their
long-term programs25.
5.6.1 MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA)
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the main Finnish institution that is
designed to support the Finish government’s foreign policy including its soft power use.
This means that while not all of the Ministry’s programs use soft power abroad, the
selected programs use soft power to achieve foreign policy goals. In the next section, I
will evaluate the main mission of each ministry looking for the goal of alliance building,
reveal the year it was created and discuss some of their programs that use soft power.
According to the official website of the MFA of Finland, their central task is to
build a secure and predictable future for all Finns (Finland. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Mission. 2019). In addition, part of the mission statement on the ministry’s website also
explains the country’s foreign and security policy which focus on preserving Finland’s
independence.
The establishment of Finnish Foreign Affairs representation started very early,
during the imperial Russia’s rule over Finland. While Finland was not an independent
sovereign country yet, Finns used the diplomatic services of the Russian embassies as
early as 1858 (The History of Foreign Affairs Administration in Finland). The
independent Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was first created in 1918, under the
name of Foreign Affairs Bureau right after Finland became an independent country (The

25 The short-term programs will not be discussed as they do not represent well the longterm soft power plans of the government as soft power is not a short-term solution.
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History of Foreign Affairs Administration 1). The Ministry’s goals were to organize
Finland’s official relations with the foreign media and to spread general information
about the country, its people, history, culture and the economy (Clerk 2014, Clerk 2015,
Ipatti 2018). These functions promoted Finnish attractiveness abroad and its ability to
strengthened alliances since 1918. Creating these soft power programs built a strong
foundation for Finnish soft power use in foreign policy.
Between 1918 and 1955, the Finnish MFA continued to strengthen its cultural
relations with the West while dealing with the Russian threat from the East. From the late
1930s through the end of the Cold War, two main factors impacted Finnish soft power
use abroad. These were the Soviet Union’s attack in 1939 and the diplomatic and
strategic balancing of Finland’s neutrality during the Cold War (Clerk 2015, Sberro
2015). During the Cold War the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ goal was to communicate
Finland’s political neutrality while maintain its cultural ties with the West by projecting
its attractiveness (Browning 2002, Clerc 2015, Ipatti 2018). Maintaining cultural ties and
projecting Finnish attractiveness are key aspects government’s strategic use of soft power
in order to balance against the Russian threat and build alliances with the West.
The duties related to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased greatly from 1955
for three reasons. With new independent countries emerging after decolonization of
French, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese and British colonies, Finland began to establish
political and commercial relations beyond the borders of Europe. Also, Finnish
international cooperation started to expand from the traditional areas into science,
technology, education and social affairs. In terms of foreign policy this meant that
Finland’s overall strategy with its hard power was to bandwagon with the USSR, but with
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its soft power it was to balance against it. For this reason, Finland needed a robust
ministry to handle its international negotiations and its soft power use.
After Finland's accession to the United Nations in 1955, the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs’ involvement with various international and regional organizations, including
economic cooperation programs greatly increased. Even more importantly for soft power
use, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1987 and 1988, new departments were
created to support development, cooperation, press, and culture (The History of Foreign
Affairs Administration 1). These functions are the core of soft power use. As a result, in
1988 the Department for Development Cooperation was created and became the first soft
power program within the MFA.
5.6.1.2 FOREIGN SERVICE
The other major department within the MFA that supports Finnish soft power use
is the Foreign Service. While the main mission of the Foreign Service is to conduct
traditional diplomacy, it is also the most visible outposts of Finnish foreign policy
conducted abroad. The Finnish Foreign Service was first created in 1918 with the
formation of the Foreign Affairs Bureau to support the foreign missions and their
diplomats abroad (The History of Foreign Affairs 1). The official government website
describes the following as the Finnish Foreign Services strategic priorities: Foreign and
security policy aims to strengthen Finland’s international position, desires to secure
Finland’s independence and regional integrity (Strategic Priorities 1). In order to achieve
these goals, diplomats and other foreign service personnel are carrying out the Finnish
foreign policy objectives abroad by relying on traditional diplomatic tools as well as soft
power tools.
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In terms of soft power use, in addition to traditional diplomatic missions, the
Finish MFA has clearly stated that Finland wants to be a key player in the global
community by supporting attractive global issues such as global warming and poverty.
By supporting global problems Finland also works in cooperation with other
governments organizations thus strengthening its international alliances (Moller and
Bjereld 2010).
5.6.1.3 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
The Department for Development Cooperation (DDC) was created in 1988 within
the MFA and to date serves as the first Finnish soft power program within the MFA. The
Program of International Development Cooperation ensures that Finland implements its
development policy by cooperating with international partners, including international
organizations and NGOs, in order to achieve development goals (Goals and Principles 1).
As the official website of the MFA states, via development cooperation, Finland has been
strengthening its dialog with international organizations and with its allies (Goals and
Principles 1). In terms of Finnish soft power use, this means that Finland has been relying
on its development policy’s execution to strengthen its alliances internationally and
regionally. With close cooperation with the United Nations, Finland also strengthens its
role in the global community which is also the largest international alliance in the world.
5.6.1.4 CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Finland takes an active part in international civilian crisis management since the
beginning of 1990’s implemented by the European union (EU), the United Nations (UN),
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and the European
Council (EC) (Crisis Management Finland 1).The objective is to promote development
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towards respect for the rule of law and human rights, democracy, good governance and a
well-functioning civil society in the target regions. The MFA is responsible for the
political guidance of civilian crisis management and decides in which operations Finnish
experts participate (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Crisis Management 1). Civilian crisis
management operations are conducted in crisis areas and other regions in which the most
critical functions of society are in need. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Crisis Management
1). By providing assistance to countries in crisis, Finland strengthens its international role
as a reliable ally. By focusing on the civilian aspect of crisis management, the Finnish
government is using its careful strategy to balance against the Russian force.
5.6.1.5 UNIT FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
The MFA’s Public Diplomacy program has been renamed many times, but since
2008 it has been called the Unit for Public Diplomacy. This department plans the Finnish
country branding in the foreign service (Finland. Unit for Public Diplomacy 1). Finnish
public diplomacy (which is a form of soft power use) is a type of strategic
communication in order to strengthen international networks in various sectors such as in
cultural exports, education, innovation policy, immigration, or even in the environmental
field. This work is accomplished through media and culture in addition to other means of
promotion and influence. The emphasis and strategic application of public diplomacy is
an important factor that suggest the Finnish government’s ability to rely on soft power
instruments in its foreign policies. The creation of the Unit for Public Diplomacy in 2008
also indicates that the Finnish government has been strategically using soft power
instruments in their foreign policies, and they plan to continue to do so.
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The MFA has been overseeing other important short-term soft power programs as
well including the Neighboring Cooperation, Cooperation with Central and Eastern
European, Russia and other CIS Countries, and the Commercial-Industrial Cooperation.
As this brief historical overview of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ programs
revealed, the Finnish government had over 31 (since 1988) years to develop its
institutions and foreign policy mechanism for representing the Finnish interest abroad
using soft power. As the above overview also revealed, Finland’s main foreign policy
goals of connecting with the West and building alliances (Sberro 2007, Browning 2008).
All these foreign policy goals require the existence of many programs, which overall
boosts soft power use.
5.6.2 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE (MEC)
The second ministry that actively supports soft power programs to achieve foreign
policy goals is the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). The formation of Finnish
international cultural policy goes back to the 1970s. In 1974 the Bill for the Promotion of
Municipal Cultural Activities articulated three objectives, one of which was the
promotion of international cultural cooperation (Kangas 2001). Later in 1999, the new
directions of cultural policy, especially regarding the role of the cultural industries in a
strategy of economic development were also written into the official program by the
Finnish government (1999). According to this new direction, art played a crucial role in
Finland’s international outreach (Kangas 2001) and as such enhanced soft power use.
The MEC is responsible for the development of education, science, cultural, sport,
and youth policies and for strengthening international cooperation in these fields. One of
their foreign policy objectives is to promote international cooperation (Ministry of
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Education and Culture 2019). The Ministry outlines national policy concerning
cooperation with international organizations, culture, youth, sports, and certain fields of
research. In international affairs, MEC participates in the work of major international
organizations and regional councils, implements programs and initiatives nationally, and
supports cultural cooperation and expatriate activities (Ministry of Education and Culture
2019).
Under MEC there are numerous programs whose mission is to use Finnish soft
power in in foreign policy. Some of these initiatives are Art and Culture, The Sports
Department, International Cooperation and the Cultural Museums and Library Activities.
The next section will review the history and mission of these programs in order to reveal
their alliance building purposes.
5.6.2.1 SPORTS DEPARTMENT
The Department for Cultural, Sport and Youth Policy was created in 1966 as an
Arts Office within the MEC (Kangas 2001). In terms of using sports to achieve foreign
policy goals, the MEC states that the focus in cooperative efforts has been on
strengthening the integrity in sports; the promotion of equal rights; anti-doping activities;
the prevention of spectator violence; and issues related to the status of athletes within
Europe as well as globally. MEC further emphasizes its role in international
organizations in sport-related cooperation. Stated differently, the underlying objective of
the Sport Department is to appeal to other countries with its focus on the ethical and
performance-based regulation and drug freeness of sports.
In terms of international interactions and objectives related to MEC, Finland's
most important cooperation organizations are the European Union, the Council of Europe
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and UNESCO (United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization). While
Finland stresses that the main goals of athletic cooperation are to coordinate and
harmonize the sport-related policies and practices within the E.U., by investing into such
goals they are also using sports as a soft power tool to interact with other European
nations. Therefore, with sports Finland does not have any global ambitions, it only uses it
to strengthen its European alliances.
5.6.2.2 ART AND CULTURE
Arts and Culture section of the MEC has been in existence since the 1974 with the
objective of strengthening international cooperation by using Finnish arts and culture
(Kangas 2001). This function also made the Arts and Culture Program the MEC’s first
Finnish soft power initiative. Before Finland’s membership into the E.U. (in 1995), this
function of the MEC focused on connecting Finland with Western countries. After 1995,
the Arts and Culture concentrated on reaching and connecting with the other members of
the E.U. Arts and Culture works to promote and fund cultural exchange, cooperation
between operators and actors working in different art forms and the distribution of works
among the E.U. members states. Thus, Arts and Culture program within MEC works to
strengthen Finland’s alliances with the other E.U. members using the cultural aspects of
soft power since 1974. This makes this program (together with the International
Cooperation) the oldest soft power initiative within the MEC.
5.6.2.3 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The MEC’s international cooperation function is responsible for the coordination
of Finland's international cooperation in arts and culture since 1974. Specifically, Finland
cooperates with UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the Nordic Council of Ministers and

102

the Nordic Culture Fund, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Arctic Council,
the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and their cultural bodies as well as their neighboring
areas (Ministry of Education and Culture/The E.U. and International Cooperation in Arts
and Culture 1). The International Cooperation function reaches countries inside and
outside of the E.U. with the ultimate goal to strengthening cooperation and alliances.
5.6.2.4. FINNISH CULTURAL AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTE
One of the newer programs created under the MEC’s International Cooperation
initiative is the Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute. This Finnish network of 17
institutes was created in 2005 with the goal to increase the recognition of Finnish culture,
art and science in strategically important countries and promote cultural exchange and
cooperation as well as field-specific research and teaching abroad (Ministry of Education
and Culture/The E.U. and International Cooperation in Arts and Culture 1). This is also
the program that is designed to reach countries outside of the E.U. Some of the cities
where the Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute is hosted that are not E.U. members
are Beirut, St. Petersburg and Tokyo (Ministry of Education and Culture/The E.U. and
International Cooperation in Arts and Culture 1).
5.6.2.5 CULTURAL, MUSEUM AND LIBRARY ACTIVITIES
When it comes to international cooperation in the library field, since the early
1990s the role of the Ministry of Education and Culture’s Cultural, Museum and Library
Activities has been to strengthen the cooperation within E.U. members (Finland. EU and
International Cooperation 1). Finland has two mobile libraries as well. These mobile
libraries contain materials in Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish and Saami (Finland. EU and
International Cooperation 1). As this brief description showed, with the museum and
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library activities Finland only works to strengthen its alliances with other E.U. members
and the Nordic states (Taraskina 2009).
Overall, as the listed foreign affairs and cultural programs indicated, Finland has
created its foreign affairs institutions as early as 1918 with the purpose of connecting
diplomatically and culturally with the West as well as strengthen its alliances abroad. In
terms soft power programs, the MEC’s Arts and Culture initiatives were created in 1974,
which ultimately grew into the Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute in 2005. The
MFA’s initial soft power institution was the Foreign Service (created in 1918), which by
1988 developed into the International Development Program. Both ministries work
together to achieve Finnish foreign policy goals by using soft power programs.
The early establishments of these government institutions strongly supported its
strategic use of soft power programs starting in 1974 all over the world, which also lead
to institutional commitment to rely on them. The descriptions and the timeline of the
creation of the foreign affairs and cultural programs further revealed that Finland has a
45-year history relying on cultural tools, and a 31-year history in using economic aid as
foreign policy soft power tools. As the listed programs indicated, as a reaction to a
perceived threat from Russia, Finland’s political elite directed Finnish foreign policy
towards a strategic application of soft power with the goal of strengthening alliances with
the West. This foreign policy was built on high soft power use abroad.
5.7 FINLAND’S SOFT POWER BUDGET
In the last section of this most-similar case design, I turn to the closer analysis of
Finland’s soft power budget. Based on my theory, due to the political elite’s narrative
about a perceived threat, in countries where there is a strong military power nearby, a
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high soft power budget is calculated into country’s federal budget as a defense
mechanism that is aimed at building alliances. This section will look into the Finish soft
power budget to see if there is a high soft power budget allocation due to the perceived
threat of Russia.
In 1998 the total budget of Finland was $69.9 Billion (USD) (Statistics Finland
2019) of which 1.6 Billion USD was spent on soft power programs26. The amount of
USD is just important as the size of this budget compared to the entire government
budget. The percentage of soft power use indicates the size of the government’s
investment into soft power use as oppose to all other budget items. 1.6 Billion USD
indicates that the soft power budget allocation was 2.2% of the total budget. In 2010, the
total annual budget of Finland was $113.7 Billion (USD) (Statistics Finland 2019) of
which they spent an average of $2.9 Billion on soft power annually. That figure
represents 2.5% of the total budget.
The soft power budget of Finland was calculated by adding up the budgets of all
of the programs that qualified as a soft power programs within the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs (MFA) and selected programs from the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC)
(see Figure 5.1 for complete list). The original Finnish budget data was provided in Euros
which was converted in USD with the fix rate of (1.11)27. These budget items allocated to
these two ministries support the Finnish government’s ability to use soft power actions28.

26 The reason the detailed budget analysis does not start at 1995, is that program level
data was not available until 1998.
27 The original Finnish budget data was also received in Finish so using google translate,
I translated each budget item into English.
28 The Unit for Public Diplomacy receives its funding through the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs since 2008 and it is included under the Other Expenditure item.
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In order to better understand the way Finland allocates its budget for soft power,
Figure 5.1 shows the money allocation for all soft power programs allocated to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Culture. The highest soft
power budget receiver is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The selected soft power
programs within the (MFA) collect about twice as much funding as the selected programs
of the Ministry for Culture and Education (MCE). These soft power programs ensure
Finland’s attractiveness abroad as well as the government’s continuous reliance on soft
power actions such as consult, host a visit, and express intent to meet and negotiate.
Studying further Finland’s program-level budget information (Figure 5.1), it is
revealed that the most well-funded soft power activities are: International Development
Cooperation; Art and Culture: The Foreign Service and the Sports Department (Finnish
Budget 1995-2010). Looking at the distribution of funding within the MFA, we can see
that the International Development Cooperation receives the most funding (average 523
Million USD) followed by Arts and Culture from the MEC (average of 376 Million
USD). Scholars have noted that Finland historically spends a lot of its budget on culture
(Kangas 2001) and this budget showed that they also use culture as a soft power tool in
foreign policy.
In terms of the consistency of funding, 9 out of 12 receive a consistent amount
each year as those are planned to be long-term programs. The three programs that receive
0 USD for selected years are: 1: the Commercial and Industrial Cooperation program,
which only received funding in 1998; 2) the Cooperation with Central and Eastern
Europe, Russia and Other CIS Countries program, which was only funded for the years of
1998-2001 and; 3) the Neighboring Area Cooperation, which only receiving funding
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from 2001 to 2008. All of these programs were designed to be short-term and were

Millions

discontinued, while the nine other programs continued to be well-funded.

Finland's Program‐Level Soft Power Budget
in Millions USD
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Figure 5.1 Finland’s Program-Level Soft Power Budget 1995-2010 Sorted in the Order of
Highest to Lowest Budget.
With respect to Finland’s total soft power budget during the 1995-2010 timeperiod, as Figure 5.2 shows, Finland provides consistent and slightly increasing funding
for its soft power programs. While the lowest budget was allocated in 1998 in the amount
of 1.6 Billion USD, Finland has increased its soft power budget until 2008, when it has
reached its highest value of 3.1 Billion USD. Figure 5.2 also shows the soft power budget

107

allocation for each ministry. Not surprisingly, MEC gets about twice as much funding as
the MFA. As it has been pointed out, Finland has been known to spend high on its culture
and education, and it is not any different in its foreign policy either.

Billions

Finland's Ministry‐Level Soft Power Budget in Billions of
USD
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Figure 5.2 Finland’s Ministry-Level and Total Soft Power Budget for 1995-2010 in
Billions of U.S. Dollars Including the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the
Ministry of Education and Culture’s (MEC) Selected Programs.
In terms of the total amount of money allocated for soft power programs within
these ministries, this amount represents roughly 2.2 % of Finland’s total budget between
1998 and 2010. The collected soft power budget also revealed that Finland does not shy
away from spending money on long-term soft power programs, and the consistent budget
allocated to these two ministries suggests that Finland will continue to spend money on
its soft power with elevated focus on cultural programs.
Overall, observing four new indicators (geopolitical threat, political elite’s
narrative, historical analysis of soft power programs, and the soft power budget
allocation), it can be concluded that in terms of geopolitics, the Russian threat has
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increased Finnish soft power use as the Finnish political elite constructed a narrative
that continued to remind of the Russian threat and encouraged the Finnish government
to balance against Russia (using soft power tools) with alliance building.
The soft power programs are over 45 years old and have been used to
strengthen Finland’s foreign policy. The continuation of 9 out of 12 programs also
suggests path-dependence, which self-enforcing lock-in mechanism ensures the future
of the soft power programs. The old institutions provided support for the soft power
programs and facilitated soft power actions all over the world resulting in an
institutional commitment to use soft power.
Finally, the foreign policy budget allocation revealed that the political elite’s
narrative about the Russian threat has been increasing the use of soft power in foreign
policy. The relatively high (2.2% of total budget) soft power budget allocation of
Finland, also revealed path-dependence, which self-enforcing mechanism further
enhances the country’s soft power actions abroad. Stated differently, in Finland the
theorized mechanism of the geopolitical threat’s enhancing impact on soft power use
has been confirmed.
5.8 GEOPOLITICS OF NEW ZEALAND
The second country in this most-similar case design is New Zealand. New
Zealand is a small, trade-dependent, geographically isolated country (Buchanan 2010).
Geopolitically New Zealand is in a very different situation than Finland. While Finland
is sharing borders with its neighbors (including Russia), New Zealand is an island
nation at the southwestern edge of the Pacific Ocean, lying around 994 miles from the
nearest foreign landmass and 1,500 miles away from Australia. Its only neighbor is
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Australia, which country does not pose any threat to New Zealand. This means that in
the case of New Zealand, the government has not been threatened by a large military
power.
In addition, historically New Zealand’s has been part of the United Kingdom’s
Commonwealth since 1840 but has a unique relationship with Britain. New Zealand
had secure economic ties with Britain (until 1973) and at the same time, it is located at
a great distance from the center of the Empire (Buchanan 2010). These geopolitical
factors allowed New Zealand from the early twentieth century a high degree of
independence and flexibility (Buchanan 2010). In terms of geopolitical threat, New
Zealand did not have to protect its independence from any invaders, and only had to be
concerned with domestic issues such as the support of its native populations (Māoris).
Stated differently, due to the lack of any existential geopolitical threat, according to
my theory, New Zealand’s political elite did not have the need to develop a narrative
addressing an imminent threat, therefore, alliance building using soft power was also
not needed.
5.9 NEW ZEALAND’S SOFT POWER
The statistical analysis of this dissertation concluded that New Zealand is one of
the lowest users of soft power actions (68%). This means that, out of 100 international
interactions, New Zealand will only rely on soft power actions 68 times. Since this is one
of the lowest levels among the studied 51 democracies, this qualitative analysis will look
into the potential indicators of such low soft power reliance.
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The New Zealand government’s strategic use of soft power has been a young
phenomenon. Before the 1990s, New Zealand was mostly known for spectacular scenery,
natural beauty, Kiwi birds, and its indigenous Māori culture, but not for its constant
international reach and efforts to build alliances in foreign policy.
5.10 THE POLITICAL ELITE’S NARRATIVE
According to my theory, in countries where there is no geopolitical threat, the
political elite does not need to create a narrative that emphasizes national security in their
programs and institutions, which leads to lower use of soft power. New Zealand is a
constitutional monarchy, which means that the Prime Minister has the most political
power including the decision to decide how much to rely on soft power. In order to
connect New Zealand’s soft power use with its political elite, the next section will look at
Prime Ministers’ narrative about national security issues. If my theory is correct, in New
Zealand there is no imminent national security issue that would threaten the existence of
the country, which also means that New Zealand does not need to rely on high soft power
us to build alliances.
In order to study the main national security issues in New Zealand, I looked at the
specific topics that Prime Ministers discuss under national security. Since WWII, the
main security issue has been the desire to ban nuclear testing in the pacific region. In
1963 Prime Minister Holyoake said the following in a parliamentary debate:
“[…] the New Zealand government has received the news that a partial nuclear test ban
treaty has been initiated in Moscow by British, United States and Soviet negotiators.
Beyond a doubt this represents the most important step taken post-war disarmament
discussion. Because of the obvious difficulties of in the way of rapid progress toward
general disarmament, which is and must remain our aim, the New Zealand Government
has joined with many other governments in advocating the urgent need to conclude a test
ban treaty.” (Holyoake 1963, 856)
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As Prime Minister Holyoake later explains in the same speech, New Zealand’s main
concern with nuclear weapons was not existential, instead they were worried about
possible radioactive fallout of the tests and the spread of nuclear weapons to other
countries in the region. As this example illustrates, the political elite did not feel
threatened by any imminent existential threat. And while the banning of nuclear testing
from the territory of New Zealand was a key foreign policy issue for the political elite
starting in the 1960s, it did not directly threaten the independence or the existence of New
Zealand, thus the narrative only had to focus on the collective good aspect of a potential
test ban treaty.
In terms of threat perception, nothing has changed in the next two decades. In the
1980s Prime Minister Robert Muldoon’s 1980 observation that “our foreign policy is
trade” also pointed to New Zealand’s lack of any geopolitical threats (New Zealand
Institute of International Affairs 2019). Years later, taking a closer look at the New
Zealand’s political elite’s narrative in 1997, Prime Minister Bolger’ said the following
about China:
“China is now New Zealand's fifth largest market. Our relationship has also facilitated
links in other areas: in science and technology, in education, in sport and cultural
activities. We have exchanged not just goods but services, human resources and capital.
The strength of the relationship owes much to the complementary way our two countries
have each developed over the past quarter century.” (Bolger 1997)
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As this speech reveals, New Zealand does not feel threaten by China’s military
power. In fact, according to this speech, the two countries have a close economic
relationship and a strong social connection. Addressing the relationship between another
potential military threat, namely Japan, Prime Minister Shipley stated the following in
1999:
“In the case of New Zealand and Japan we have moved from two countries who hardly
knew each other, to regional partners. Around the region, we are entering a new
millennium woven together by a wide and colorful fabric of people to people links, trade,
investment and an emerging sense of being an Asia Pacific community.” (Shipley 1999)
Similarly to Prime Minister Bolger’s speech earlier, Prime Minister Shipley’s
narrative also confirms a strong social and economic link between New Zealand and
Japan without the perception of any threat from the military power. Moving on to the
2000s, the one threat identified in some of Prime Minister Clark’s speeches in 2000 was
globalization:
“New Zealand, as a small nation ‘surrounded by the images and perceptions of others,
was particularly vulnerable to cultural globalization but insisted that we are not a suburb
of Los Angeles, London or Sydney.” (Clark 2000, 1)
As a result of the Clark policies, by 2004 the Ministry for Culture and Heritage
stated that in a “globalized world it is all the more important that people are able to assert
their own unique identity.” (11) The ministry wanted to provide necessary protection
against the threat of global cultural homogenization (Goff 2000). As this example shows,
in 2000 the only threat identified in the political elite’s narrative in New Zealand was
globalization, which again, is not an existential threat. Globalization merely impacts
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culture, identity and lifestyle, which is why the Clark Administration focused its narrative
on protecting New Zealand’s culture.
Similarly, to the listed predecessors, Prime Minister Key has named nonproliferation as well as trade and regional cooperation as New Zealand’s main foreign
policy objectives and did not talk about national security threats. Continuing his
predecessor’s foreign policies, in a speech delivered in 2008 Prime Minister Key stated:
“I said I did not believe there would be major changes in our international relationships
under a National Government, and that New Zealand’s nuclear-free legislation should
remain.” (Key 2008)
In terms of alliance building, New Zealand is a member of the UN, which makes
the government set objectives that include the goals of the UN as well.
“New Zealand has contributed troops and personnel to UN peacekeeping operations since
they began in 1948. We’ve been involved in more than 40 peace operations in more than
25 countries over the past seven decades, either under UN auspices or as part of
coalitions. In peacekeeping duties we're known as collaborative, practical and respectful
team players with a good understanding of multiculturalism and an easy rapport with
local communities.” (New Zealand. Peace Rights and Security. 2019)
Providing peacekeeping forces and humanitarian aid are definitely soft power
actions, and as the official foreign policy website has shown, New Zealand has been
utilizing these types of soft power. For example, in the 1990s, New Zealand participated
in numerous peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor and in
the Asia-Pacific region (McGraw 2000). These missions were conducted for two reasons:
1) to demonstrate New Zealand’s international commitment to security issues to its allies,
and; 2) to strengthen its regional economic connections (McCraw 2000).
In addition, in 1951 New Zealand joined ANZUS, which was a military alliance
with the U.S. and Australia to protect the security of the Pacific. In 1984 the ANZUS
Treaty began to unravel when New Zealand declared its country a nuclear-free zone and
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refused to allow U.S. nuclear-powered submarines to visit its ports, and on September 17,
1986, the United States suspended its treaty obligations toward New Zealand (Office of
the Historian 1). Even though New Zealand has been unprotected by ANZUS since 1986,
she has not joined any other military alliances, which also indicates that they do not feel
threated by any of the military powers in the region.
In summary, the listed Prime Ministers and their foreign policy narratives made it
clear that New Zealand was living in peace with its neighbor and with the regional
hegemons. Without the perception of any threat in the region, New Zealand’s political
elite did not turn its foreign policy towards national security and alliance building but
rather focused on tightening the economic relations within the region, especially with
China and Japan. Two national security issues that were uncovered by the analysis were
nonproliferation and globalization.
While the resolution of these issues requires some soft power use, based on the
analysis of the above-listed political leaders, New Zealand’s political elite did not create a
narrative that would encourage more alliance building in addition to the existing
alliances. Instead, the political elite promoted strengthening existing economic
relationships in the region, which required a low degree of soft power. Further, since
2000 New Zealand’s foreign policy goal also included protecting the country’s culture
from globalization. This goal also required very low or no soft power use abroad. For the
listed reasons, New Zealand did not need to build a high level of soft power use into its
institutions and into its foreign policy.
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5.11 SOFT POWER INSTITUTIONS OF NEW ZEALAND
In order to learn more about the possible indicators of New Zealand’s low soft
power use, I turn to the closer study of its institutions. In the following section using
historical analysis, I identify and describe the soft power government programs of New
Zealand to uncover when they were created and for what reason. In New Zealand, I found
9 programs within two ministries that carry the mission of soft power. These are:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (selected programs) (MFAT)
o Administration of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities (1968)
o Subscriptions to International Organizations (1968)
o Pacific Cooperation Foundation (1989)
o Promotion of Asian Skills and Relationships (1991)
o Policy Advice and Representation - Other Countries (1998)
o Policy Advice and Representation - International Institutions (1998)
o Hosting of Pacific Islands Forum Meeting (MFAT) (short-term)
o International Radio Services (MFAT) (short-term)
Ministry for Culture and Heritage (selected program) (MCH)
o Cultural Diplomacy International Program (2007)
In order to better understand the goals of each ministry that funded the selected soft
power programs, I went to the official websites as well as read the New Zealand
treasury’s budget documents for each year. In addition, I collected foreign policy analysis
articles written about such programs and government goals.
5.11.1 THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE (MFAT)
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) was created in 1943 with the
purpose of making New Zealand more prosperous and safer (2019). As indicated in the
MFAT’s 2003 budget, the specific goal of this section of the government was the active
and constructive engagement on political, security, and economic issues within the AsiaPacific region, through strengthened bilateral relationships with key partners (particularly
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Australia, Japan, and the United States) and through participation in regional groupings
(Treasury New Zealand 2003 p.4).
The appropriations of the MFAT programs aimed to secure advice and services
for the government’s businesses with foreign countries and their governments, and with
international organizations. MFAT contributes to the achievement of key government
goals through the pursuit of activities which strengthen national identity, promote an
inclusive, innovative economy for the benefit of all, protect and enhance the
environment, and restore trust in government (p. 4). When listing the eight strategic goals
of MFAT, the list includes the goal of strengthening and protecting the use of
international rules and institutions to pursue New Zealand values and interests, but it
mostly focuses on regional economic development and territorial security (New Zealand
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019).
In 1995, the government also announced that New Zealand’s diplomatic
representation would be strengthened in Asia in the following cities: Beijing, Kuala
Lumpur, Singapore and Seoul (McCraw 2000). In 1995, New Zealand opened an
embassy in Hanoi to strengthen trade with Vietnam (McCraw 2000). This meant that the
foreign policy goals of New Zealand remained strictly regional and with an economic
focus. As the previous examples demonstrated, the MFAT’s main foreign goal is to
create economically beneficial partnerships mostly in Asia (New Zealand. Aid and
Development. 2019). The missions and activities of the Ministry are crucial in facilitating
soft power use abroad.
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5.11.1.2 SUBSCRIPTION TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
In accordance with the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968, this
section and payments is responsible for using soft power with international organization
by maintaining a good relationship with organizations such as the UN (United Nations),
the Commonwealth Secretariat, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (New Zealand
Foreign Affairs and Trade Budget 1998 p. 186). By promoting a positive relationship and
facilitating communication between New Zealand and large multinational organizations,
New Zealand is increasing its attractiveness with other countries as well as with the
organizations. In terms of the political elite’s narrative, membership to international
organizations helps New Zealand to strengthen its economic connections with its regional
trading partners thus improving New Zealand’s position in the regional market.
5.11.1.3 ADMINISTRATION OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES
Since the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act of 1968, another special
section that was created focuses on administering special privileges and diplomatic
immunities to diplomats of other countries. Specifically, this program enhancement of
New Zealand’s political and economic relationships with other countries by providing
diplomatic privileges (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Budget 1998, p. 191).
This is an important aspect of New Zealand’s soft power use, as providing diplomatic
benefits to representatives from other countries enhances its attractiveness abroad. This
gesture provides additional benefits to traditional diplomacy because not only the
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receiving country’s perception of New Zealand increases but also all those countries’
who are aware of the list of countries’ who were provided the diplomatic privileges.
5.11.1.4 PACIFIC COOPERATON FOUNDATION
Established in 1989, this program ensures that New Zeeland is pressing for
practical economic benefits from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
process, asserting New Zealand’s role in the wider Asia Pacific region by: strengthening
key bilateral linkages with Asia Pacific states; actively engaging in regional political
groupings and working closely with Australia and South Pacific countries to address
neighborhood issues (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Budget 1998 p. 189).
According to the official website of the foundation, the ultimate goal of this foundation is
to promote connected, informed and enabled communities in the Pacific region by
implementing public/private sector economic development and socio-cultural initiatives
in the Pacific region (Pacific Cooperation Foundation 1). This program became New
Zealand first soft power program within the MFAT.
5.11.1.5 PROMOTION OF ASIA SKILLS AND RELATIONSHIPS
In order to reach out to strategic partners, the government set up and substantially
funded the Asia 2000 Foundation stating in 1991, which administered programs that
helped the business sector to operate in Asia, promoted Asian studies in New Zealand,
supported cultural links and media coverage of Asia and helped greater knowledge and
acceptance of Asia among New Zealanders (McKinnon 1993).In terms of soft power use,
this was New Zealand’s the second set of programs within the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade that was designed to use soft power to achieve foreign policy goals.
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The Asia 2000 Foundation focused its foreign policy instruments to strengthen its
economic relationship with its non-threatening regional partners.
5.11.1.6 POLICY ADVICE AND REPRESENTATION-OTHER COUNTRIES
Since 1998, this group of programs has been created to improved conditions for
New Zealand’s trade and economic growth – focusing especially on Asia and the Pacific
- through regional and bilateral mechanisms, including APEC. The other function of
these programs is to maintain New Zealand’s role in the South Pacific and the close
relationships with Australia and South Pacific countries. In addition, these programs
work to enhance New Zealand’s political and economic relationships and high-level
contacts with other key countries in Asia, the Americas, Europe, Africa and the Middle
East (New Zealand Budget 1998 p.1990).
5.11.1.7 POLICY ADVICE AND REPRESENTATION-INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Based on the budget documents of New Zealand, this budget item was created in
1998 to improved conditions for New Zealand’s trade and economic growth through
multilateral mechanisms, including the WTO. This set of programs increased New
Zealand contributions to collective security through cooperation with allied and friendly
nations, a positive role in the UN, strengthening of the UN system and the rule of law,
and participation in peacekeeping, disarmament, humanitarian and regional security
networks. Finally, this initiative also supported New Zealand’s interests in the
development of international action, both multilateral and regional, for the protection of
the environment (New Zealand Budget 1998, p.191).
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5.11.2 MINISTRY FOR CULTURE AND HERITAGE (MCH)
The other Ministry in New Zealand that funds soft power programs is the Ministry
for Culture and Heritage. The history of this Ministry goes back to 1963, when the first
ministry to oversee art was created under the name of Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council of
New Zealand29. The purpose of this royal council was to support high art (classical
music, ballet, literature etc.) and make it widely accessible domestically (Skilling 2005).
In other words, the purpose of this council was to get the people in New Zealand cultured
(Skilling 2005). Such was the government's growing interest in the cultural sector that, in
1975, a ministerial portfolio for the arts was established (Volkerling 2010). This was
coordinated by the Department of Internal Affairs until 1991, when a separate
department, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs was created.
In the previous year’s arts and cultures were not strategically applied in foreign
policy. In 2000, there was a change in New Zealand’s political elite’s narrative as well as
in its foreign policy. With the leadership of Prime Minister Clark, the Ministry for
Culture and Heritage (MCH) was established not only to support and protect domestic
culture from globalization, but also to rebrand New Zealand as unique, welcoming and
innovative in order to improve the country’s position in the global market. MCH was
created by bringing together the Ministry of Cultural Affairs with the history and heritage
functions of the Department of Internal Affairs. The core functions of this ministry were
to strengthen New Zealand’s modern image abroad and to protect New Zealand’s culture

29 The involvement of New Zealand governments in culture, however, has a much longer
history. The government's role in protecting and managing the nation's cultural resources
can be traced back to at least 1865. But this approach had no foreign policy strategic goal.
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from globalization (Skilling 2010, Mark 2010). The creation of the MCH could focus on
protecting domestic culture and at the same time promoting New Zealand as a welcoming
business partner to other countries (Mark 2010). This new foreign policy goal and new
function of MCH also boosts New Zealand’s soft power use.
The MCH also provided advice on arts, culture, heritage, sport, recreation, and
broadcasting in addition to care for New Zealand memorials, monuments, war graves and
symbols of national identity domestically and abroad (New Zealand Ministry of Culture
and Heritage 2019). The creation of the MCH in 2000 was an important soft power
milestone for New Zealand. It formally marked government's recognition of the benefits
to be gained from bringing together the various cultural activities that for many years had
been scattered among several departments and now they could be applied in foreign
policy as well.
5.11.2.1 CULTURAL DIPLOMACY INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM
The first soft power program within the MCH was the Cultural Diplomacy
International Program’s (CDIP). At its creation in 2007, the objectives of the CDIP were
to project abroad a distinctive profile of New Zealand as a creative and diverse society
with a unique, contemporary culture strongly rooted in its diverse heritage. Even more
importantly for soft power use, to position New Zealand among targeted overseas
audiences as a country they could understand and want to engage with (Mark 2010).
The CDIP was created as a collaboration between six core New Zealand
government agencies: The Ministry for Culture and Heritage (MCH) and supported by a
Steering Group made up of representatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and
Trade (MFAT), New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE), Tourism New Zealand
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(TNZ), Te Puni Kōkiri (Ministry of Māori Development) (TPK), Education New Zealand
(ENZ) and New Zealand Story. The Steering Group consults other government and
cultural agencies and, on occasion, private sector interests, in order to recommend
programs or activities to the Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage. The roles of the
CDIP program are the management and delivery of a series of projects and activities
primarily focused on Asia and in locations where New Zealand is pursuing free trade
agreements such as in the U.S. and in the E.U. (Ministry for Culture and Heritage 2010).
CDIP programs included presentations of New Zealand cultural activities in the
selected region, including cultural activities, publicity, media, catalogues, translation and
project management. In addition, some of the other activities include management of
historic places, museum services, performing arts services and public broadcasting
services (NZ Cultural Diplomacy Report 2010). The economic benefits of each programs
were crucial for the New Zealand government and they were highlighted in each
program’s outcomes. This meant that in the case of New Zealand, even with this new
soft power program, the government was mostly using soft power actions to strengthen
its economic partnerships but not to gain alliances all over the world.
While the CDIP was established to spread New Zealand’s attractiveness abroad,
there was an issue that weakened its effectiveness. CDIP did not coordinate the
appropriate programs with the desired foreign policy objectives well (Mark 2010). The
reason for such miscoordination was the lack of a clear plan to create programs that can
connect with the country’s foreign policy objectives. For instance, the many of the
programs portrayed New Zealand as unique, deeply rooted in a diverse heritage but they
were not promoting a welcoming message for investors or to visitors (Mark 2010). The
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foreign policy object of New Zealand was to promote an image of society and culture that
is open to foreign investors, but what the CDIP program actually promoted was a
traditional cultural heritage that has been protected and sheltered. Stated differently, the
practice of New Zealand’s soft power has been poorly managed and badly executed as a
soft power tool.
As this analysis revealed, New Zealand’s soft power institutions were created in
1943 (MFAT) and in 2000 (MCH) and its first programs were formed in 1989 (Asia
Pacific Foundation) and in 2007 (Cultural Diplomacy International Program). As these
examples showed, New Zealand’s soft power use is mostly limited to their Asian partners
and allies and to peacekeeping missions to support developing nations. While New
Zealand does use some soft power to reach countries outside of the Pacific region, New
Zealand does not have to deal with a threatening power thus she does not seek to spread
its influence intensely outside of the existing alliances.
5.12 NEW ZEALAND’S SOFT POWER BUDGET
Similarly to the Finnish case, in the last part, I will evaluate New Zealand’s
spending habits on soft power programs while looking for indicators that may explain its
low soft power use. The shown budget is the combination of the above explained two
ministries and their 9 programs from 1995-2010, including specifically selected
programs’ budget from the MFA and from the MCH30. It is important to note here why
the education and sport budgets were not included in New Zealand’s soft power budget
while they were part of the Finnish soft power budget calculation. As the treasury

30 Online budget information was only available from 1998. The Treasury of New
Zealand scanned in their budget books and emailed them to me. While ministry level data
was retrieved, but program level data could not be before 1998.
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document from 2010 explains, the government’s goals for education are solely focused
on education of citizens, closing educational gaps between communities, and supporting
the Māori and Pacific communities (Treasury 2000, p7). The Department of Education of
New Zealand does not identify education as a tool to increase the country’s attractiveness
abroad so for this reason, it was not included in the soft power budget. On a similar note,
after studying New Zealand’s the strategic goals of the sports programs, (despite of the
international success of the ALL Black Rugby team), I concluded that they did not
support any foreign outreach efforts at all, so these were not included in the soft power
budget programs.
In 1998, the New Zealand government’s total budget was 24.28 Billion USD of
which 0.01 Billion USD was allocated to soft power programs (NZ Treasury 1999). This
budget allocation represents 0.001% of the total federal budget. In 2010, New Zealand’s
annual budget increased to 68.8 Billion USD (New Zealand Treasury 2010). As Figure
5.4 shows, the soft power budget was 0.28 Billion USD which represents 0.04% of New
Zealand’s governments budget. Figure 5.4 clearly shows an increase in the total soft
power budget as well as in the percentage of soft power spending over the total
government budget from 0.001% to 0.04%.
The original budget data was provided in New Zealand Dollar and was converted
into US Dollars at the fixed rate of 0.69. It is also important to note that in addition to the
Government of New Zealand, there is also private funding received for such initiatives.
My research focuses on the government spending and does not include any other
financial support. In order to provide a more telling picture of New Zealand’s soft power
budget, I also collected budget information on a program-level. The complete list of soft
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power programs can be seen on Figure 5.3. Figure 5.3 shows all 9 soft power programs
that were included in the budget analysis and also reveals any changes in their funding.
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Policy Advice and Representation ‐ Other Countries (MFAT)
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Figure 5.3 Soft Power Budget Allocation of New Zealand by Programs31 within
Ministries sorted by highest to lowest budget.
31 Budget items Policy Advice and Representation-Other Countries PLA and
Promotional Activities both have the same function as the Policy Advice and
Representation-Other Countries. They are supplementary budget items (not programs).
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The program-level data on soft power budget tells us that the government does
not fund soft power initiatives consistently. Figure 5.3 shows that out of the 12 budget
items, 10 are programs (two are supplementary budget items and not programs), two
receive funding for a few years but then do not get any money for a while. One of these is
Hosting the Pacific Island Forum, which received funding for the years 1998, 1999, and
2003 but not for all the other years. The other is the International Radio Services, which
was transferred into the private sphere after 2002. Cancelations happen because either
these programs were planned for a short-term, or the money was allocated elsewhere. In
the case of the Pacific Island Forum, it is not hosted by New Zealand every year. The
program-level data also reveals that one program within the MFA, the Policy Advice and
Representation for Other Countries receives the most funding (average of 112 Million
USD) and all other soft power programs get a significantly lower budget for each year
between 0.5 Million USD to 22 Million USD.
It is also important to note that the 2010 funding is the highest amount (0.28
Billion USD) allocated for the examined 1995-2010 time-period for soft power use. The
creation of a new soft power program (Cultural International Diplomacy Program32) in
2007 and the later merged ministries creating the Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment in 2012 are indications that the New Zealand government is going to focus
more on the use of its soft power in the future, however, some of the issues surfacing are
the lack of government programs and institutions that would exercise such soft power
actions consistently.

32 CDIP’s first budget allocation was created in 2006 so it can be fully operational by
2007. Budget data for this program has been collected from 2006-2010.
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Moving to the ministry-level analysis, Figure 5.4 shows the country’s soft power
budget by the two listed ministries to indicate any changes in the money allocation. As
Figure 5.4 shows, since 1998 the soft power spending has been slowly increasing from
0.1 Billion USD to 0.23 Billion USD by 2008. Figure 5.4 also shows that almost all of
the soft power budget allocation was to the MFAT with the only exception of the CDIP
programs starting in 2006. Overall, it was the last year of this analysis (2010), that
allocated the most funds to the MFAT and to the MCH soft power programs during the
examined time-period as the budget increased the soft power spending to 0.28 Billion
USD by 2010. Stated differently, based on the observed changes in New Zealand’s soft
power budget and its new (CDIP) program, it is reasonable to say that the government
will rely more on soft power actions in the future33.

33 In addition, the creation of programs under the Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment fit the descriptions of Nye’s soft power, but this specific ministry was not
created until 2012 by merging the Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of
Science and Innovation, Department of Labor and the Department of Building and
Housing (New Zealand Treasury). While the time-frame of this dissertation ends in 2010,
New Zealand shows promising budget trends and programs that indicate an increase in its
soft power use in the future.
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Figure 5.4. New Zealand’s Soft Power Budget by Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, and by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage
In conclusion, as the above qualitative analysis revealed, New Zealand’s soft
power budget is low and uneven. In addition, the government limits most of the soft
power programs to a regional reach, which also limits New Zealand’s global recognition.
However, due to a shift in the political elite’s narrative, the government’s new programs
such as the CDIP and its budget allocation suggests that New Zealand will focus more on
the use of soft power internationally in the future.
5.13 CONCLUSION
Overall, what governments do is a very important factor in understanding their
soft power use. As this chapter revealed, Finland has a high soft power reliance and New
Zealand uses soft power instruments to a low degree. I theorized that this is due to a
threatening neighbor that makes Finland to use a strategic balancing mechanism to build
alliances. As this chapter also showed, New Zealand does not have a perceived threat that
would encourage alliance building, thus New Zealand does not need to use a high level of
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soft power. And while New Zealand also uses soft power instruments, her strategic
choices focus on positioning itself in the regional market and forming economically
beneficial partnerships targeting China, Japan, and the Pacific Islands. While both
countries use soft power, as the previous study revealed, they both hope to achieve
different goals from such action, which impacts the amount of soft power they rely on.
What this chapter has discovered were indicators that the statistical analysis
missed. These were: 1) geopolitical threat; 2) political elite’s narrative; 3) age and
mission of soft power programs; 4) the differences in the consistency and the amount of
the respective governments’ soft power budgets. More deeply, what this chapter revealed
was the importance of a perceived geopolitical threat, measured by the narrative a
country developed and reflected in the programs it develops and funds over time. In
Finland, where Russia has threatened the country’s independence, the political elite
promoted a foreign policy, which carefully balanced with soft power in order to not
provoke their aggressive military giant. This resulted in high Finnish soft power reliance.
In New Zealand, on the other hand, due to the lack of any perceived geopolitical threats,
the political elite focus the country’s foreign policy on existing economic ties and
protection from globalization. None of these goals required high soft power use. Table
5.2 shows the results of the comparison between Finland and New Zealand.
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Table 5.2 Finland and New Zealand Comparison
Finland

New Zealand

Soft Power Use

High (94%)

Low (68%)

Geopolitical Threat

Threatened

Not Threatened

Political Elite’s National Security Present

Not Present

Narrative
First Soft Power User Institution

1918 Foreign

1943 Ministry of

Affairs Bureau

Foreign Affairs and
Trade

First Soft Programs

1974

1989 Pacific

International

Cooperation

Cooperation

Foundation within

Programs within

MFAT

MCE
Soft Power Budget as a % of Total

High

Low

Government Budget

2.2%

0.001%-0.04%

Consistent

Inconsistent

Revealing the impact of the geopolitical differences between Finland and New
Zealand, this analysis discovered that due to geopolitical threat, the Finnish soft power
use has been a much older phenomenon than in New Zealand. In the case of Finland, its
proximity to Russia has pushed the elite to create a narrative that constantly reminds of
the Russian threat. Due to the proximity of the Soviet Union, Finland was also forced to
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use its soft power programs to strengthen its sovereignty and take a politically neutral
position during the Cold War. Finland bandwagoned with its hard power but balanced
with its soft power programs. After the Cold War, Finland shifted its soft power towards
even more engagement with the West to build alliances. This resulted in the creation of
early soft power programs and institutions. Today these elements all serve as strong
pillars of high Finnish soft power use. Thus, geopolitical differences showed that having
a threat at the border increased Finnish soft power use in the form of a defense
mechanism. In the case of New Zealand, having a friendly neighbor resulted in a much
lower perceived need to use soft power.
The political elite’s narrative has been different in each country as well. While
in Finland, the political elite continuously points to the Russian threat, in New Zealand,
the political elite’s narrative focuses on nuclear disarmament and globalization. This
meant that while in Finland the idea of a necessary alliance building mechanism based on
existential threat was constructed into the soft power programs, in New Zealand that was
not the case. In New Zealand, the political elite’s narrative focuses on less threatening
issues and positioning the country as an attractive regional economic partner.
Further, it is important to note the difference between the number and the age of
soft power institutions and programs as well. The first Finnish soft power facilitating
institution was created in 1918 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), for the purpose of
strengthening Finland’s hard-earned independence from Russia and the first Finnish soft
power program was established in 1974 under the name of International Cooperation
under the Ministry of Education and Culture. In New Zealand, on the other hand, the first
institution that could facilitated soft power programs was not created until 1945 (Ministry
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of Foreign Affairs and Trade) while its first specifically soft power program was
established in 1989 (Pacific Cooperation Foundation). As these results show, Finland has
been relying on soft power programs since 1974, while New Zealand only started
utilizing it in 1989.
Comparing the number of ministries and programs that are associated with soft
power use in foreign policy, this chapter revealed that both countries have two ministries
that supervise their soft power use. One is a foreign affairs ministry and the other is a
ministry overseeing cultural affairs. In terms of the number of ministries involved, these
two countries are identical. In addition, this dissertation also identified 10 soft power
programs for New Zealand and 12 programs for Finland. Based on the number of soft
power programs, Finland has a larger number of government programs specialized on
soft power use abroad, which also contributes to its higher soft power reliance and to the
Finish institutional commitment to soft power use.
In terms of the budgetary differences, Finland spends much more money on its
soft power than New Zealand. This analysis revealed that the Finnish funding has been
consistent and appears to be locked into the annual budget calculation. The breaking
down of the soft power budget also revealed strategic differences. For Finland, its main
soft power budget allocation goes to cultural initiatives while in New Zealand it is
allocated for its MFAT’s policy advice programs, which is focusing on building
economic relationships.
In addition, New Zealand’s budget allocation pattern further indicates steady
increase in soft power budget since the 1990s. More specifically, New Zealand’s soft
power budget has been increasing from 0.001% to 0.04% of the total federal budget
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during the observed time-period. Finland, on the other hand, spends consistently on its
soft power around 2.2% of its total annual federal budget. Even with New Zealand’s
increase of its soft power budget, Finland still spends 55 times more money every year on
its soft power programs than New Zealand, which results in a higher Finnish soft power
reliance.
The strategic distribution of their respective money vastly differs as well. On the
ministry-level and on the program-level, Finland allocated its soft power budget more
evenly while New Zealand heavily funds one program (Policy Advice and
Representation-Other Countries) and barely allocated money to the other programs. In
order to successfully promote New Zealand’s foreign policy interest though soft power
use, the government needs to spend its budget more evenly, so most of the soft power
programs can strengthen and develop.
My two cases revealed new variables that can improve future quantitative
analyses of countries’ soft power use. The most-similar case design was able to disclose
the boosting impact of geopolitical threat on Finland’s soft power use, which factor
should also be tested on a larger number of countries. In the case of New Zealand, a new
foreign policy goal emerged. New Zealand wishes to strengthen its position in the
Southeast region and focuses most of its soft power efforts to achieve this goal. The
regional outreach of this policy also leads to a lower use of soft power actions, while
Finland’s alliance building foreign policy requires a more global outreach. This
ultimately also leads to higher soft power reliance for Finland.
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CHAPTER 6.
THE U.S.’S HISTORICAL STRONG RELIANCE ON SOFT POWER

In the previous chapters I outlined elements that may impact democracies’ soft
power use, and then I analyzed the patterns of soft power use amongst 51 democracies.
The statistical results showed that my hypothesized link between democracies’ social
trust and their soft power use is weak. In fact, social trust only explained about 18% of
countries’ soft power use variation. The statistical analysis also revealed that the
previously included resource and institutional variables could not explain more than 20%
of the variation either so more qualitative analysis was needed to uncover new
explanatory variables. I now turn to a crucial case design to study in-depth the already
included factors and to reveal any new independent variables.
6.1 CASE SELECTION. CRUCIAL CASE-U.S. AS A HEGEMON
There are 51 democracies in my dataset that are spread out geographically in all
five continents and have diverse economic and institutional characteristics. In my sample
there are 28 European, 12 from the Americas, 7 Asian, 1 Middle Eastern, 2 Australian
and 1 African nation. The United Stated has been selected for a crucial case design for
the following reasons. The United States is a wealthy hegemon that is very active in
international relations. In terms of its soft power action count, it stands out as the highest
user of soft power compared to all other democracies in the dataset. See Table 6.1. My
statistical measurement of American soft power use revealed that the U.S. government
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relies on an average of 32,788 soft power actions each year. This is an especially high
value compared to all other democracies in the dataset as the average soft power action
count is 2,306 per year.
Table 6.1 Average Soft Power Action Count and Average Soft Power Percentage
(1995-2010).
Soft Power Action Count Average
Per Year
United States

32,788

51 Democracies

2,065

The case of the United States also plays an important role in soft power literature
and in international relations in general. Not only the concept of soft power was created
by an American scholar (Joseph Nye), but also the United States’ use of soft power has
been the focus of most soft power scholarship1. In addition, the U.S. as a hegemon
impacts the international behavior of all other countries. In this chapter, the U.S. provides
a crucial case through which I will be able to examine one country for the purpose of
understanding how the most prominent actor in international relations behaves in terms of
its soft power use. I am specifically interested in uncovering any new factors that may
have resulted in such high soft power reliance.
Turning to a crucial case design, I will explore the possible drivers of the
American high soft power use. Crucial case studies are based on most-likely or leastlikely designs and can be useful for the purposes of testing certain types of theoretical
arguments, as long as the theory provides relatively precise predictions and the
measurement error is low (Eckstein 1975). Most/least likely designs are based on the
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assumption that some cases are more important than others for the purposes of testing a
theory. They are based on a Bayesian perspective in which the weight of the evidence is
evaluated relative to prior theoretical expectations (McKeown 1999, George and Bennett
2005). This means that the U.S.’ soft power reliance should be examined as a crucial
case because of its major power status in world politics and because of its high soft power
action outcome.
My statistical analysis revealed that, the U.S. has an exceptionally high GDP
(1.15 trillion USD) and high CINC scores (0.14). Both of these values support its major
power status in the world but none of these factors provided adequate answers about the
high American soft power use in the regression models of Chapter 4. The polity score
(10) was just slightly higher than the average of 51 democracies (8.87), therefore it was
not providing additional explanation regarding the exceptionally high soft power use
either (See Table 6.1).
Table 6.2 Average values for the main independent variables from the statistical analysis
(1995-2020). GDP is in current USD
Social Trust
GDP
CINC
Polity
United States

1.62

1.15E+13

0.14

10

51

1.06

7.00E+11

0.01

8.87

scale min

-0.46

3.57E+09

0

-10

scale max

2.18

1.5E+13

1

10

Democracies
Average
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My expectation based on my theory was that the high social trust value would
drive the American high soft power use. However, the findings indicated that the U.S.’s
social trust value was only slightly high at 1.62, which did not explain its exceptionally
high soft power reliance (See Table 6.2). Therefore, while the American social trust value
is somewhat higher that the average social trust value of the 51 countries include in the
dataset (1.06), it is not high enough to confirm my theory.
Since social trust could not provide adequate explanation for American high soft
power use, I turn to the realist literature that offered alternative explanations. Chapter 5
explained in detail my theory of soft power use based on the perception of geopolitical
threat. I will apply this theory to reveal if geopolitical threat offers answers about the high
American soft power use. The following sections will further study the impact of
geopolitical threat on American soft power use.
6.2 EXPLAINING THE EXEPTIONALY HIGH SOFT AMERICAN POWER USE
Since social trust did not provide sufficient answers about countries’ soft power
use, I now turn to alternative explanations. As I explained in Chapter 5, the foreign
policy literature pointed to geopolitics’ impact on countries’ foreign policy behaviors.
This literature suggested that countries react to geopolitical threat by taking actions that
are designed to mitigate the threatening actor (Clerk 2015, Sberro 2015, Moisio 1998,
Browning 2002). Specifically, realist literature pointed to alliance formation as
countries’ reaction to a perceived threat (Walt 1985). Realist and neorealist literature
have also suggested that when a country is framed as a strong military power, it will
impact the others by causing them to perceive them as a threat (Sherif 1966, Levine and
Campbell 1972, Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001). In terms of soft power use, this means
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that countries that feel threatened may use soft power instruments to a higher degree in
order to build alliances against the perceived threat.
As the realist literature also suggested, states that appear aggressive can make
others react with the goal of strengthening alliances against this perceived threat. This is
called balancing (Walt 1985). When the aggressor is believed to be unalterably
aggressive, balancing with others is also the best way to avoid becoming a victim (Langer
1950, Walt 1985). In this chapter I theorize that threatened countries are more likely to
use a high level of soft power to balance out the strong regional threat by trying to build
alliances.
It is also one of the underlying assumptions of this theory that high positive
interaction with other countries in the form of soft power can enhance alliance building
by creating, what Nye (2011) called a climate of attractions and a web of personal ties.
The high level of positive interaction between countries makes alliance formation more
likely. In terms of my crucial case design, this means that according to this alternative
theory, the U.S. is expected to rely on a very high degree of soft power to balance against
the perceived threat. Specifically, this means that the crucial case should exhibit the
strong alliance building and seek to balance against the threat.
My theory further suggests that as a result of the perceived geopolitical threat the
political elite creates a narrative that emphasizes national security and alliance building.
As it was explained in Chapter 5, major geopolitical actors such as Russia create a
situation in which the political elite in other countries perceives them as threat. In order to
communicate this threat to the public and to the leadership, the political elite creates a
narrative that emphasizes the need for protection in the form of alliance building.
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Also, governments that are perceiving a threat, as a result of the political elite’s
narrative on national security, they create soft power programs and institutions to
strengthen their alliances. These institutions support educational, cultural and other types
of programs that enhance the mutual understanding between countries and thus
strengthen alliances. Over time these programs become well established. For this reason,
the history of the American programs signals institutional commitment. Stated
differently, when programs exist for a long time, they are likely to remain in use and thus
enhance the country’s soft power use abroad.
Finally, allocating federal budget to soft power programs should also be closely
related to the political elite’s narrative. Because of the political elite’s narrative about the
perceived threat to their national security and the need for alliance building, we
should expect the government to fund programs that support this narrative in the form of
cultural and educational programs. This narrative builds into the budget calculation and
increases the amount of funds approved for soft power programs. These programs
support the government’s efforts to balance against the perceived threat by strengthening
the cultural, personal and often political connections between countries and ultimately the
alliances between them. The repeated issues of national security and alliance building in
the political narrative often result in a lock-in mechanism which makes it more likely that
the government will continue to use these programs instead of canceling them. This is
also called path-dependence, and it results in the consistent and high soft power budget
allocation and signals the general policy direction of the government2 (Jones et al. 2009).
Overall, in countries where there is a perception of geopolitical threat, the
political elite is likely to create and maintain an emphasis on the importance of national
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security and alliance building. In order to be successful in the promotion of their foreign
policy, the country needs soft power institutions and a consistent soft power budget
allocation. Closely studying the U.S. therefore, I seek to I seek to determine whether the
biggest soft power user supports this new formulation of the theory as well as uncover factors

that may have been overlooked in my statistical models.
This chapter will proceed as follows: I turn to four indicators. These are: 1)
perceived geopolitical threat; 2) narrative of the political elite; 3) the history and mission
of the soft power programs and institutions; 4) the budget of soft power programs. In the
conclusion, I will trace the connection between the newly found indicators and soft power
use in the United States.
6.3 GEOPOLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES
Based on my theory, the existence of a perceived geopolitical threat can lead to a
defense mechanism in the form of balancing with high soft power use. In this section, I
discuss American geopolitics with special attention to any perceived geopolitical threat
that would lead to a possible high American soft power use.
While the U.S. has been fortunate with its geographic location being surrounded
by oceans to protect it and with peaceful neighbors such as Canada and Mexico, it found
itself as one of the two key players in the Cold War. The U.S. and Russia were allies
during WWII, but since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the U.S. was worried about
the geographic and ideological spread of Communism (Scott 1996). Directly after WWII,
the Soviet Union started to threaten the U.S. with its geopolitical ambitions (Leffer 1984).
Since 1946, until the late 1980s the official interpretation of the strategic goals of the
USSR was that they seek regional and global dominance (Wolfe 1984, Scott 1996). In
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terms of geopolitics, this also meant that the U.S. was facing an enemy that was
perceived to want to expend its borders and its influence as far as possible.
The American response after World War I was the creation and support of a new
network of democratic countries (Arndt 2006, Lebovic 2013). By the 1960s the Soviet
threat became more imminent. The domino theory argued that the Soviet Union will try
to take over the developing world country by country and destroy the American liberal
world order (Scott 1996). In terms of an American response, the political elite chose to
promote strong alliance building to protect against the perceived threat of the USSR. This
meant that the political elite selected actions that would stop and even roll back the USSR
from these countries to ensure the free expansion of Western democracies (Scott 1996,
Persico 1990). As a result of the American political elite’s narrative on the perceived
threat, starting in the 1960s many programs and aid packages were created and sent to the
geographically threatened areas such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia and
Mozambique as part of the alliance building efforts (Scott 1996).
While my case study begins after the Cold War, this chapter argues that the
perceived geopolitical threat of the Cold War jump-started the American soft power use
as a defense mechanism against a threat. I further theorize that this historical occurrence
also created the political and institutional foundations for American high soft power use
after the Cold War.
With the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical threat also declined until
September 11, 2001 (Debrix 2007). The attacks on the World Trade Centers ignited a
new geopolitical threat in the form of the Global War on Terror. The new policy also
emphasizes the need for Americans to be protected from terrorism (Coleman 2013). The
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anxieties and fear born from the 9/11 attacks with respect to transboundary interactions
continued during the 2000s in the U.S. (Coleman 2013).
Geopolitics’ influence on the American history lead to the development and
continued perception of threat (first from the Soviets and later from terrorists) in the U.S.
political elite (Debrix 2007, Coleman 2013). Since U.S. national security has been
threated since World War II, the main foreign policy goal was to protect American
borders and gain influence abroad. Since both Communism and terrorism were perceived
existential and ideological threats to the American way of life, as a defense mechanism
the U.S government relied on a high level of soft power in order to combat such
perceived threats in the form of alliance building.
6.4 THE POLITICAL ELITE’S NARATIVE: NATIONAL SECURITY
With this section I will pay special attention to the theorized connection between
the political elite’s narrative in national security and the American soft power use.
Specifically, I will focus on the American political elite’s narrative about the perceived
Soviet threat during the Cold War, and the perceived threat of terrorism after 2001.
Looking at speeches and publications from the political elite, I will also evaluate if the
policy direction was pointing to alliance building as a result of such perceived threats and
if the U.S. government was balancing with its soft power actions.
The U.S. is a Federal Presidential Constitutional Republic in which the President
plays a key role in foreign policy formulation. As part of the political elite, the
President’s narrative guides the formulation of foreign policy which can increase or
decrease soft power use. This section will highlight some presidential (and other
members of the political elite) speeches to evaluate if there is a perceived national

143

security threat and if they were likely to use soft power instruments in order to create
alliances. This section will also look at the alliances that were formed during this timeperiod to see if they were created to defend against the perceived threat.
6.4.1 THE POLITICAL ELITE’S NARRATIVE ABOUT THE SOVIET
THREAT
Even though Russia and the U.S. were allies during WWI, after the Bolshevik
revolution in 1917 there was a growing fear that the Soviets planned world domination,
which perception influenced the American political elite’s foreign policy narrative
(Leffler 1984, Leffler 1985, Scott 1996). By 1946, it was a common place for intelligence
and military reports to state that the Soviet foreign policy goal was to dominate the
Communist world (Leffler 1984). In 1947, Undersecretary of State Dean G. Acheson
warned that three continents could fall prey to Soviet domination (Acheson 1969). As a
result, what showed up in the political elite’s narrative was the need for the U.S. to
remain in control of its geographic destiny (Debrix 2007) in addition to create and expand
a network of like-minded democratic countries (Ruggie 1994). This was a carefully
crafted foreign policy in which the U.S. protected its sphere of influence and
strengthened its alliances.
In the 1940s and 1950s, as a result of the perception of threat, the American elite
supported the expansion of the American alliances in Southeast Asia and in Europe as a
direct result of the expanding Soviet threat in China and in Eastern Europe (Leffler
1984). As the National Security Council stated in a report in 1948, "Soviet political
warfare might seriously weaken the relative position of the United States, enhance Soviet
strength and either lead to our ultimate defeat short of war, or force us into war under
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dangerously unfavorable conditions" (Leffler 1984). As this segment shows, the America
elite in charge of national security felt that the U.S. had to implement foreign policy tools
to balance against the Soviet threat. This policy direction led to alliance building in
Europe and in Southeast Asia.
In the 1960s American foreign policy turned towards Latin America to spread its
influence. As President Kennedy announced on March 13, 1961, the U.S. government
wanted to strengthen its alliances with Latin America. In the name of Alliances for
Progress, President Kennedy declared that the U.S. government will provide economic
assistance to Latin American countries:
“I have called all people of the hemisphere to join in a new alliance for progress. Let us
transform the American continent. For our unfiled task is to demonstrate to the entire
world that men’s unsatisfied aspirations for economic progress and social justice can be
best achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions
(Kennedy 1961).
As President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress speech demonstrated, the American
president created new alliances with selected Latin American countries in order to
balance against the soviet threat using democratic institutions and economic aid. This
program also built democratic institutions in Latin America thus strengthening the
political and social connection between the U.S. and selected South American countries
including Puerto Rico, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia (JFK Library 1).
As the Cold War and the arms race continued into the 1970s, the political elite
increasingly perceive the Soviet Union as a threat. In 1974 Kissinger wrote that the U.S.:
“will oppose the attempt of any country to achieve a position of predominance either
globally or regionally. We will resist any attempt to exploit the policy of détente to
weaken our alliances. We will react if relaxation of tension is used as a cover to
exacerbate conflict in international trouble spots. The Soviet Union cannot disregard
these principles in any area of the world without imperiling its entire relationship with the
United States.” (p.261-262)
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Secretary of State Kissinger explained that the Soviet Union’s threat had to be
stopped (Kissinger 1974). In fact, the above section also reveals the imminent perceived
Soviet threat not only to the U.S. but also to the world. This global threat scale required
exceptionally intensive soft power use from the U.S. Secretary Kissinger’s (1974)
statement also reveals the special attention paid to protecting alliances in this global
struggle.
Even more pronounced was the Soviet threat during the 1980s when the U.S. was
worried about a so-called domino effect of the Soviet Union’s expansion. In fact,
President Reagan and most of his key advisors believed that the Soviets wanted world
domination (Wolf 1984, Scott 1996). As President Reagan explained in an interview in
June 1980:
“Lets’ not delude ourselves, the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If
they weren’t engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn’t be any hot spots in the
world.” (House 1980)
Reagan’s speech shows the continuous perceived threat from the Soviet Union.
Using the metaphor of the unstoppable dominos falling, President Reagan’s narrative
points to the U.S. important job to prevent any dominos from falling and also emphasizes
the impact of the Soviet threat.
In a speech in 1984, Reagan stressed the importance of strong alliances:
“Strength is essential to negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we're weak, we
can do neither. Strength is more than military power. […] Equally important is our
strength of spirit and unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad […] Our
defenses are being rebuilt, our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our
values has never been more clear.” (Reagan 1984)
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The above speech points to the Reagan Administration’s focus on the
strengthening alliances in order to balance against Communism. The alliance building
process was an important aspect of the American foreign policy during the Cold War and
continued after the Cold War (Ruggie 1994).
Overall, the American political elite during the Cold War created a narrative of
national security and the need to build alliances. This narrative manifested in continued
alliance building against the perceived Soviet threat on a large scale. As a result, the U.S.
government has joined the Allies (1941), helped create the United Nations in 1945 and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, joined the United Nations
Command in 1950 and joined the Australia, New Zealand and the United States Security
Treaty (ANZUS) in 1951. In addition, in 1954 the U.S. joined the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO), 1955 the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, in 1958 the
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Strategic Cooperation
Agreement with Israel in 1981.
In terms of alliance building, by 1965, based on the Correlates of War’s
International Government Organization data shows that the U.S. was one of the most
integrated countries with the most alliances (Pevehouse et al 2004). In addition, literature
has also pointed to the American foreign policy goal of skillfully forming alliances
during this time-period in order to balance against the Soviet threat (Debrix 2007, Leffler
2005, Payne 1994) and to build and strengthen a network of democratic countries with
U.S. leadership (Ruggie 1994). Stated differently, during the Cold War as a result of a
perceived threat from the Soviet Union, the American foreign policy was oriented to
relay on high soft power use in order to build alliances all over the world.
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6.4.2 THE POLITICAL ELITE’S NARRATIVE ABOUT THE THREAT FROM
TERRORISM
After the end of the Cold War, there was a calmer period where the perceived
threats were declining. During this time, the political elite’s national security speeches
focused on the American role in the post-Cold War era. In 1990 immediately after the
Cold War has ended, President Bush stated the following:
“This is the beginning of a new world order […] in which self-determination,
cooperative deterrence, and joint action against aggression would come to hold greater
sway.” (Bush 1990). Based on the Bush foreign policy statement therefore, the future of
American foreign policy was based on multilateral cooperation and working together
with other nations. This enhanced alliance building continued into the Clinton
Administration. Working together with NATO, the United States wanted to extend, in the
words of President Bill Clinton, "the fabric of transatlantic prosperity and security" into
Central and Eastern Europe (Ruggie 1994).
President Clinton later further explained in his 1995 State of the Union address:
“Our security still depends upon our continued world leadership for peace and freedom
and democracy. As the statement shows, President Clinton expressed a strong desire to
build international alliances. In addition, President Clinton’s also stresses the need for
American global leadership.
The attacks of 9/11 brought a high level of fear back into American society,
especially into the political elite (Debrix 2007). As Debrix (2007) stated, after 9/11 the
political elite empathized the cultural differences between the U.S. and the attackers from
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the Middle East and suggested to focus on national security. President Bush had to
respond to a direct attack on American soil from a peacekeeper to a terrorism eradicator
around the world. President Busch stated the following about American’s role in
responding to 9/11. “Our responsibility to history is clear: to answer these attacks and rid
the world of evil.” (Busch 2001, p.1). As President Busch’s statement reveals, according
to the President, terrorism was a threat to U.S. national security and the U.S. had to play a
global leadership role in stopping terrorism in other countries as well. As President Bush
noted during his 2002 State of the Union address of America’s new war against terror:
“Our cause is just, and it continues. Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our worst
fears and showed us the true scope of the task ahead. We have seen the depth of our
enemies’ hatred in videos, where they laugh about the loss of innocent life. And the depth
of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design ....They embrace
tyranny and death as a cause and a creed. We stand for a different choice, made long ago,
on the day of our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose freedom and the dignity
of every life.”
President Bush’s address illustrates well the magnified perceived threat caused by
terrorism. The speech advocated for the protection of the U.S. and all other countries
from such perceived threat. Specifically defending our European allies. As Blankley
(2006), the former speechwriter of President Reagan wrote:
“To preserve the West, Americans must revive Europe’s Western values. We cannot
afford to lose Europe. We cannot afford to see Europe transformed into a launching pad
for Islamist jihad.” (p. 21)
As the above-narrative shows, the post 9/11 period’s narrative was dominated by
language that emphasized the perception of fear and the need to stay close with our allies
as well as the need to defend them. In other words, the elite’s narrative about national
security advocates alliance formation in order to protect against the perceived threat.
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This continued perceived threat from terrorism also played a strong part in
President Obama’s narrative:
“This century's threats are at least as dangerous as and, in some ways, more complex than
those we have confronted in the past. They come from weapons that can kill on a mass
scale and from global terrorists who respond to alienation or perceived injustice with
murderous nihilism. They come from rogue states allied to terrorists and from rising
powers that could challenge both America and the international foundation of liberal
democracy. They come from weak states that cannot control their territory or provide for
their people.” (2007 p.3)
As President Obama stated, the perceived threat of terrorism from multiple
directions was imminent and dangerous. His narrative enforced the need to focus on
national security to protect the country. In addition, President Obama also emphasized
that need to build alliances and defend America as well as all other countries by working
together:
“America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, and the world cannot meet them
without America. We can neither retreat from the world nor try to bully it into
submission. We must lead the world, by deed and by example.” (Obama 2007 p. 4)
President Obama’s turn to the global community to engage them and work
together with them in order to defend itself and each other shows the American foreign
policy of building alliances as a reaction to a perceived threat of terrorism. In terms of the
Obama Administration’s alliance building efforts, the U.S. was still member of NATO
and in addition later joined the U.S.–Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement in
2012 and renewed the U.S Israel Strategic Partnership in 2013. This is relevant as these
partnership in addition to joining the Paris Climate Agreement in 2016 demonstrate that
after 9/11 the U.S. continued to be highly engaged in the world and committed to alliance
building.
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In the same speech president Obama also stated:
“Today we are called again to provide visionary leadership. […] To renew American
leadership in the world, I intend to rebuild the alliances, partnerships, and institutions
necessary to confront common threats and enhance common security.” (Obama 2007 p.2)
In the U.S. the political elite has been very clear about the perceived threat of
Communism during the Cold War and about the perceived threat of terrorism after 2001.
As a result of the Soviet threat, one aspect of the elite’s narrative was the focus on
national security and alliance building which boosted soft power use.
The political elite’s narrative also revealed a new factor in its foreign policy. The
narrative clearly demonstrated the American desire for global leadership. Regarding
global leadership, literature suggests that hegemons (Wight 1978) such as the U.S. aspire
to create a global empire and to do so they will be more active in international relations.
According to this explanation, hegemonic states have a different agenda than other
countries as they wish to become global leaders (Lemke 2003, Wight 1978). Soft power
is especially useful to countries that are trying to expand their global roles and project
more power. Therefore, in the American case, a global leadership desire has also been
revealed as a factor boosting its soft power use.
6.5. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN SOFT POWER
PROGRAMS
According to my theory, in countries where there is a perceived threat, the
political elite creates a narrative that leads to the creation of soft power institutions and
programs so the country can balance against the threat. In order to study the U.S.
institutions’ soft power programs and the consistency of the American government’s soft
power mission, I will now focus on the historical development of soft power institutions.
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I will pay special attention to the age and lifespan of each institution and whether the
mission statements include alliance building in foreign policy in the mission statements.
The goal is to reveal any connections between the elite’s narrative about national security
and the level of soft power use executed by these programs.
In order to better understand the American government’s strategic choices
regarding its soft power reliance, in the following section I turn to the analysis of soft
power programs to reveal, which U.S. programs support alliance building with soft power
tools. I also study the timespan of each program to see how long they have been in
existence. I also collect information from various government websites and from federal
budget documents. In addition, I also refer to foreign policy articles.
Even though there is no soft power program within the U.S government, the
evaluation of the listed programs revealed soft power elements.3 In the American
government’s budget documents I found that it is the Department of State’s selected
programs along with the Department of State’s affiliated agencies that are compatible
with my definition of soft power. The following list is a chronological order of the
American soft power programs.
Department of State (DOS) (1789)
o Diplomatic and Consular Programs (1789)
o Division of Cultural Relations (1938)
o Foreign Affairs Programs (1946)
 Education and Cultural Exchange Programs (1946)
 Fulbright Program (1946)
 Peace Corps (1961)
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Department of State Affiliated or Independent Agencies
o
o
o
o
o

Broadcasting Board of Governors (1941)
United States Information Agency (1953)
United States International Aid Development (1961)
United States Institute of Peace (1984)
Overseas Contingency Operations (2001)
As the compiled list shows, in the U.S. there is one department, which is the

Department of State (DOS) with 7 programs and 5 affiliated/independent agencies that
are using soft power to achieve foreign policy goals identified by this study. In the next
section, I will evaluate the DOS’ and the affiliated/independent agencies’ soft power
programs to see if they seek to build alliances with their efforts in order to balance
against a perceived threat.
6.5.1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE (1789)
The State Department, originally known as the Department of Foreign Affairs at
the time of its creation in 1789 is the oldest of the cabinet-level agencies in the Executive
Branch. It consists largely of diplomats and Foreign Service officers who carry out
American foreign policy throughout the world (AllGov. DOS. 2019). Since its creation,
the Department of State has grown and has been reorganized to focus on emerging global
responsibilities (Office of the Historian 2019).
The foreign affairs functions of the U.S. Government are carried out through a
complex network of agencies. Foreign policy and diplomatic relations are led by the
Department of State, development assistance is led by the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), international broadcasting by the Broadcasting Board of
Governors; and other functions carried out by several other agencies, including the Peace
Corps (US Budget 2003, p. 229). Each will be evaluated in the following section.
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6.5.2 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (1789)
The U.S. government has been using diplomatic relations programs since
September 15, 1789 as part of the Department of State (f/k/a Department of Foreign
Affairs). Initially there were two services devoted to diplomatic and consular activity.
The Diplomatic Service provided ambassadors and ministers to staff embassies overseas,
while the Consular Service provided consuls to assist United States sailors and promote
international trade and commerce. Since 1789, these functions have greatly expanded.
Today, the conduct of diplomatic relations involves the learning and exchanging
in-depth knowledge and understanding of political and economic events in many nations.
Some of the main goals include promoting human rights internationally, supporting
emerging democracies and economic development, improving the global environment,
and meeting humanitarian emergencies that destroy political and economic well-being
and stability are vital to America’s long-term interest. These goals require quality
reporting, analysis, and personal contact. American diplomats and Department of State
staff work at more than 260 missions abroad (U.S. Budget 2007, p.13). While these
functions were not specifically soft power programs, they facilitated the use of soft power
as they were created to use traditional diplomacy with other governments.
6.5.3 DIVISION OF CULTURAL RELATIONS (1938)
The United States government has created soft power programs as early as the
1930s to expand its influence abroad (Arndt 2006). The first U.S. soft power program
identified by this study is the Division of Cultural Relations created in 1938. The
formation of this department was partly the result of Wilson’s universalist pledge after
World War I to make the world a better place again with the help and guidance of the
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U.S. (Arndt 2006, Lebovic 2013), and partly as a result of the growing influence of the
Communist ideology of the Soviet Union (Leffler 1984, Leffler 1985, Scott 1996, Keys
2004).
The War and the U.S.’s sizable bureaucracy and large federal budget also raised
questions about the intellectual side and goals of U.S. foreign policy, specifically about
the best way to handle the outreach with other governments in the future (Healt and
Kaplan 1977, Arndt 2006). As a solution to these questions, the foundations of soft power
programs were created first in the form of the Division of Cultural Relations. The
designers of this division had built a mechanism to support the ideas of American cultural
internationalism and the idea that the attractive American lifestyle can transform
ideologies and societies for the rest of the Century (Keys 2004, Arndt 2006).
The Division of Cultural Relations was created to use influence abroad (Arndt
2006) and while it was not technically called a soft power program, it fits my definition
of soft power. This cultural program was created to communicate the attractiveness of
American norms and values while promoting a dialogue with other countries in order to
facilitate political and economic cooperation while the rest of the world was dealing with
the rise of fascism (Arndt 2006, Lebovic 2013). Spreading American attractiveness and
ideas soon became the main function of the Cultural Division of the State Department,
which handled the information exchange together with international educational and
scientific cooperation (Cull 2003).
With the creation of the Division of Cultural Relations, the idea of creating a
centralized department where American information flow and cultural outreach has been
synchronized in order to spread the image of prosperous American democracy in the
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form of the America dream (Ninkovich 1981). The deeply held belief that the
attractiveness of the American lifestyle could transform other ideologies and social
systems was the underlying motivation (Keys 2004).
6.5.4 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PROGRAMS (1946)
The Foreign (International) Affairs programs initially were broken up into issue
areas such as diplomats, embassies, travel, culture and information. The general mission
of these programs was to support diplomats and development experts, and project
American values all over the world (Clinton 2011). Based on my conceptualization of
soft power actions, I found that many of the International Affairs Programs qualified as
soft power programs. To see the full list of State Department Programs, See Appendix C.
According to the federal budget documents for the fiscal year 1996, the specific
purpose of the Department of State’s Foreign Affairs programs was to support other
nations in their needs:
“The programs continue our commitment to strengthen democracy and the emergence of
free market economies in the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union
[…] support of a strong and growing global economy and […] providing humanitarian
response to crises and conflicts that have divided many nations.” (DOS Budget FY 1996,
p.115)
This statement was later changed to a message focusing on building international
coalition, shifting the focus from domestic development to the War on Terror:
“Since September 11, 2001, the Department’s top priority has been the war on terrorism.
The State Department has led the effort to build and manage the broad-based
international coalition that helped defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and is now
destroying the al Qaeda terrorist network around the world. […] While the war on
terrorism is our top foreign policy priority, the President has stressed that it cannot be
our only one. We live in an age of tremendous opportunities to advance America’s
interests (DOS Budget FY 2003, p. 231).
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Finally, arriving to the 2011’s agenda of fostering global consensus as it was articulated
in their budget statement.
“The Department of State […] and other international programs advance the interests of
the United States through engagement, partnership, and the promotion of universal
values. Through the power of example and the empowerment of people, using diplomatic
and development tools, the Administration is working to forge the global consensus
required to defeat the threats, manage the challenges, and seize the opportunities of the
21st century.” (DOS Budget FY 2011, 106).
As the mission statement of the 2011 budget document above shows, the
objective of the U.S. government’s International Affairs programs was to strengthen
international engagement and foster global consensus and cooperation by using the
examples of American values in addition to diplomatic, economic and other soft power
instruments. This statement makes it clear that spreading American values and interest
vis soft power instruments in order to create alliances is one of the core American foreign
policy goals. This statement also confirms that in 2011 the main objective remains to
spread American influence through attraction abroad. With respect to soft power actions,
the mission statement also indicates that the U.S. wishes to use soft power instruments to
foster global cooperation in order to protect against threats.
6.5.5 EDUCATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS (ECE)
(1946)
The Education and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE) was first created in 1946
under the name of Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC). In
1961 it became the Education and Cultural Exchange Programs with the mission to
increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of
other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange that assist in the
development of peaceful relations (ecastategov/about 1). As part of the Department of
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State (Under Bureau of Educational Cultural Affairs), the Education and Cultural
Exchange Programs connect scholars, artists, educators, athletes, students and the youth
in the United States and in almost every other country in world (ecastategov/about 1).
ECE cultivates mutual understanding between the people of the United States and
the people of other countries to promote friendly, and peaceful relations, as mandated by
the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. ECE exchange program
alumni consist of over 1 million people around the world, including more than 75 Nobel
Laureates and nearly 450 current and former heads of state and government
(ecastategov/about 1). In terms of soft power, the ECE programs use a high degree of soft
power to connect people in the U.S. and abroad through talent and scholarship.
6.5.6 FULBRIGHT PROGRAM (1946)
The 1940s produced another significant soft power program. The Fulbright Program,
created in 1946 was one of the new initiatives which later became one of the most
significant exchange programs (Dizard 2004, Arndt 2006, Lebovic 2013). Today the
Fulbright Program runs under ECE. The basic idea was to support the free exchange of
the elite from various countries who would spread the American norms and values and
make the U.S. more attractive abroad. It was initial funded by the surplus of the wartime
economy and that its ideological and foreign policy justifications were based on rational
efforts to promote American hegemony and power politics (Lebovic 2013). More
specifically, as Lebovic (2013) explains, the idea of the Fulbright exchange programs
grew out of American “nationalist globalism” in support of U.S. global hegemony by
using the unifying power of American culture. In addition, by strengthening the mutual
understanding between the U.S. and other countries in the Fulbright Program the U.S.
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government is also increasing its ability to build alliances with those countries through
exchange visitors.
6.5.7 UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY (1953)
United States Information Agency (USIA) is an independent agency which was
initially only responsible for providing information about the U.S., its policies and about
the good understanding of American society and its values. The agency was created in
1953 in order to spread American influence via culture and people to people diplomacy
until 1999 when it was merged into the State Department under the newly created Under
Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
The United States Information Agency (USIA) served two purposes: 1) to
promote better understanding of the U.S. in other countries and; 2) to increase mutual
understanding between Americans and the public abroad (Wang 2007). Even more
importantly, the creation of USIA with the Unites States Information and Education
Exchange Act of 1948 provided a legal foundation for American soft power use for many
years to come (Wang 2007).
At the birth of USIA in 1953 the Cold War and the bipolar system guided the
foreign policy of the U.S. This meant that the long-term goal of the government was to
defeat Communism. In 1953 the main function of the newly created USIA was to handle
cultural information such as books, libraries, cultural centers and exhibits in other words
focus on the information side of American soft power (Arndt 2006, Cull 2003, Wang
2007). From its creation in 1953, USIA served as the key information agency which was
created to produce and spread information about the U.S.
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Nevertheless, the use of American culture and the way of life remained part of the
method to conduct foreign policy. The American soft power machine was fueled by the
Cold War’s ideological conflict with the Soviet Union and it was going strong until the
end of the Cold War in 1990. As a result, USIA had numerous directors throughout the
years promoting various messages and foreign policy agendas, but overall, continued to
be the most extensive public relations machine in the world (Cull 2003, Wang 2007).
By 1994, the agency defined, explained, and advocated U.S. policies abroad and
sought to increase knowledge and understanding among foreign audiences of U.S. society
and it values which is a remarkable vehicle for soft power use (United States Budget
1994, p. A-1155). Other programs included overseas missions, Radio Free Asia and the
Bureau of Information among others. For the full list of programs see Appendix H. USIA
as independent agency was later melted into the Internal Communication Agency in 1998
(Act 1998), but it’s mission and prior activities abroad created the foundations of soft
power programs that are still active today. The formation of USIA contributed to the
American government’s consistent and strategic soft power use around the world (U.S.
Budget 2020).
The above-mentioned soft power programs were not discontinued only transferred
into the State Department in 1999 (Cull 2003, Wang 2007). Studying these programs and
their goals and mission statements while considering the historical changes in the world,
it becomes apparent that the U.S. mission to influence other nations with its culture,
norms and values did not end with the Cold War. In fact, the mission statements
continued to express the will to build alliances using the attractiveness of American
wealth and culture.
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The United States Information Agency was the largest full-service public relations
organization in the world during the Cold War, spending over $2 billion per year to
highlight America's view, while diminishing the Soviet's side interacting with about 150
different countries (Snyder 1995). It was also one of the first centralized government
bureaucracies in the world that was created to use influence abroad (Gienow-Hecht
2010). In 1953 the information flow was centralized under USIA with the ultimate goal
of overseeing all outgoing information about the U.S. (Cull 2010). Initially, the agency
created programs that shaped the information flow to their countries about the U.S., but
later it also included programs that supported the exchanges of persons, both short and
longer-term visits and created publications, television and radio broadcasting, libraries
and exhibits (U. S. Budget 1992 p. Part 2-198). Overall, USIA played a key role in the
formation and execution of soft power use and thus increased American soft power use
abroad.
6.5.8 PEACE CORPS (1961)
The Peace Corps was created in 1961. Its mission was to share American ideals
and values abroad. The volunteers of the Peace Corps dispel myths about the United
States, help people of interested countries and create bonds of friendship with host
country citizens. The volunteers are teachers, business advisors, information technology
consultants, agriculture and environmental specialists, and health and HIV/AIDS
educators (Peace Corps Budget 2009).
Since 1961, the Peace Corps has represented the United States in 141 countries,
working to advance the agency’s three goals: 1) building local capacity by strengthening
the capacity of local communities and individuals through the service of trained
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volunteers; 2) sharing America with the world by promoting a better understanding of
Americans through volunteers who live and work within local communities; and 3)
bringing the world back home by increase Americans’ awareness and knowledge of other
cultures and global issues through volunteers (Peace Corps Congressional Budget
Justification/Summary, ii). The Peace Corps strengthens mutual understanding between
countries therefore strengthen American soft power use and alliance building.
6.5.9 UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
(USAID) (1961)
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is an
independent agency of the United States federal government that is primarily responsible
for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance. The programs within
USAID are designed to expand diplomatic and development operations (QDDR 2). These
commitments are compatible with my soft power definition of soft power as they include
increased U.S. foreign assistance in order to reduce poverty, combat global health threats,
develop markets and govern peacefully, which makes the U.S. attractive abroad […]
(New Era of Responsibility 2010, 87). With large sum of development assistance
provided mostly to developing countries by the U.S. government, the U.S. appears
supportive, and attractive which increases its soft power. The USAID’s sizable budget
also reflects the U.S.’s commitment to strengthen diplomatic and assistance tools to
address current and future challenges that impact the security of the United States. While
USAID is an independent agency, its budget is often treated with DOS’s foreign affairs
budget due to their close relationship and their common foreign policy goals.
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The origin of the United States Agency of International Development (USAID)
can be traced back to the post-World War II U.S. foreign policy. Moving away from
isolationism, policy makers had been advocating for a more internationally involved
foreign policy. The cornerstone of this policy shift was the result of Secretary of State
George C. Marshall’s commencement address at Harvard University in 1947 (Natsios
2005). The core message of the speech was that the U.S. should use its wealth and power
to help the world devasted by the war back to economic health (Marshall 1947). As a
result of this speech, the Marshall Plan was created and soon after USAID was
established. Secretary Marshall’s speech indicated; the U.S. should help other countries
for the simple reason that it can. This notation was built into the foundation of both the
Marshall Plan and later into USAID. In terms of soft power, helping war-torn countries
has always been one of the actions that results in a favorable view and increased political
and economic cooperation.
Building on the success of the Marshall Plan, President Harry S. Truman
proposed an international development assistance program in 1949. The 1950 Point Four
Program focused on creating markets for the United States by reducing poverty and
increasing production in developing countries and diminishing the threat of Communism
by helping countries prosper under capitalism. Similarly to the Marshall Plan, these
programs provided economic aid to countries in need which action in return brought the
U.S. into a favorable light and increased its attraction abroad. From 1952 to 1961,
programs supporting technical assistance and capital projects continued as the primary
form of U.S. aid, and were a key component of U.S. foreign policy (USAID History).
With increasing economic assistance built into American foreign policy, this soft power
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instrument also became one of the core pillars of U.S. global engagement. But it needed a
strong institution to oversee these foreign policy actions, therefore in 1961 President
Kennedy created USAID (United States Agency for International Development).
USAID has many programs focusing on separate issues such as Agriculture and
Food Security, Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, Education, Gender Equality,
Global Health and Science, Technology and Innovation, just to mention a few. For the
full list of programs, see Appendix I. The Bush Administration has made development a
national security priority and one of the three strategic areas of emphasis for foreign
policy and the Global War on Terror (Natsios 2005). As a result, international economic
development became one of the three foreign policy goals of the U.S. after 2001.
In terms of soft power actions, sending aid to other countries is one of the key
soft power instruments that connect countries together. And in terms of the U.S.’s foreign
policy objectives, USAID programs continue to strengthen the U.S.’s global leadership
role and they play a key role in U.S. foreign policy. The fact the U.S. government
continuously uses these soft power programs (U.S. Budget 2020) reveals that it sees them
as effective and useful foreign policy tools. In addition, the use of development aid
increases American soft power use abroad.
Overall, USAID has been functioning as a soft power institution, running
programs that provide financial aid to other countries and thus increase American soft
power use since 1961 and promotes American alliance building through economic
assistance.
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6.5.10 BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS (1941)
The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) was originally formed in 1941 as
part of the United States Information Agency, but it is now an independent entity since
1999. The BBG is still funded by Congress under Foreign Affairs programs budget items.
BBG is responsible for all U.S. non-military international broadcasting programs. The
BBG promotes freedom and democracy and enhances understanding through multimedia
communication of accurate, objective, and balanced news, information, and other
programming about America and the world. BBG radio, television, and internet programs
reach over 215 million people each week in 61 languages. The agency was created when
the USIA was folded into the State Department and remained independent ever since.
Through this program, the BBG funds operations of the Voice of America (VOA),
Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
(RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN,
including Alhurra and Radio Sawa). Their budget includes funding for local and regional
coverage on VOA Radio Deewa to Afghanistan and Pakistan, MBN television and radio
maintenance and repair, and digital equipment at RFE/RL and RFA (U.S. Budget 2012).
These radio programs have played a key role in ending the Cold War using soft power
tools (Simonyi and Trunkos 2015). And today they continue to spread American culture
and influence using only the voice of radio programs in numerous languages. By
contributing to the understanding of American culture and values, the BBG also fosters
the possibility of alliance building.
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6.5.11 THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (USIP) (1984)
The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) formed in 1984 is an independent
institute that is established and funded by Congress. USIP was created to help prevent
and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and
development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital
worldwide. The resources of USIP support peace-building efforts around the world and
empower people with knowledge, skills, and resources through conflict management
education, training, and research. USIP promotes peace and democracy in 15 developing
or war-torn countries. Assisting post-conflict countries by which increasing America’s
attractiveness abroad not only create bridges with other countries but also adds to the list
of soft power action of the U.S and promotes alliance building.
6.5.12 DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S-OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY
OPERATIONS (OCO) (2001)
In addition to the highlighted DOS Foreign Affairs and Related Agencies, the
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) programs must also be discussed as their sole
purpose is to rebuild specific war-torn countries (Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan), which,
similarly to the Marshall Plan, fits my definition of soft power. The main goals of the
operations were to assist with post-war reconstruction of facilities as a result of the
Global War on terror and train people to be able to run their own government, but such
actions also bring the U.S. government welcomed attraction as the Department of State
helps the fragile countries to grow into self-reliant and secure nations (Department of
State 2011, p. 763).

166

Since 2001, the Contingency Operation budget is a new temporary part of the
Department of State’s budget, which was created to replace some of the previous efforts
of the Department of Defense to provide reconstruction, security, and stabilization
assistance funding executed by non-military personnel. The account provides a source of
flexible contingency funding to meet unforeseen reconstruction and stabilization needs of
strategic countries (DOS FY 2011, McGarry and Epstein 2019).
The Department of State’s Budget for the fiscal year 2011 stresses these Overseas
Contingency Operations funds. The increasing amount of aid provided to Afghanistan
and Pakistan is allocated in order to revitalize economic development and to confront the
resurgence of the Taliban. Also, these OCO funds support the continued progress towards
a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq and prepares the Department of State to assume
responsibility for security, logistics, and police training programs as part of the militaryto-civilian transition in Iraq (DOS FY 2011, 105).
This type of soft power has not been outlined enough in previous soft power
literature; however, it fits my definition of the concept. While the contingency operations
used to be coordinated and executed by military personnel thus, they may appear as hard
power actions at first, but looking closer into the nature of these actions reveals that
helping war-torn countries to rebuild can increases the U.S.’s attractiveness in Iraq and in
Afghanistan and thus qualifies as a soft power program. Not only people receiving
assistance from the U.S. government in the selected countries build trust and admiration
for the U.S. servicemen on the ground, but also the international community notices the
help of the U.S. government. All these activities increase American attractiveness abroad.
Therefore, since 2001 this creates a new soft power program for the U.S.
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One thing that became apparent by studying closer the listed programs while
putting them in a historical context was that since 1938, the U.S. government has been
consistently working on strengthening its alliances using all the previously established
soft power programs. Initially, the U.S. government created programs as a reaction to the
Soviet threat, and after 2001, the OCO program was established as a result of the
perceived terrorist threat. The historical analysis also revealed that for the past decades,
old programs such as the Fulbright Program and institutions such as the USIA4 has been
executing American soft power in order to build alliances in order to balance against the
Soviet Union and later against terrorism.
The mission statements and the timeline of the creation of the foreign affairs,
cultural, educational and economic programs further revealed that the U.S. has an 82-year
history relying on cultural instruments, 79-year history in using broadcasting tools and
59-year experience in using economic aid in foreign policy. As the listed programs and
institutions also revealed, as a reaction to the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and
later from terrorism, the American political elite directed foreign policy towards a
strategic use of soft power tools in order to strengthen alliances all over the world, which
resulted in overall high soft power use.
In addition, similarly to the previous section on the analysis of the political elite’s
narrative, the evaluation of the government programs also revealed the U.S.’s desire to
have a global reach with its cultural and educational programs. This means that while the
perceived threat from the Soviet Unions and later from terrorism boosted the reliance on
these soft power programs, in addition to alliance building the American desire to be a
global leader has also greatly enhanced its soft power use.
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6.6 SOFT POWER BUDGET
In order to reveal more about the American soft power budget, I will look at the
allocated budget covering a 16-year timeframe. Based on my theory, in countries where
there is a perceived threat, the political elite creates a narrative that focuses on national
security which builds into the budget. As a defense mechanism, this narrative encourages
alliance building in order to balance against the perceived threat. My theory also indicates
that due to a path-dependent mechanism, balancing against a perceived threat result in a
consistently high soft power budget. This section will look into the American federal
budget to see if there is a high soft power allocation due to a perceived threat.
I compiled the U.S.’s soft power budget by first selecting those agencies and their
specific programs (listed above) which fit my soft power definition, then their annual
budgets were collected for the time-period of 1995-2010. This included the combined
budgets of the Department of State’s International Affairs Programs (including selected
foreign operations and related programs), plus the Department of State’s Overseas
Contingency Operations budget5 since 2002. Since the U.S. government’s International
Affairs budget includes over 60 programs and the programs are regularly renamed,
placed under new budget items, under new programs, or moved out of the DOS’s budget
as an independent program, so I only compiled program-level budget data on the most
known, consistently named and placed and funded budget issues and programs. These
are: Diplomatic Relations, USIA, BBG, Peace Corps, USAID, and USIP in addition to
the Department of State’s Overseas Contingency Operations budget6.
The goal of the collection of the soft power budget and the breakdown of the
largest soft power programs are to study the soft power policy commitment of the U.S.
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and connecting it with possible enhancers such as the political elite’s narrative on
national security. The budget quantifies collective political decisions made in response to
incoming information, the preferences of the decision makers and the institutions that
structure how decision are made (Jones et al. 2009). Changes in the distribution of
budgetary outcomes is crucial to the study of policy changes (Jones et al. 2009) and in in
this dissertation indicates a change in the support of soft power use with the underlying
objective to build alliances in order to balance. It is the underlying assumption of this
dissertation that if a government allocates money to a program, it intends to use its
instrument to achieve its foreign policy goals. In addition, the amount of money allocated
represents the level of significance of such programs to the government.
The U. S.’s soft power budget within the State Department increased from $25
billion (in 1995) to $65 billion by 2010 (See Figure 6.1). This increase was consistent
with the rise of the total U.S. federal budget. After 9/11 when the Overseas Contingency
Operation funding was added to assist with the non-military side of nation building,
American soft power budget began to increase. As a result, the combined budget of the
State Department’s International Affairs Program and its temporary emergency funding,
by 2007 the soft power funding increased to 74 Billion, or 2.6 % of the total federal
budget.
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Figure 6.1. U.S.’ Soft Power Budget 1995-2010
Studying closer the three budget items on Figure 6.1, a steady increase can be
discovered with peaks in 1999, 2004 and 2007. Seeing the consistency of a minimum of
2% budget allocation for soft power programs throughout the examined time-period
signals an important strategic statement. It is also important to note, that the two main
soft power programs are both related to the Department of State, which indicates the
government’s intention to use these soft power programs to achieve foreign policy goals.
Looking deeper into the budget spike in 1999, the federal budget document
reveals that the Clinton Administration requested more money for the Foreign Affairs
programs specifically to support the newly independent states and for supporting the
NATO integration of three new countries (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) (US
Budget 1999, p 126-127). Supporting the three new former Soviet Satellite’s countries’
membership into the alliance made the U.S. look attractive not only to the supported
countries but also to all Western democracies. In the budget document president Clinton
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explains his increased budget request with his desire to “advance U.S. leadership around
the world” (US Budget 1999, p. 126).
The budget spikes of 2004 and 2007 were the results of the Global War on Terror
(GWOT). The U.S. government decided to fund the non-military foreign affairs related
efforts through numerous departments. In 2004, the State Department received a large
amount of funding for its Overseas Contingency Operations7 program for Iraq,
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 2007 budget spike represents the Bush Administration’s
efforts to enhance democracy building and cultural and education exchange programs
focusing on the Muslim world (US Budget 2007, p. 197). Both of these budget spikes
were created as a reaction to the political elite’s narrative about the perceived threat from
terrorism, and as a defense mechanism, these budget items were built into the American
effort to strengthen American alliances abroad.
Looking into the program-level analysis of the American soft power programs, as
Figure 6.2 shows, the budget items receive a stable allocation between 11 Million USD to
1.8 Billion USD each year. Since the Department of State has over 60 programs (only
seven are shown), these allocations nicely add up into a consistent and stable soft power
budget. Overall, soft power had enjoyed the consistent support of the federal government
at a 2% of the federal budget with the lowest budget allocated in 1997 and 1998 (less
than 2%) and the largest spike in 2007 to 2.6% of the federal budget (See Figure 6.2).
Most of the mentioned programs belong to the Department of State and three are
(USAID, USIP, Broadcasting Board of Governors) are now independent agencies. Some
programs such as the Voice of America Radio broadcast are placed into new programs
within the State Department and some agencies such as USIA are later combined into
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larger programs such as the Internal Communication Agency (Act 1998). Moving issue
areas into different departments, creating and recreating mission statements is just the
way governments try to adjust to changing demands (Arndt 2006, Cull 2003). In term of
budget allocations, moving budget items into different department or program happens
frequently. The historical overview of this dissertation revealed that cultural programs,
for instance, have been moved multiple times within the State Department’s various
bureaus (Arndt 2006). This analysis also revealed that in 2001 as a result of 9/11 a new
policy orientation of the U.S. government increased the reliance and funding of nation
building projects in post-conflict areas (Marks and Lamb 2012). This increase also leads
to higher soft power use and enhanced alliance building in the targeted region.

Figure 6.2 Program-Level Budget Information for Selected Department of State Related
Programs and Agencies
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And while the U.S. total budget allocated for soft power programs are not high
compared to its hard power allocations (Schneider 2005, Pigman 2010) it is one of the
key findings of this dissertation that while the American government’s allocation of a
minimum of 2% of total federal budget does not match its military spending (over 20%),
but compared to other countries’ soft power programs it is a consistent and significant
funding. In New Zealand for instance, there is less than 0.5% of the total budget allocated
for soft power initiatives.
The increasing numbers speak for themselves. Just as Nye suggested in a hearing
at the Committee on Foreign Relations (2008b), the U.S. government considers the soft
parts of power and allocates money for democratization and developments. The stability
and the long history of the soft power institutions also indicate the government’s
consistent strategic use of soft power tools. Another important observation about the soft
power budget allocation is that it remained consistent with the lowest budget allocated in
1997 and 1998 with only $15 billion, and the highest budget provided in 2007 with $74
billion including the contingency operations, which constituted a budget spike (Jones et.
at 2009).
In addition, the evidence of path dependency can also be discovered in relations to
the timespan and budget allocated. As Pierson (2000) explained path dependency, once a
budget item or program is introduced it is likely to continue due to a relative benefit of
the existing program. In this increasing return process, the probability of taking steps
towards the same path increases with each step taken into that same direction (Piearson
2000). In other words, in terms of soft power use, since 1938 the U.S. created institutions
and allocated budget to support its soft power actions. These programs remain funded
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over time as doing so was relatively easier and cheaper than stopping the existing
programs and starting new ones. Also, the idea of alliance building for national security
reasons and the need to strengthen global leadership remained locked into the listed
government programs’ mission statements.
Overall, all these programs were created to spread U.S. influence around the
world starting in 1938. This indicates a strong motivation not only to continue to use soft
power instruments but also to create new ways to reach out to people in other countries.
These programs continued to survive because the U.S. has also continued to rely on them
to advance its interest. Also, these programs play a role in solving international problems
using cost-effective tools such as economic aid (Clinton 2010, McGarry and Epstein
2019). This analysis confirmed what has been revealed many times (Schneider 2005,
Pigman 2010, Nye 2011) soft power instruments are cheaper than hard power tools. The
fact that most of these programs still exists today is a strong indicator that the U.S.
government is planning to rely on soft power actions in the long-term (US Budget 2020).
The budget documents also revealed that the mission statements include the desire
for American global leadership. While in the 1960s, economic assistant was needed, in
the 1990s, it was democracy building in Europe and in the 2000s defeating global
terrorism were the main budget items of the American government. In all these cases, the
American political elite envisioned U.S. global leadership in these listed issues and
Congress allocated the funds. Ultimately the high soft power spending lead to high soft
power reliance in foreign policy.
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6.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter discovered indicators that the statistical analysis missed. The
underlying question was what factors led to the American high soft power use outcome
when the theorized social trust was only at a medium level? The American case study
provided the following answers: First, the U.S. leaders perceived a strong geopolitical
threat since the Cold War and later after 9/11. These perceived threats were geographic
as well as ideological. Second, in order to stop the Soviet Union from spreading and
terrorism from attacking, a strong national security focused narrative became part of the
political elite’s narrative and policy recommendations. This narrative encouraged a
form of a defense mechanism based on alliance building. The strong alliance building
efforts (balancing) also ensured the high reliance on soft power instruments. This analysis
also revealed that the political elite also supported a strong American global leadership
role in the new world order for the same reason. Both of these policy directions resulted
in high soft power use.
Third, the history of American government programs revealed that since 1938,
the U.S. government intentionally created programs which were designed to spread U.S.’
influence via attraction. In addition, the consistent alliance building, and global
leadership mission of these programs has also been revealed. This means that in the U.S.
the political elite’s narrative supported the use of soft power tools in order to balance
against the perceived threats. This also led to high soft power use in foreign policy.
Fourth, the budget distribution of the U.S. government’s soft power programs
also confirmed that only some of the budget changes dynamically with policy changes
(Jones et al 2009). Thus, the soft power budget and the idea to use attraction abroad are
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path-dependent and the American government continues to rely on them since 1938.
Also, by studying the patterns of soft power budgets, this analysis showed that the
smaller soft power programs continue to run without disturbance or spikes while the
major programs that receive the most funding react to policy changes in the form of
budget spikes. This means that, as Pierson (2000) explained, steps taken into one
direction become self-enforcing because the relative benefits of continuing the same path
is higher than starting something new. Increasing returns processes ensure that the
American soft power programs communicating attractiveness abroad continue to live on
and get funded. Therefore, the U.S. soft power institutions’ budget are path-dependent,
strong and stable.
As the consistent funding of soft power programs together with the mission
statements of the programs also revealed, the U.S. government continues to fund
programs that strengthens its global leadership role. By relying on a high level of soft
power actions the U.S. continues to work on achieving its ambitious global agenda.
Stated differently, one of the findings of this chapter is that the U.S. government has had
an inspiration to become a global leader and has been consistently creating soft power
programs and allocating budget to support such a cause. While this a unique aspect in
studying countries’ soft power actions as most countries do not seem to desire a global
leadership role, this is an important factor in American soft power use and sheds light on
the soft power use of a critical case. This also means that learning about the strategic soft
power selectin of the strongest soft power user country in the world (in the number of soft
power actions per year) also confirms my new theory about the importance of geopolitics
in countries soft power use.
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This budget analysis also revealed spikes in soft power allocation in 1999, 2004
and in 2007. These spikes indicate a policy move in favor of supporting soft power
actions and programs. Since this analysis ends in 2010, a longer time-series is needed to
reveal more about this uncovered budget increase and possible policy changed with soft
power use. In general, the U.S. soft power budget has been found consistent with a slight
increase.
In conclusion, based on the findings of this chapter, the U.S. government’s
geopolitical threat combined with its global leadership ambition are the key factors in
its high level of soft power use. In addition, the institutional factors pointed to the
willingness to use more soft power to achieve foreign policy goals. It seems that the
perception of threat is a much stronger indicator of the U.S.’s soft power actions than
social trust. The examined new factors of the American case study point to a quantitative
testing of the new variables. If they are found statistically significant, those will
strengthen future quantitative analysis of countries’ soft power use.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RELEVANCE
This dissertation started out by comparing a constructivist approach of
democracies’ social trust’s impacting their soft power uses, to realist approaches of
resources and institutions. While social trust could not produce strong answers to why
some democracies use more soft power than others, nor did the realist explanations of
resources or institutions. Therefore, the real finding of this dissertation was answering the
question, what else could explain democracies’ soft power use? The case studies of this
analysis revealed that different countries construct their soft power use differently to
achieve their goals as a reaction to geopolitical threat.
More specifically, my quantitative approach revealed that social trust was not the
main indicator of democracies’ soft power use. While social trust was positively
correlated with countries’ soft power use, the statistical analysis showed that it only
explained a small amount of the soft power use variation, therefore new indicators had to
be explored. The quantitative multifactor analysis revealed that military alliances was
statistically significant factor in countries soft power reliance. In order to learn more
about its impact, I turned to three case studies.
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The three case studies revealed two independent variables that were driving soft
power use. In Finland and in the U.S., geopolitical threat led to high soft power use to an
exceptionally high level. In addition, in the critical case of the U.S., the desire to be a
global leader also drove American soft power use. Both of these countries turned to soft
power use in order to create alliances as a defense mechanism and the U.S. also used it to
strengthen its global leadership role. Overall, the case studies concluded that different
countries create their foreign policy differently in order to achieve their foreign policies.
In the case of Finland where Russia has been posing a geopolitical threat, soft
power was used to mitigate the aggressive neighbor and to strengthen global alliances to
preserve the Finnish independence. In this carefully constructed Finnish foreign policy,
the political elite continued to emphasize the need to reach out to Western Europe and to
the rest of the world in order to strengthen their cultural and political bonds as well as
protect Finland with strong alliances against Russia. And while the concept of soft power
was coined by an American scholar, and soft power scholarship does not focus on
countries’ soft power use before 1990, the Finnish case study also revealed that Finland
might have been using soft power before the U.S. did. If that is the case, Finland might be
one of the first users of soft power in the world.
The budget description of the Finnish soft power programs and the foreign policy
analysis articles confirmed geopolitics’ enhancing effect on Finish soft power use, where
balancing against Russia led to the Finnish high soft power reliance. Stated differently, in
Finland, geopolitics made the political elite create a narrative that emphasized the
continued national security threat, which resulted in both political and institutional
commitments to high soft power use.
180

In the case of the U.S. the Cold War’s perceived ideological and territorial threats
from the Soviet Union also boosted American soft power use all over the world. From
jazz diplomacy to the Marshall plan, from the Fulbright program to the creation of the
Institute of Peace, the American government has invested lots of money and effort into
government programs that make America more attractive. As a result of the Soviet
geopolitical threat, the U.S. constructed a foreign policy that included showcasing the
attractive aspects of the American way of life as well as created programs that would
send financial assistance to countries in need.
The crucial case study of the U.S. also revealed another boosting factor in the
form of the desire to be a global power. This independent variable also greatly boosts soft
power use, especially since the Cold War, the U.S. has been relying on demonstrating the
world the attractiveness of the American life trough government programs. This goal has
also become a large part of U.S. foreign policy, which supports American use of cultural,
educational and economic tools to spread American way of life all over the world.
Finally, in the case of New Zealand, this study confirmed that countries construct
their foreign policies according to their needs and circumstances. Since there was no
imminent geopolitical threat or the desire to be a global leader, New Zealand’s use soft
power serves a different reason and as a result it is used to a lower degree then Finland.
As the most similar case design revealed, New Zealand uses its soft power to strengthen
its position in the regional market.
Further, New Zealand’s main reason to use soft power is its desire to strengthen its
regional economic relationship. In this case, the political elite’s narrative pointed to the
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strengthening of economic and social ties in the Pacific region and the budget allocation
supports such goals. Having mostly regional economic goals resulted in New Zealand’s
low soft power use. There was an interesting foreign policy shift in New Zealand in 2006
uncovered by this dissertation. With the leadership of Prime Minister Clark, in New
Zealand’s started to invest more money into soft power programs in foreign policy as
well as started promoting New Zealand more actively not just to the regional but also
globally. This policy shift suggest that New Zealand will prioritize its global engagement
more and therefore will rely on soft power to a higher degree in the future.
Overall, both the new conceptualization and the new operationalization of soft
power actions provided scholars a new way to study soft power and test new hypotheses
in foreign policy. The discovered five new indicators (geopolitics, narrative of the
political elite, soft power programs, soft power budget and global leadership inspiration)
should be further tested in large n quantitative models to reveal their impact on countries’
soft power use.
7.1 POLICY RELEVANCE

Scholars traditionally analyze conflict or the lack of conflict (peace) and they fail
to include the application of soft power as a policy choice even though my analysis
showed that 80% of all international interactions are soft power action between countries.
Knowing the patterns of soft power selection, academics and scholars will be able to
better understand why leaders make certain decisions with respect to their foreign
policies.
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One interesting result of this analysis was that even though one of Finland’s
strongest soft power resource is its education, the government does not use it to promote
its foreign policy goals. The mission statements of the education budget-items did not
reveal any foreign policy goals for Finnish education programs. This is a subject area
where Finland could strengthen its soft power use abroad.
In New Zealand the recent increase soft power budget and the creation of a new
soft power programs such as the China Free Trade Agreement in 2008, the Rugby
Diplomacy and the TV co-production agreement with China in 2011 all indicates that
New Zealand might be increasingly using its soft power to enhance its regional market
share. However, in order to be successful in soft power use, the government of New
Zealand has to coordinate its foreign policy goals well and clear with its ministries and
programs so they can all work towards the same foreign policy outcomes.
Finally, while historically the U.S. stood out as the leading soft power user, this
dissertation revealed that many other countries rely on soft power as well. For the U.S. to
remain a leading soft power user, the government needs to better coordinate its programs
with the country’s foreign policy goals. In terms of non-democracies, future research
needs to look into their soft power use patterns. There is a strong possibility that today,
the non-democracies are the main soft power users on the global stage.
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APPENDIX A
SOFT AND HARD POWER RE-CODING
The re-coding of the CAMEO mediation dataset is based on the following:
Soft power actions=1
Hard power actions=2
I used MySQL to recode the ICEWS dataset. All events that I re-classified as soft power
actions were recoded as 1. All events that were re-classify as hard power action received
2. In cases where it could not be decided for sure if the action was taken to create
attractiveness or coerce, or the action was taken towards a third party, these were dropped
from the dataset.
Dropped cases:
1) When the description of the event is more specific, but the giver or initiator state’s
intentions such as coercing of building attractiveness cannot be determined. For
instance, 1.11 decline comment, 2.241 appeal for changing leadership or 2.244
appeal for military cooperation.
2) If the initiator state is asking a third party to do something. This action does not
provide me information about the initiator’s action.
Note: When governments only talk about doing something (express intent, demand,
appeal for etc.) those actions are all coded as diplomatic actions.
Dropped events:
dropped from soft power
11

decline comment

12

make a pessimistic comment

13

make an optimistic comment

16

reject or deny responsibility

24

appeal for political reform

26

appeals to others to meet or negotiate

28

appeal to others to engage in or accept mediation
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34

express intent to institute political reform

52

defend verbally

53

rally support on behalf of

75

grant asylum

90

Investigate

241

appeal for leadership change

242

appeal for policy change

244

appeal for change in institutions or regime

251

appeal for easing administrative sanction

254

appeal to easing economic sanctions, boycott or embargo

341

express intent to change leadership

342

express intent to change policy

831

accede to demands for change in political leadership

832

accede to demand for policy change

834

accede to demands for institutional or regime change

dropped from hard power
101

demand material cooperation

104

demand political reform

105

demand that target yield

113

rally opposition against

114

complain officially

120

Reject

123

reject request or demand for political reform

128

defy norms, law

141

demonstrate or rally
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1014

demand intelligence cooperation

1041

demand leadership change

1042

demand policy change

1222

reject request for military aid

1224

reject request for military protection or peacekeeping

1231

reject request to change leadership

1232

reject request to change policy

1411

demonstrate or rally for leadership change

1412

demonstrate or rally for policy change

1622

reduce or stop military assistance

Soft Power Events Coded:

34

1034

make a public statement

14

consider policy option

15

acknowledge or claim responsibility

17

engage in symbolic act

18

make empathetic comment

19

express accord

20

make and appeal or request

21

appeal for material cooperation

22

appeal for diplomatic cooperation

23

appeal for material aid

27

appeal to others to settle dispute

30

express intent to cooperate

31

express intent to engage in material cooperation

32

express intent to cooperate diplomatically

Bold indicates the most commonly used events.
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33

express intent to provide material aid

35

express intent to yield

36

express intent to meet and negotiate

37

express intent to settle dispute

38

express intent to accept mediation

39

express intent to mediate

40

Consult

41

discuss by telephone

42

make a visit

43

host a visit

44

meet at a third location

45

engage in mediation

46

engage in negotiation

50

engage in diplomatic cooperation

51

praise or endorse

54

grant diplomatic recognition

55

Apologize

56

Forgive

57

sign formal agreement

60

engage in material cooperation

61

cooperate economically

63

engage in judicial cooperation

64

share intelligence or information

70

provide aid

71

provide economic aid

73

provide humanitarian aid

74

provide military protection or peacekeeping
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80

yield

81

ease administrative sanctions

82

ease political dissent

83

accede to request for political reform

84

return or release

85

ease economic sanctions, boycott or embargo

86

allow international involvement

87

de-escalate military engagement

91

investigate crime or corruption

92

investigate human rights abuse

93

investigate military action

94

investigate war crimes

212

appeal for military cooperation

213

appeal for judicial cooperation

214

appeal for intelligence cooperation

233

appeal for humanitarian aid

234

appeal for military protection or peacekeeping

243

appeal for rights

253

appeal for release of person or property

255

appeal to allow international involvement

311

express intent to cooperate economically

313

express intent to cooperate in judicial matters

314

express intent to cooperate on intelligence

331

express intent to provide economic aid

333

express intent to provide humanitarian aid

334

express intent to provide military protection or
peacekeeping

212

343

express intent to provide rights

351

express intent to ease administrative sanctions

352

express intent to ease popular dissent

353

express intent to release person or property

354

express intent to ease economic sanctions, boycott on
embargo

355

express intent to allow international involvement

356

express intent to de-escalate military involvement

811

ease restrictions on political freedoms

812

ease ban on political parties or politicians

813

ease curfew

814

ease state of emergency or martial law

833

accede to demands for rights

841

return or release persons

842

return or release property

861

receive deployment of peacekeepers

862

receive inspectors

863

allow for humanitarian access

871

declare truce, cease fire

872

ease military blockade

873

demobilize armed forces

874

retreat or surrender military

Hard Power Events Coded:
72

provide military aid

100

Demand

102

demand for diplomatic cooperation

103

demand material aid

213

106

demand meeting

107

demand settling of dispute

108

demand mediation

110

Disapprove

111

criticize or denounce

112

Accuse

115

bring lawsuit against

116

find guilty or liable

121

reject material cooperation

122

reject request or demand for material aid

124

refuse to yield

125

reject proposal to meet

126

reject mediation

127

reject plan, agreement to settle dispute

129

Veto

130

Threaten

131

threaten, non-force

132

threaten with administrative sanctions

133

threaten political dissent

134

threaten to halt negotiations

135

threaten to halt mediation

136

threaten to halt international involvement

137

threaten with repression

138

threaten with military force

139

give ultimatum

140

engage in political dissent

142

conduct hunger strike
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143

conduct strike or boycott

144

obstruct passage or block

145

protest violently or riot

150

demonstrate military or police power

151

reduce relations

152

increase military alert status

153

mobilize or increase police power

154

mobilize or increase armed forces

160

reduce relations

161

reduce or break diplomatic relations

162

reduce or stop material aid

163

impose embargo, boycott or sanctions

164

halt negotiations

166

expel or withdraw

170

Coerce

171

seize or damage property

172

impose administrative sanctions

173

arrest, detain or change with legal action

174

expel or deport individuals

175

use tactics of violent repression

180

use unconventional violence

181

abduct, hijack, or take hostage

182

physical assault

183

conduct suicide, car or other non-military bombing

184

Use human shield

185

attempt to assassinate

186

Assassinate
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190

use conventional military force

191

impose blockade, restrict movement

192

occupy territory

193

fight with small arms and light weapons

194

fight with artillery and tanks

195

employ aerial weapons

196

violate cease fire

201

engage in mass expulsion

1011

demand economic cooperation

1012

demand military cooperation

1013

demand judicial cooperation

1031

demand economic aid

1032

demand military aid

1033

demand humanitarian aid

1034

demand military protection or peacekeeping

1043

demand rights

1044

demand change in institutions and regime

1051

demand easing of administrative sanctions

1052

demand easing political dissent

1053

demand release of person or property

1054

demand easing economic boycott, embargo or sanctions

1055

demand to allow international involvement

1056

demand de-escalation of military engagement

1121

accuse of crime corruption

1122

accuse of human rights abuses

1123

accuse of aggression

1124

accuse of war crimes

216

1125

accuse of espionage

1211

reject economic cooperation

1213

reject judicial cooperation

1214

reject intelligence cooperation

1221

reject request for economic aid

1223

reject request for humanitarian aid

1233

reject request for rights

1234

reject request for change in institution or regime

1241

refuse to ease administrative sanctions

1242

refuse to popular dissent

1243

refuse to release person or property

1244

refuse to ease economic sanctions, boycott or embargo

1245

refuse to allow international involvement

1246

refuse to de-escalate military engagement

1311

threaten to reduce or stop aid

1312

threaten to boycott, embargo or sanction

1313

threaten to reduce or break relations

1321

threaten with restrictions on political freedoms

1381

threaten with blockade

1382

threaten occupation

1383

threaten unconventional attack

1384

threaten conventional attack

1385

threaten unconventional mass violence
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APPENDIX B
SOFT POWER RANKING (2010)
Comparison between McClory’s ranking and my ranking for the year 2010
McClory’s Soft Power Ranking 2010

My Ranking 2010 Democracies

1. France and UK

1. USA

3. USA

2. Japan

4. Germany

3. India

5. Switzerland

4. S. Korea

6. Sweden

5. UK

7. Denmark

6. Australia

8. Australia

7. Mexico

9. Finland

8. Brazil

10. Netherlands

9. Germany
10. Argentina
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My Ranking 2010 for All Countries
1. USA
2. China
3. Russia
4. Japan
5. India
6. Iran
7. Turkey
8. South Korea
9. UK
10. Nigeria
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APPENDIX C
LATENT SOCIAL TRUST
Indicators for Measurement Model (Justwan et al. 2018 Table 2 p.153)
Indicator type and name

Survey-based measures
General Trust Question
General Trust Question
Institutional correlates
Political rights

Political rights (nonlinear effect)
Corruption
Bureaucratic quality
Judicial independence
Non-currency
money/total money
supply
Civil liberties
Institutional
effectiveness
Former soviet country

Data source

Value
range

World values 0.03–0.74
survey
Barometers
0.02–0.75

Exp.
(a)

Indicator
relationship to
social trust
suggested by

+
+

Polity IV
(Marshall &
Jaggers,
2002)
Polity IV
(squared)
Transparency
International
(2017)
ICRG (PRS
Group, 2015)
Cingranelli
et al. (2014)
Clague et al.
(1999)

−10 to 10

+

0–100

+

You (2012)

0.40–10

+

You (2012)

0.04–1.00

+

0–2

+

0.03–0.99

+

Freedom
House
(2017)
Elgin and
Oztunali
(2012)
hand-coded

1-7

_

0.08–1.13

_

0-1

-
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Delhey and Newton
(2005)

Rothstein and Stolle
(2008)
Rothstein and Stolle
(2008)
Baliamoune-Lutz
(2011)
Delhey and Newton
(2005)
Rothstein and Stolle
(2008)
Bjørnskov (2006)

Social-psychological
correlates
Protestantism
Income Inequality Gini
index
Ethnic fractionalization

La Porta et
al. (1999)
(World
Bank, 2015)
Fearon and
Laitin (2003)

0–97.80

World Bank
(2015)
World Bank
(2015)
World Bank
(2015)
World Bank
(2015)
World Bank
(2015)

1.08–9.22

+

0–98.11

+

15.90–
73.90
0.01–1.00

+
_
_

Delhey and Newton
(2005)
Rothstein and
Uslaner (2005)
Delhey and Newton
(2005)

Biological/environmental
correlates
Fertility rate
Environmentally
protected areas
Size of female
population
Prevalence of
malnourishment
Water pollution

24.26–
55.85
5.00–
70.00
0.09–0.45

+
_
_

Zak and Fakhar
(2006)
Zak and Fakhar
(2006)
Zak and Fakhar
(2006)
Zak and Fakhar
(2006)
Zak and Fakhar
(2006)

(a)Expectation for the relationship between a given indicator and the estimated latent
trust variable.
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APPENDIX D
LIST OF SOFT POWER DEPARTMENTS AND PROGRAMS IN FINLAND
(AS BUDGET ITEMS 1995-2010)
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

The Foreign Service
Civilian Crisis Management
Neighboring area cooperation
International development cooperation
Commercial-industrial cooperation
Cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and other CIS countries
Neighboring area cooperation
Other expenditure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration

Selected Items from the Ministry of Education and Culture
1.
2.
3.
4.

International cooperation
Art and culture
The Sports Department
Cultural, museum and library activities

222

APPENDIX E
LIST OF SOFT POWER DEPARTMENTS AND PROGRAMS IN NEW ZEALAND
(AS BUDGET ITEMS 1995-2010)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (selected programs) (MFAT)
1. Administration of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities
2. Consular Services
3. Pacific Security Fund
4. Policy Advice and Representation - International Institutions
5. Policy Advice and Representation - Other Countries
6. Policy Advice and Representation - Other Countries PLA
7. Pacific Cooperation Foundation
8. Promotion of Asian Skills and Relationships
9. Subscriptions to International Organizations
10. Promotional Activities - Other Countries
11. International Radio Services
12. Hosting of Pacific Islands Forum Meeting
Ministry for Culture and Heritage (selected programs) (MCH)
1. Cultural Diplomacy International Program
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APPENDIX F
LIST OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PROGRAMS
IN 2001
FOREIGN AFFAIRS BY FUNCTION (150-155)
A. Administration of Foreign Affairs
Diplomatic & Consular Programs (D&CP)
D&CP Worldwide Security Upgrades
Salaries & Expenses (S&E)
Capital Investment Fund (CIF)
Technology Fund
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
International Information Programs (IIP)
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance:
Worldwide Security Upgrades
Other State Programs:
Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs
Representation Allowances
Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service
Payment to the American Institute in Taiwan
State Office of the Inspector General
Repatriation Loans Program Account
F.S. Retirement and Disability Fund
B. International Organizations
Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA)
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO)
UN Arrearage Payments (CIO/CIPA)
C. Related Programs
The Asia Foundation
East-West Center
North-South Center
National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
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Commission on International Religious Freedom
Eisenhower/Israeli-Arab Exchange Programs
National Commission on Terrorism
D. Supplemental Appropriations
Balkans and Southeast Europe /5
E. Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)
International Broadcasting Operations
Broadcasting to Cuba
Broadcasting Capital Improvements
F. Other Programs
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
Holocaust Assets Commission
International Trade Commission
II. Foreign Operations (Including Wye)
Title I - Export and Investment Assistance
Export-Import Bank (EXIM)
Export-Import Bank - Loan Subsidy
Export-Import Bank - Administrative Expenses
Export-Import Bank - Direct Loans, Negative Subsidies
Subtotal, Export-Import Bank
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
Administrative Expenses for Credit & Insurance Programs
Net Offsetting Collections
Credit Funding - Direct & Guaranteed Loan Subsidies
Subtotal, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Trade and Development Agency (TDA)
Title II - Bilateral Economic Assistance
U.S. Agency for International Development
Sustainable Development
Child Survival & Diseases Fund /3
Development Assistance (DA) /3
Development Fund for Africa (DFA)
Development Credit Authority
Central American/Caribbean
Emergency Disaster Recovery Fund
International Disaster Assistance
Micro and Small Enterprise Development - Subsidy
Micro and Small Enterprise Development - Admin. Exp.
Urban and Environmental Credit Program - Subsidy
Urban and Environmental Credit Program - Admin. Exp.
Development Credit Program Subsidy
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Development Credit Program Administrative Expenses
USAID Operating Expenses
USAID Inspector General Operating Expenses
Other Bilateral Economic Assistance
Economic Support Fund (ESF) - w/ Fund for Ireland
Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (SEED)
Asst. for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSA /NIS)
Independent Agency
Peace Corps
Inter-American Foundation /3
African Development Foundation /3
State Department
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INC)
Assistance to Plan Colombia
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)
U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA)
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining & Related Prog. (NADR)
Department of the Treasury
Treasury Technical Assistance
Debt Restructuring
Title III - Military Assistance
International Military Education & Training (IMET)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF)
Title IV - Multilateral Economic Assistance
International Financial Institutions
Global Environment Facility (GEF)
International Development Association
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) - Ordinary Capital
Inter-American Development Bank - Fund for Special Operations
Asian Development Bank
Asian Development Fund
African Development Fund
African Development Bank
European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD)
IADB - Multilateral Investment Fund
Inter-American Investment Corporation
MDB Arrears
International Organizations & Programs (IO&P) /3
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Supplemental and Advance Appropriations
Assistance to Plan Colombia
Balkans and Southeast Europe /5
Debt Restructuring (HIPC)
Wye and Egypt Supplemental
Total, Wye & Egypt Supplemental
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
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APPENDIX G
LIST OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS IN 2010
FOREIGN AFFAIRS BY FUNCTION (150-155)
A. Administration of Foreign Affairs
Diplomatic and Consular Programs
Capital Investment Fund
Border Security Program
Working Capital Fund
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance
Conflict Stabilization Operations
Office of Inspector General
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs
Representation Allowances
Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service
Buying Power Maintenance Account
Repatriation Loans Program Account
Payment to the American Institute in Taiwan
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund
B. International Organizations
Contributions to International Organizations
Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities
C. Related Programs
The Asia Foundation
Center for Middle Eastern
Western Dialogue
Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship Program
Israeli Arab
Scholarship Program
East-West Center
National Endowment for Democracy
D. Related Agencies
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Broadcasting Board of Governors
International Broadcasting Operations
Broadcasting Capital Improvements
United States Institute of Peace
FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND RELATED PROGRAMS
II. United States Agency for International Development
USAID Operating Expenses
USAID Capital Investment Fund
USAID Inspector General Operating Expenses
III. Bilateral Economic Assistance
Global Health Programs
Development Assistance
International Disaster Assistance
Transition Initiatives
Complex Crises Fund
Development Credit Authority
Economic Support Fund
Migration and
Refugee Assistance
U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund
Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund
B. Independent Agencies
Peace Corps
Millennium Challenge Corporation
Inter-American Foundation
African Development Foundation
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APPENDIX H
USIA PROGRAMS (1990-1997)
1. Overseas Missions
2. Bureau of Broadcasting
3. Radio Free Asia
4. Educational and Cultural Affairs
5. Policy guidance and program support
6. Bureau of Information
7. Agency direction and management
8. Administrative support from other agencies
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APPENDIX I
USAID PROGRAMS
(WWW.USAID.GOV)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Agriculture and Food Security
Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
Economic Growth and Trade
Education
Environment and Global Climate Change
Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
Global Health
Science, Technology and Innovation
Water and Sanitation
Working in Crises and Conflict
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